Education and economic inequalities by Theodore M. Mitrakos
BANK  OF  GREECE
Economic  Bulletin























































4BANK  OF  GREECE
Economic  Bulletin
Number  23,  July  2004BANK OF GREECE
21, E. Venizelos Avenue
102 50 Athens
www.bankofgreece.gr
Economic Research Department - Secretariat
Tel. +30210 320 2392
Fax  +30210 323 3025
Printed in Athens, Greece
at the Bank of Greece Printing Works
ISSN 1105 - 9729Contents  EMU strategies for new Member States:
the role of Exchange Rate Mechanism II
Theodoros S. Papaspyrou 7
Education and economic inequalities
Theodore M. Mitrakos 27
Gender wage differentials in Greece
Evangelia Papapetrou 47
Working Papers 65
Monetary policy and financial system
supervision measures 75
Decisions of the Bank of Greece 77
Statistical section 95
Articles published in previous issues of
the Economic Bulletin 121ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 23   7/04 6EMU strategies
for new Member States:






Once EU enlargement was completed on 1 May
2004, the issue of preparation of new Member
States  for  euro  area  membership  has  occupied
centre stage in economic policy discussions. This
paper reviews the institutional and economic pol-
icy framework faced by the new Member States
and examines the main analytical aspects and pol-
icy issues related to the preparation for euro area
membership.  Against  the  background  of  past
experience,1 and in the light of EU rules, the role
of Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) in the
convergence effort of the new Member States is
examined.  Key  aspects  of  the  mechanism  are
analysed,  including  the  appropriate  timing  and
duration of participation in ERM II, intervention in
the foreign exchange markets to defend central
rates,  the  practical  significance  of  the  Balassa-
Samuelson effect, fiscal adjustment as well as exit
strategies from existing regimes.
The choice of monetary and exchange rate strate-
gies can be expected to both influence the timing
of ERM II entry and the outcome of the whole
effort to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria.
This paper examines the conditions under which
different monetary frameworks could ensure both
price and exchange rate stability.
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* Helpful comments by Vassilis Droucopoulos, Heather Gibson,
Isaac Sabethai and George Tavlas are gratefully acknowledged.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Greece.
1 An analysis of the main lessons to be drawn from past conver-
gence experience, notably that of Greece, the most recent mem-
ber of the euro area, is provided in T. Papaspyrou: “EMU strate-
gies: lessons from past experience in view of EU enlargement”,
Bank of Greece, Working Paper No. 11, March 2004. Also, analy-
sis of Greece’s monetary and exchange rate strategy in the drive
to  EMU  is  supplied  in  “Greece’s  economic  performance  and
prospects”, Bank of Greece and The Brookings Institution, 2001.Particular attention is paid to policy issues and
the risks associated with the free movement of
capital.  The  risk  of  destabilising  capital  move-
ments  can  be  considerably  reduced  by  the
implementation  of  sound  and  consistent  eco-
nomic policies. Moreover, monetary authorities
have at their disposal instruments to cope with
the undesirable effects of massive capital move-
ments in the short term, while more sustainable
solutions  are  introduced  by  adapting  policies
and improving the policy mix over the medium-
to-long term.
Finally, it emerges from the analysis that existing
Community  institutions,  rules  and  mechanisms
provide a helpful framework to guide the conver-
gence effort of new Member States towards EMU.
It is therefore essential that full use is made by
new  Member  States  of  the  institutions,  mecha-
nisms and assistance available through EU instru-
ments in order to enter EMU under the best pos-
sible conditions.
2. New Member States and the
EU institutional and policy framework
From the date of accession, EU rules on economic
and budgetary policy also apply to new Member
States, which “shall regard their economic poli-
cies  as  a  matter  of  common  concern”.2 This
implies that new Member States:
ñ will participate in the mechanisms for multilat-
eral surveillance and co-ordination of economic
policies,  implemented  through  the  Broad
Economic  Policy  Guidelines  and  the  Stability
and  Growth  Pact,  thus  influencing  economic
policy decisions at EU level, and;
ñ will have to comply with rules prohibiting mon-
etary financing and privileged access of govern-
ments to funds from financial institutions, as well
as with rules specifying that the Community or
Member  States  shall  not  assume  the  commit-
ments of any Member State3 (no bail out).
New Member States are expected to join the euro
area, as no opt-out clause exists for any of them
similar  to  that  for  the  United  Kingdom  and
Denmark.  Indeed,  all  new  Member  States  have
declared their intention to adopt the euro as soon
as is economically feasible, and some of them plan
to join ERM II soon after their accession to the EU.4
With  regard  to  euro  membership,  the  new
Member States have the status of “Member States
with  a  derogation”.5 This  means  that  from  the
date of accession to the EU, they are members of
the European System of Central Banks and partic-
ipate in certain bodies of the European Central
Bank,  such  as  the  General  Council  —a  key
responsibility of which is to monitor the operation
of ERM II — but they are not involved in the for-
mulation and implementation of monetary policy
for the euro area. The status of Member States
with a derogation will cease once they become
members of the euro area.
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 23   7/04 8
2 Article 99 of the Treaty establishing the European Community
(thereafter EC Treaty).
3 These provisions, of Articles 101 to 103 of the EC Treaty, apply
to all members of the EU, regardless of their participation or not
in the monetary union. They are, however, even more important
for the smooth operation of EMU.
4 The Estonian kroon, the Lithuanian lita and the Slovenian tolar
were included in ERM II on 27 June 2004, with the following cen-
tral rates: 1 euro = 15,6466 kroon, 1 euro = 3,45280 litas and
1 euro = 239,640 tolar, and with the standard fluctuation band
±15%.  According  to  the  EU  Communiqué  of  27  June  2004,
Estonia and Lithuania are joining ERM II with their existing cur-
rency board arrangements in place, as a unilateral commitment,
thus placing no additional obligations on the ECB.
5 Article 122 of the EC Treaty.A precondition for euro membership is fulfilment of
the  Maastricht  convergence  criteria  on  inflation,
interest rates, fiscal performance and exchange rate
stability, as well as harmonisation of each Member
State’s legislation with the Treaty and the Statute of
the ESCB. The latter concerns, in particular, national
legislation ensuring central bank independence.
Exchange rate developments and policies during
the  transition  towards  the  single  currency  have
been the subject of specific references in Com-
munity legislation, as currency movements could
affect the functioning of the single European mar-
ket. Specifically, in the transition to the euro, each
Member State must treat its exchange rate policy
as a matter of common interest.6 Moreover, the
European  Council  Resolution  of  Amsterdam7
states that the single market must not be endan-
gered by real exchange rate misalignments, or by
excessive  nominal  exchange  rate  fluctuations
between the euro and the other EU currencies,
which  would  disrupt  trade  flows  between
Member States, and, further, that the surveillance
of Member States’ macroeconomic policies will
be organised with a view to avoiding such mis-
alignments or fluctuations.
ERM II is the framework for monitoring and assess-
ing exchange rate stability and the sustainability of
central  rates.  In  implementing  these  tasks,  the
mechanism is expected to play a key role in the EU
surveillance  and  co-ordination  mechanisms,  in
combination with other key instruments such as
convergence  programmes.  Several  references  in
Community legislation specify the role of ERM II:
ñ According to the Amsterdam Resolution and the
Agreement8 between the ECB and central banks
of Member States participating in ERM II, the
mechanism  will  help  to  ensure  that  Member
States outside the euro area participating in the
mechanism orient their policies towards stabil-
ity, foster convergence and thereby help them in
their efforts to adopt the euro.
ñ In the above Resolution, it is specified that ERM
II will help to protect Member States outside
the euro area and Member States adopting the
euro from unwarranted pressures in the foreign
exchange  markets.  In  such  cases  the  mecha-
nism  may  assist  Member  States  outside  the
euro area participating in it, when their curren-
cies come under pressure, to combine appro-
priate policy responses, including interest rate
measures, with coordinated intervention.
ñ Furthermore,  economic  and  monetary  policy
objectives  presented  in  convergence  pro-
grammes9 —which  are  key  means  in  defining
convergence strategies and monitoring progress
towards EMU— will have to be compatible with
ERM  II  exchange  rate  stability  requirements.
Thus,  for  Member  States  participating  in  the
mechanism, policies should be oriented to sta-
bility. For those outside, policies need to avoid
real exchange rate misalignments and excessive
nominal exchange rate fluctuations.
EMU strategies for new Member States: the role of Exchange Rate Mechanism II
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6 Article 124 of the EC Treaty.
7 Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of an
exchange rate mechanism in the third stage of EMU, Amsterdam,
16 June 1997, OJ C 236, 2 August 1997, p. 5.
8 Agreement of 1 September 1998, as last amended on 29 April
2004,  between  the  ECB  and  the  national  central  banks  of  the
Member States outside the euro area laying down the operating
procedures  for  an  exchange  rate  mechanism  in  stage  three  of
EMU, OJ C 236, 2 August 1997, OJ C 362, 16 December 2000,
and OJ C 135, 13 May 2004.
9 For  provisions  governing  convergence  programmes,  see
Council Regulation No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 “On the strength-
ening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveil-
lance and coordination of economic policies”, OJ L 209, 2 August
1997.It emerges from the above that existing EU insti-
tutions, rules and mechanisms provide a consis-
tent and helpful framework to guide the conver-
gence effort of new Member States towards EMU.
Despite some recent controversies about how key
frameworks,  such  as  the  Stability  and  Growth
Pact, would be used in practice, no Member State
contested the usefulness of these frameworks in
ensuring sound and sustainable economic and fis-
cal policies for the EU and the euro area.
The next section examines in more detail the role
of ERM II in the strategies of new Member States
in preparing for EMU.
3. ERM II as a framework for guiding
convergence
This section reviews the main aspects of ERM II
and  draws  a  number  of  conclusions  about  its
expected role in guiding new Member States in
their  drive  towards  EMU,  on  the  basis  of  past
experience of the operation of the mechanism in
its various forms, taking account of the present
EU institutional framework.
ERM II replaced the European Monetary System
as from 1 January 1999.10 The mechanism links
currencies  of  Member  States  outside  the  euro
area to the euro and operates within the frame-
work of stability-oriented policies which are at
the core of economic and monetary union. An
Agreement11 between the ECB and national cen-
tral banks lays down the operating procedures for
ERM II. The mechanism is based on a central rate
of the participating currencies against the euro,
with  one  standard  fluctuation  band  of 
±15%, although narrower bands can be agreed.
Central rates, fluctuation bands and realignments
are set by common procedure involving Finance
Ministers,  the  ECB  and  national  central  bank
Governors and the Commission.12 Intervention at
the margins by the ECB and the central banks
participating in ERM II will in principle be auto-
matic  and  unlimited,  unless  it  is  deemed  to 
conflict  with  the  primary  objective  of  ensuring
price stability.
ERM II should be seen as a mechanism testing the
consistency  of  policies,  encouraging  necessary
adjustment and helping to achieve convergence. It
provides  both  more  flexibility  and  stability  com-
pared with earlier versions of the mechanism; with
the wider fluctuation bands it offers more policy
flexibility and acts as a buffer against one-way bets,
discouraging  speculative  attacks.13 It  also  offers
greater stability, as the objective of euro area mem-
bership, made credible by appropriate economic
policies  and  Community  multilateral  surveillance
mechanisms, supports convergence efforts.
ERM II rules are flexible enough so that they can
accommodate a number of exchange rate regimes
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10 The Danish krone had been the only participating currency in
ERM II, from 1 January 2001 to 27 June 2004, date at which the
Estonian kroon, the Lithuanian litas and the Slovenian tolar joined
the mechanism (see footnote 4). It is noted that the Danish krone
observes the narrow fluctuation band ±2.25%. The drachma par-
ticipated in ERM II from 1 January 1999 until 31 December 2000,
the last day before Greece joined the euro area.
11 See footnote 8.
12 “Decisions on central rates and the standard fluctuation bands
shall be taken by mutual agreement of the ministers of the euro-
area Member States, the ECB and the ministers and central bank
governors of the non-euro area Member States participating in the
new mechanism, following a common procedure involving the
European Commission, and after consultation of the Economic
and Financial Committee...” Resolution of the European Council
on the establishment of ERM II (see footnote 7).
13 Further analysis on the use of fluctuation bands in assessing
compliance  with  the  exchange  rate  criterion  is  provided  in 
T. Papaspyrou (2004).followed  by  new  Member  States.14 However,
some regimes have already been identified at this
stage as incompatible with ERM II, namely free
floating,15 crawling peg and exchange rates fixed
to currencies other than the euro. In particular,
currency board regimes linked to the euro could,
in principle, be accepted as special arrangements
within the ERM II fluctuation bands.16 Unilateral
euroisation is not considered compatible with the
Treaty.17
The guiding principle which should govern the
EU approach to new Member States’ exchange
rate  strategies  within  ERM  II  is  that  their
exchange rate regimes must be adapted to the
requirements of ERM II and not vice versa. In
practice, this would imply that, although every
effort should be made to accommodate specific
exchange  rate  regimes  (e.g.  euro-based  cur-
rency board regimes which have proven their
sustainability), this must be done on the condi-
tion that these regimes are supported by appro-
priate economic and budgetary policies agreed
by all parties concerned.
New  Member  States  have  made  significant
progress towards a fully-fledged open economy
system, in reforming the economic and financial
system and the institutions in general and in lib-
eralising capital movements. However, the sus-
tainability  of  these  reforms  has  not  yet  been
tested under the competitive pressure implied
by full EU membership and, further, under the
rigorous framework of ERM II. This is an addi-
tional  reason  why  the  convergence  effort,
including structural reforms, must be designed
and implemented with care, in connection with
the timing of ERM II entry and the length of stay
in the mechanism.
The timing of entry into ERM II is a key issue in the
convergence  process.  In  tackling  this  sensitive
issue, it may be useful to examine, first, the sub-
stance  of  the  needed  adjustment  and  then  see
what would be, in each case, the optimal timing of
entry. The first period of EU membership would be
the  time  to  introduce/complement  necessary
reforms18 in key markets and institutions and test
the capacity of the economy to implement them
successfully.  In  a  second  phase,  policies  and
reforms will be corrected and/or strengthened in
the light of the experience gained during the first
period and of external developments. The whole
—first plus second— period could be about five
years, and may be shorter or longer depending on
the situation in each country.
The adjustment and reform period could coincide,
fully or partly, with that of ERM II participation.
The criteria for such participation would be both
the interest of the Member State concerned and,
also, the need to preserve the credibility of ERM II.
In  practice,  this  requires  a  sufficient  degree  of
progress towards sustainable convergence, ensur-
ing that the objective of meeting the convergence
criteria remains on track. The second part of the
EMU strategies for new Member States: the role of Exchange Rate Mechanism II
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14 A summary of monetary and exchange rate regimes in new
Member States is given in the Annex, Table A.
15 For our purposes, the relevant aspect here is: floating vis-à-vis
the euro.
16 The ECB does not consider currency boards to be a substitute for
participation in ERM II but rather as a unilateral commitment on the
part of the countries concerned, specifying that such arrangements
will  be  assessed  on  a  case-by-case  basis  (see  ECB’s  document:
“Policy position of the Governing Council of the ECB on exchange
rate issues relating to the Acceding Countries”, made public on 18
December 2003). This position seems to be the same as those of the
Commission and the ECOFIN Council on this specific issue.
17 See ECOFIN report, Athens, 5 April 2003.
18 Such  reforms  could  be  introduced  before  entering  ERM  II.
Indeed, in some cases this could present an optimal situation both
for the credibility of the mechanism and for the medium to long-
term interest of the country concerned.adjustment effort, which could correspond to the
final stage of ERM II participation, should repre-
sent the conditions that will, in general, prevail in
the euro area. It is, as a consequence, important
that ERM II membership not be seen as an “ante
room” for euro-area membership, but as a useful
framework  providing  the  opportunity  to  make
valuable adjustments and introduce reforms which
would  form  the  basis  for  real  convergence  and
sustainable nominal convergence. This is the rea-
son why in some cases, notably if the success of
certain major reforms is uncertain, early participa-
tion in ERM II may not be an optimal option.
In  conclusion,  if  the  following  elements  are  in
place:
ñ clear definition of policy priorities in connection
with the convergence criteria,
ñ sustainability of policies and adequacy of bud-
getary resources for their implementation, and
ñ commitment to implement the adjustment and
reform programme,
then experience shows us that a country will be
able to participate successfully in ERM II. On the
other hand, if the Member State concerned feels
that a higher degree of freedom in setting priori-
ties is preferred and/or no consensus exists for the
implementation of major reforms, it may be bet-
ter to delay entry into ERM II.
How long should a country stay in ERM II? There
is  no  predetermined,  optimal  duration  for  such
participation,  between  the  two-year  legal  mini-
mum and a longer time period. The decisive ele-
ment should be that adequate progress was made
by the Member State concerned in achieving sus-
tainable  convergence.19 However,  the  participa-
tion period should not be too long as, in such a
case, there is a risk that convergence momentum
is lost and the commitment to the adoption of the
euro fades. It is, therefore, necessary that the con-
vergence effort keeps its momentum and once a
critical mass of reform and convergence progress
has  been  achieved,  entry  into  ERM  II  may  be
sought. This requires a careful design of the con-
vergence effort, notably the setting of priorities
and  policy  instruments  to  achieve  them,  thus
avoiding any reversals in the convergence effort.
A key feature of ERM II is obligatory intervention
at  the  margins,  which  is  in  principle  automatic
and  unlimited,  with  very  short  term  financing
available.20 However,  the  ECB  and  the  central
banks of the other ERM II participants could sus-
pend intervention if this were to conflict with their
primary objective, which is to maintain price sta-
bility.  This  conditional  intervention  was  consid-
ered by some analysts as introducing uncertain-
ties  about  the  ECB’s  commitment  to  defending
ERM II central rates.21 However, this provision is
a  direct  consequence  of  the  ECB’s  mandate
defined in the Treaty to give priority to maintain-
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19 A  high  degree  of  sustainable  convergence  is  an  objective
explicitly  mentioned  in  the  relevant  Treaty  provisions  (conver-
gence criteria) and an essential element of sustainable exchange
rate stability in the ERM II Resolution (see footnote 7).
20 For the purpose of intervention, the ECB and each participat-
ing non-euro-area national central bank must open for each other
very short term credit facilities (VSTF). The VSTF is in principle
automatically available and unlimited in amount for the purpose
of financing intervention in participating currencies at the mar-
gins.  For  the  purpose  of  intra-marginal  intervention,  the  VSTF
may, with the agreement of the central bank issuing the interven-
tion  currency,  be  made  available  subject  to  conditions  (see
Agreement mentioned in footnote 8).
21 Folsz (2003), for example, argues that “the defensive system
would be stronger if the commitment of the ECB to intervene
were free of all uncertainties”.ing price stability. Therefore, references to condi-
tional intervention should be interpreted as imply-
ing that the ECB would, in general, intervene to
defend a specific central parity, provided that the
country concerned follows the economic and fis-
cal policies agreed through the ERM II framework
and through Community surveillance and co-ordi-
nation mechanisms, or adaptations to these poli-
cies decided upon with the same procedures.22
Moreover,  events  during  the  EMS  crisis  during
1992-93  showed  that  intervention  by  central
banks to defend a currency parity can only con-
tinue if it is supported by sustainable economic
and  financial  policies.  Therefore,  the  focus  and
the effort must be, first of all, to ensure sound
policies. This would be the best “guarantee” for
both a smooth transition to euro area member-
ship  and  support  by  the  ECB,  through  foreign
exchange market intervention, if the need arises.
A specific issue concerns the Balassa-Samuelson
(B-S)  effect,  namely  whether  ERM  II  provides
enough flexibility to allow for an appreciation of
the real exchange rate (in high-growth, catching-
up economies of new Member States) resulting
from  higher  productivity  growth  in  the  traded-
goods sector. Real appreciation could be achieved
through nominal appreciation, increased inflation
or  a  combination  of  both.  It  emerges  from  the
analysis of ERM II provisions, as well as from past
assessments of compliance with the convergence
criteria, that ERM II provides enough flexibility to
accommodate nominal appreciation as this would
not be an obstacle to meeting the requirements of
the exchange rate convergence criterion.23 On the
other hand, higher inflation due to wage equalisa-
tion  across  tradable  and  non-tradable  sectors
could pose a problem. However, the size of such
an effect should not be overestimated. According
to  recent  research,  the  inflation  differentials
between  EU  and  Central  and  Eastern  European
countries attributed to the B-S effect (estimated in
the  literature  between  1%  and  4%  per  annum)
should be treated with caution, as a number of
factors may reduce such an effect.24 It is noted, in
this respect, that in the case of two high-growth
EU economies, Ireland and Greece, in the qualifi-
cation period for euro membership (1996-99) no
particular inflation problems had arisen, although
the revaluation of their currencies’ central rates
during the last year before euro area membership
contributed to containing price increases.
Probably more important than the possibility of
accommodating the eventual B-S effect through a
currency  appreciation  is  the  possibility  for  new
Member  States  to  adjust  the  exchange  rate
through  a  devaluations  in  order  to  recover  lost
competitiveness, in the event of price increases
not justified by B-S effects. Although such adjust-
ments  could  be  made  within  ERM  II,  sizeable
exchange rate adjustments might better be made
EMU strategies for new Member States: the role of Exchange Rate Mechanism II
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22 The low share of new Member States’ money supply to the
euro area’s money supply suggests that the risk of excess liquid-
ity from a hypothetical intervention by the ECB in defence of a cur-
rency is very limited. It is noted that in the biggest new Member
State (Poland) the share of M3 in euro area’s M3 is about 0.7%,
while the share of M1 to the corresponding figure for the euro
area is somewhat higher, about 1.2%
23 A nominal appreciation, within the fluctuation bands, is con-
sidered  as  complying  with  the  exchange  rate  criterion  of  the
Treaty,  following  an  interpretation  applied  in  the  convergence
reports  of  the  EMI  (1998),  the  ECB  (2000)  and  the  European
Commission (1998 and 2000).
24 According to Von Hagen and Zhou (2003): (a) The B-S effect
is  a  long-run  tendency,  which  may  be  less  prominent  over  a
shorter time horizon; (b) productivity growth of the services sec-
tor, which is the main component of the non-tradable sector, can
be very fast in the accession countries, as it is developing essen-
tially from very low starting levels; (c) productivity growth of the
tradable sector will gradually lose its momentum as it reaches a
higher level; and (d) the pressure of high unemployment rates
may prevent the wage rate from equalising at a level compatible
with tradable-sector productivity growth.before the currency in question enters the mech-
anism (see also above the discussion about the
timing of ERM II entry).
Concerning  fiscal  adjustment,  new  Member
States must respect the provisions of the Treaty
about  general  government  balances  and  debt
ratios,  as  well  as  those  of  the  Stability  and
Growth Pact about a budgetary position close to
balance or in surplus in the medium term.25 A key
issue is how these obligations can be reconciled
with  the  need  for  most  acceding  countries  to
undertake important investment projects in order
to  improve  infrastructure  and  make  progress
towards real convergence. This is, indeed, one
crucial aspect of the adjustment process of new
Member States and underlines how important it
is  that  they  pursue  a  policy  of  sound  public
finance, controlling current primary expenditure
so that adequate budgetary resources can be allo-
cated  to  the  necessary  investment  in  order  to
improve infrastructure. It also implies the need to
consider  carefully  the  strategy  of  convergence
towards EMU, the right setting of priorities and
the timing of ERM II membership and accession
to the euro area.
How  do  Commission  proposals,  of  November
2002, for fiscal coordination, as approved by the
Council,26 affect  new  Member  States’  conver-
gence strategy? The proposals’ aim was to clarify
certain provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact
and put the focus on the cyclically-adjusted fiscal
balance as well as the long-term sustainability of
public  finance.27 They  are  helpful  to  the  new
Member States by putting emphasis on sustain-
able  fiscal  adjustment,  including  structural
reforms which raise the growth potential of the
economy, and on the need to reduce public debt
at a satisfactory pace towards the 60% of GDP ref-
erence  value.  This  approach  increases  new
Member States’ leeway as their government debt
ratio was estimated at 42% of GDP, on average, in
2003, much lower than either that of the EU (64%
of GDP) or that of the euro area (70.5% of GDP).28
An  issue  related  to  fiscal  consolidation  is
whether  macroeconomic  stabilisation,  pursued
in order to achieve the nominal convergence cri-
teria, is also compatible with real convergence
i.e.  the  capacity  to  obtain,  in  parallel,  high
enough  rates  of  real  GDP  growth  in  order  to
maintain  progress  towards  real  convergence.
The examples of Ireland and Greece showed that
the two processes can be mutually supported,
notably if the process of nominal convergence
acquires enhanced credibility, thus affecting the
formation of key variables such as interest rates,
wages and prices.
The “exit strategy” is a key issue of exchange rate
policies in relation to ERM II membership. The
issues covered under this concept concern both
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 23   7/04 14
25 It should be recalled that the Stability and Growth Pact applies
to all Member States of the EU. However, Member States that
have not adopted the euro cannot be subject to the possible sanc-
tions provided for by the Pact.
26 Commission Communication on “Strengthening the co-ordi-
nation  of  budgetary  policies”,  COM(2002)  670  final,  27
November  2002,  and  Report  of  ECOFIN  Council  of  7  March
2003, endorsed by the Brussels European Council of 20 and 21
March 2003.
27 As  was  noted  by  both  the  Commission  and  the  ECOFIN
Council,  these  clarifications  were  made  within  the  framework
established by the Treaty (Article 104, on excessive deficits), sec-
ondary legislation (Stability and Growth Pact) and the “Code of
conduct” on the content and format of stability and convergence
programmes (July 2001).
28 It  may  be  worth  exploring  what  room  for  interpretation  is
allowed for, notably for catching-up economies, in the provisions
of Article 104 (3) of the EC Treaty on excessive deficits, stating
that the Commission in its assessment “shall take into account
whether the government deficit exceeds government investment
expenditure and take into account all other relevant factors...”exit from current exchange rate regimes to ERM II
and  from  ERM  II  to  the  euro.  In  analysing  this
issue,  a  number  of  situations  can  be  distin-
guished:
a. currency board arrangements (CB) based on the
euro,
b.pegs to the euro, and
c. managed float and free float regimes.
The  above  situations  involve  large  differences,
especially  with  respect  to  the  policy  options
available in each case. For example, CB regimes
can find their place in ERM II as arrangements
involving  (very)  narrow  fluctuation  bands,  pro-
vided that the corresponding central rate in each
case  is  judged  appropriate.  “Peg  to  the  euro”
regimes can fall more easily into the normal fluc-
tuation band of ±15% of the ERM, notably if they
have been shadowing ERM II fluctuation bands
already. “Managed float” and “free float” regimes
can also be relatively easily adapted to the ERM II
rules provided that they are supported by appro-
priate policies.
Despite the differences that exist in the above sit-
uations, the basic policy requirement for ERM II
participation is, in all cases, the same: an appro-
priate and sustainable central rate must be cho-
sen, supported by the right economic and mone-
tary policies. This basic requirement must guide
decisions on central rates, including those cases
where the continuation of pre-ERM II exchange
rate regimes seems attractive, in view of the com-
plications of alternative solutions.29
Regarding exit from ERM II towards the adop-
tion of the euro, it seems advisable to follow the
same  approach  adopted  in  the  case  of  the
eleven  Member  States  in  1998  and,  later,  by
Greece in 2000: when the Council decided that
these countries fulfilled the convergence crite-
ria, the conversion rate of each currency was
also determined.30 Any other option (e.g. post-
poning  the  decision  on  conversion  rates  until
the  last  day  before  entry  into  the  euro  area)
would  increase  uncertainty  about  the  sustain-
ability  of  central  rates,  inviting  speculative
attacks against the currencies.
4. Options for monetary and exchange rate
strategies
The  choice  of  the  appropriate  monetary  and
exchange rate strategy is an important issue, as it
could influence the outcome of the whole effort to
meet the Maastricht convergence criteria, notably
those referring to price and exchange rate stabil-
ity. Such a choice could determine, in particular,
the timing of ERM II entry, as participation in the
mechanism implies specific obligations regarding
EMU strategies for new Member States: the role of Exchange Rate Mechanism II
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 23   7/04 15
29 This last remark, referring notably to CB regimes, does not
imply  that  the  merits  of  the  continuation  of  existing  parities
should be overlooked. It only means that if the risks of imbalances
or serious economic problems are considerable, then necessary
adjustments  and  reforms  must  be  introduced  in  order  to
strengthen the sustainability of currency parities.
30 Strictly  speaking,  the  Council  determined  only  the  bilateral
central rates (and not the final conversion rates) when deciding, in
May  1998,  which  Member  States  will  adopt  the  euro  from 
1  January  1999.  This  was  necessary  for  technical  reasons,  as
explained in the Joint Communiqué issued on 2 May 1998: “Since
the ECU was a currency basket, which included the Danish krone,
the Greek drachma and the pound sterling, it was not possible to
announce before the end of 1998 the irrevocable conversion rates
at which the euro would be substituted for the participating cur-
rencies. However, it is possible to announce the bilateral rates of
the currencies participating in the euro area which will be used on
31 December 1998 in computing the exchange rates of the official
ECU and thus in computing the irrevocable euro conversion rates
for these currencies.” Of course, no such technical constraints
existed when a decision was taken about Greece’s participation in
the euro area, as the euro was already in place. exchange rates. As a consequence, monetary and
exchange  rate  strategies  should  be  determined
jointly,  taking  account  of  economic  conditions
and prospects, and the time horizon of planned
convergence effort.
An  analytical  distinction  can  be  made  between,
firstly, monetary policy regimes based on exchange
rate  targeting  and,  secondly,  regimes  in  which
monetary policy is centred on targets other than
the exchange rate.
In  the  case  of  exchange  rate-based  monetary
strategies, the main issue is the sustainability of
the chosen strategy and, therefore, the effort is
normally focused on strengthening the elements
which support such a strategy. Examples of such
regimes are euro-based currency board regimes,
euro targeting within pre-determined fluctuation
bands  and  a  number  of  other  variations  of
exchange rate-based regimes.
For the second category of monetary regimes, a
notable  example  of  which  are  those  based  on
“inflation targeting”, a key issue is whether they
can also ensure exchange rate stability, which is
one  of  the  convergence  criteria  and  an  explicit
requirement of ERM II, within the currency fluctu-
ation  bands  specified  by  the  mechanism.  Such
monetary regimes, in particular the “inflation tar-
geting” framework followed, for example, by the
Czech Republic and Poland, seem to have served
well the countries concerned in reducing and con-
taining inflation. As a consequence, these coun-
tries may be reluctant to abandon them in favour
of exchange rate-based regimes.
Available evidence31 from past convergence expe-
riences indicates that both exchange rate-based
monetary regimes as well as inflation targeting
regimes  can  lead  to  a  successful  outcome.  An
example  of  countries  having  followed  the  first
kind of monetary regime is Austria and of the sec-
ond Finland, both of which managed to qualify
for  euro  membership  in  1998.  A  more  careful
examination of facts seems to suggest that it is
rather  sound  and  sustainable  policies  imple-
mented by the countries concerned —within a
credible EU institutional and policy framework—
that are the main determinants of the successful
convergence process and, probably, less the spe-
cific monetary policy framework. The following
elements seem to support this view:
ñ an inflation targeting regime, which is effec-
tive  in  reducing  inflation  and  maintaining
price stability, leads to reduced exchange rate
variability;32
ñ research  has  shown  that  inflation  targeting
regimes associated with independence of cen-
tral  banks  (one  of  the  requirements  for  euro
area membership) also lead to lower exchange
rate variability than in those where such inde-
pendence is absent;
ñ the dichotomy between inflation targeting and
exchange rate targeting may not be that sharp
in practice, as there is a strong pass-through
from nominal exchange rates to domestic infla-
tion in small open economies.33
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31 See for example Genberg (2004).
32 Kuttner and Posen (2001) argue that the more weight mone-
tary authorities place on stabilising inflation relative to output the
more  exchange  rate  variability  is  reduced  and  further  that
exchange rate stability can be the outcome of credible policies,
aimed at controlling inflation, and is not exclusively the outcome
of hard pegs.
33 Coricelli et al. (2003).The above seem to attenuate concerns about pos-
sible incompatibilities between inflation targeting
(and  other  non-exchange-rate-based  monetary
regimes)  and  exchange  rate  stability  require-
ments.34 Nevertheless, Member States concerned
should  design  with  care  their  monetary  and
exchange  rate  policies  with  a  view  to  avoiding
inconsistent  situations  and  strategies.  Moreover,
the fact that certain monetary regimes have served
well the monetary policy objectives in a number of
Member States does not necessarily imply that this
would be the case in the future, taking also account
of exchange rate stability requirements. As a con-
sequence, the choice of monetary and exchange
rate regimes must be made in each case not on
grounds of facility, for example in order to avoid
ERM II constraints or because the current regime
served the country concerned well in the past, but
as a part of a plan to achieve specific policy objec-
tives.  Moreover,  there  is  the  risk  that  monetary
strategies  associated  with  floating  exchange  rate
regimes may provide a way out of difficult but nec-
essary choices and lead, thus, to a postponement
of  necessary  adjustments.  Therefore,  preparation
to  accommodate  requirements  of  exchange  rate
stability and entry into ERM II and to the euro area
must be given timely and due attention.35
5. Capital mobility and ERM II: an adversary
or an ally in the drive to euro membership?
This section examines, on the basis of existing evi-
dence,  first,  the  policies  by  which  the  risks  of
destabilising capital movements can be consider-
ably reduced and, second, how to deal with such
capital movements when they, eventually, occur.
Free  capital  movements  are  an  integral  part  of  an
open economic and financial system and can con-
tribute importantly to economic efficiency and devel-
opment, by making available financial resources and
valuable  know-how  (in  the  case  of  foreign  direct
investment) where they are most needed. However,
speculative capital movements had often been asso-
ciated with currency instability and crises under fixed
or quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes. This was the
case within the EMS in the past, as well as in many
instances elsewhere in the world.
How can capital mobility be best managed within
the ERM II framework and what are the policy
measures  which  could  turn  capital  movements
from an adversary into an ally in the convergence
effort? Some tentative answers can be given to
this  question  on  the  basis  of  past  experience
within the EMS as well as of international evi-
dence. They include the following elements:
(i) Sound and sustainable economic, monetary and
fiscal policies in order to enhance confidence in
the prospects of the economy and avoid a situa-
tion which might invite an attack on the cur-
rency. A solid and well-supervised financial sys-
tem  and  implementation  of  reforms  in  the
labour, goods and services markets are indis-
pensable elements of the policy package.
(ii) Clear  and  unambiguous  commitment  to  the
objectives  of  convergence  and  euro  area
membership and readiness to take corrective
measures, if needed, to ensure their achieve-
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34 Some authors do not share this view. Buiter (2004), for exam-
ple, argues that the simultaneous pursuit of three nominal targets
(i.e. inflation, nominal exchange rate and interest rate) involves
significant risks.
35 According to the ECB, a number of new Member States are
reviewing their monetary and exchange rate strategies in view of
their  future  participation  in  ERM  II  (ECB, Annual  Report  2003,
April 2004).ment; capacity to mobilise all available policy
instruments to this end.
(iii)Transparency in economic policy-making and
openness  in  dealing  with  Community  and
international  institutions,  the  business  com-
munity and the general public.
The factors under (i) above are indispensable ele-
ments of a consistent and credible convergence
strategy. Readiness to adapt and take corrective
measures is also essential; in this respect, the sig-
nals  conveyed  by  capital  movements  and  asset
prices may be useful as early indicators of emerg-
ing  difficulties.  Furthermore,  transparency  and
openness  mentioned  under  (iii)  above  reduce
uncertainty about the policies and intentions of
policymakers  and  positively  affect  expectations
(important  factors  in  modern  economies),  thus
exerting a stabilising influence.
As already noted, ERM II provides a more helpful
framework  for  limiting  speculative  pressures  —
notably  through  the  wider  fluctuation  margins
which make one-way bets less likely— compared
to  the  earlier,  pre-1993  EMS.  Furthermore,  by
focusing on the implementation of sound and sus-
tainable policies, including structural reforms, the
mechanism  encourages  timely  corrective  action
and adjustments, thus reducing the risk of central
rate misalignments. Both these elements enhance
the usefulness of ERM II as a tool for streamlining
stabilisation and convergence.
In  addition  to  appropriate  economic  policies,  a
sound financial system is necessary in order to limit
the risks of instability or delays in the convergence
process. A fragile financial system may prove to be
a serious constraint. For example, a policy of high
interest rates considered necessary to defend the
currency could create problems for domestic banks
in the case of weak balance sheets.
Extensive  borrowing  in  foreign  currency by  the
banking and/or the corporate sector, not hedged
or  unmatched  by  receipts  in  foreign  exchange
(natural hedge) could also create problems for the
banking sector and affect the performance of the
economy more generally, putting at risk exchange
rate policy and the implementation of the conver-
gence process. Although enterprises make their
commercial  and  financial  decisions  freely  and
assume the corresponding risks, vigilance should
be exercised in relation to the potential impact of
foreign currency exposure of the corporate sector
and, in turn, of the banking system.
The  above  constitute  indispensable  elements  of
policies  aimed  at  contributing  to  a  safe  drive
towards EMU. They are, therefore, factors helping
to  prevent destabilising  capital  movements.
However,  speculative  capital  movements  may
occur for a number or reasons, including inappro-
priate policies, international factors beyond the con-
trol of the authorities or a combination of factors.36
The authorities should be in a position to cope
with  speculative  capital  movements  when  they
occur.37 Indeed, the authorities are not deprived
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36 For  a  discussion  of  these  issues  see  also  Gibson  and
Tsakalotos (2004).
37 It may be useful in this regard to clarify that Community legis-
lation,  which  provides  for  complete  freedom  of  capital  move-
ments within the EU, does not distinguish between “speculative”
and “non-speculative” capital movements. However, for analytical
reasons a distinction between capital operations may be useful.
“Pure” speculative capital movements can be considered as those
involving borrowing in domestic currency with simultaneous sell-
ing against foreign exchange, in an attempt to force a devaluation
of the domestic currency. If the devaluation takes place, specula-
tors repay the loan and gain the difference.of means of action in such situations despite gen-
eral  perceptions  to  the  contrary.  Experience
shows that the monetary authorities do have ways
of dealing effectively with the undesirable effects
of massive capital movements, “speculative” or
other.  Such  instruments  include,  in  particular,
interest rate changes, sterilisation operations or
the imposition of reserve requirements and pru-
dential measures within, of course, the margins
allowed by Community law on free movement of
capital and free provision of financial services.
It is, however, true that some of these measures
do not, usually, provide a lasting solution to the
problem of destabilising capital flows – which are
often inherent to the convergence process. They,
nevertheless, make it possible to cope with a dif-
ficult situation, gaining time in order to develop
more sustainable solutions, by adapting economic
policies and improving the policy mix.
The challenges the monetary authorities face in
dealing with massive capital movements largely
emanate from the unwelcome effects of measures
taken to defend the exchange rate on monetary
conditions and the economy in general. Such dif-
ficulties  arise  from  the  well-known  difficulty  of
reconciling  independent  monetary  policy  with
fixed  exchange  rates  and  free  capital  mobility.
This implies, in practice, that interest rates are pri-
marily  used  to  defend  the  exchange  rate  —
notably in the case of massive capital outflows—
and cannot at the same time be used to adapt
monetary policy to changing economic and mon-
etary conditions, if this is not compatible with the
exchange rate target.
Also, in the case of massive capital inflows, a reduc-
tion in interest rates to render domestic financial
assets less attractive to foreign investors can lead to
an undesirable loosening of monetary conditions.
The  unwelcome  effects  of  capital  inflows  on  the
monetary base and liquidity can be met by sterilisa-
tion operations. Changes in reserve requirements
can also be used. Despite the limits of sterilisation
operations, they are useful tools in the short term,
enabling the authorities to gain time and adapt the
policy mix. The main drawback of sterilisation is the
fact that, if successful in absorbing excess liquidity,
it maintains domestic interest rates unchanged, thus
continuing  to  attract  foreign  capital,  perpetuating
the excess liquidity problem which gave rise to the
sterilisation operations in the first place.38
Although both situations pose difficult problems for
the monetary authorities, massive capital outflows
present often a more acute problem, as they may
lead to the depletion of foreign reserves to defend
the currency. They also necessitate rises, sometimes
sharp, in interest rates, a development that could
adversely affect economic activity and the financial
situation of companies and financial institutions.39
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38 Sterilisation may, also, be costly, as the replacement of high
interest  rate  domestic  securities  for  lower  interest  rate  foreign
securities in the balance sheet of the central bank implies loss of
interest income for the bank.
39 It might look somewhat paradoxical, but the more sophisticated
the financial sector, the more exposed the currency of the Member
State concerned to speculative attacks seems to be, as it is easier to
borrow in domestic currency in domestic or international financial
markets (see footnote No. 37). For this reason (regardless of other
aspects related, for example, to how strong the commitment to
euro membership was) it was easier to attack the pound sterling
during the 1992 EMS currency crisis than other currencies; an addi-
tional argument, in the same vein, is that a Member State with an
international financial centre, such as London, is very reluctant to
introduce measures which, although not incompatible with rules
about freedom of capital movements or prudential measures, could
be perceived as restrictive by the international financial community
and thus not compatible with its reputation of an open financial
centre. It emerges from the above that it is excessive to evoke, as
some analysts do, the pound sterling’s example during the 1992/93
EMS  crisis,  as  a  typical  case  of  a  speculative  attack  which  new
Member States could face during their participation in ERM II.In the event of balance of payments difficulties,
often taking the form of massive capital outflows
and  pressure  on  the  currency  in  the  foreign
exchange  markets,  Member  State(s)  concerned
may  use  the  Community  balance  of  payments
facility foreseen in Article 119 of the EC Treaty.40
The facility, providing medium-term financial sup-
port  accompanied  by  economic  terms,  may  be
used only by Member States with a derogation
(i.e. Member States not having adopted the euro),
as participants in the monetary union are by defi-
nition not concerned, individually, with balance of
payments problems.41
In conclusion, free movement of capital provides
useful and timely information to the authorities
about  inconsistent  or  unsustainable  policies,
enabling timely action to remedy the situation. To
fully exploit such precious early signals, a strategy of
openness and transparency about policies, data and
future plans should be in place. This strategy should
also support full co-operation and openness in deal-
ing with Community and international institutions,
including acknowledgment of eventual difficulties.
Such  openness  and  transparency  prevent  incom-
plete information, which often leads to mis-infor-
mation. As expectations are central in the operation
of today’s internationalised economies, where the
role of financial markets is crucial, the best way to
stabilise expectations and render them a stabilising
instrument is openness and transparency.
6. Conclusions
The issue of euro area membership for the new
Member States has occupied centre stage in policy
discussions after May 2004. This paper examined
the role of ERM II in the convergence effort of the
new  Member  States,  against  the  background  of
past convergence experience and in the light of EU
rules for economic and monetary policy. ERM II is
the  framework  for  monitoring  and  assessing
exchange  rate  stability  and  the  sustainability  of
central rates, and plays a key role in the EU sur-
veillance  and  co-ordination  mechanisms.  It  pro-
vides both more flexibility and stability compared
with earlier versions of the mechanism and should
be seen as an instrument testing the consistency of
policies,  encouraging  necessary  adjustment  and
helping to achieve convergence.
ERM II rules are flexible enough to accommodate
a number of new Member States’ exchange rate
regimes except those of free floating42 (or man-
aged float without a mutually agreed central rate)
and currency boards based on currencies other
than  the  euro.  The  choice  of  exchange  rate
regime should be made, in each case, as part of a
plan to achieve specific policy objectives, before
opting for ERM II membership and, in a second
stage, to ensure a successful participation in the
mechanism.
Decisions on the timing of ERM II participation
will largely depend on whether convergence and
structural reforms are well on track or whether
uncertainties  remain  which  might  necessitate
sizeable economic policy adjustments, including
perhaps a change in the exchange rate. In the new
Member  States,  the  sustainability  of  progress
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40 An analysis of this facility is provided in Papaspyrou (1993).
41 The facility for Medium-Term Financial Assistance for the
Member  States  balance  of  payments  (Council  Regulation 
No. 332/2002, 28 February 2002) should be distinguished from
the Very Short-Term Financing Facility, which is part of the ERM II
arrangements and whose purpose is intervention in euro and in
the participating non-euro area currencies.
42 See footnote 15.made in these areas has to be tested under the
competitive pressure of full EU membership and,
further, under the rigorous framework of ERM II.
It cannot be excluded that, in certain cases, delay-
ing entry could be to the benefit of both the coun-
try concerned —to allow greater freedom in set-
ting policy priorities— while also preserving the
credibility of ERM II.
There is no, a priori, optimal duration for ERM II
participation  between  the  two-year  legal  mini-
mum and a longer time period. The decisive ele-
ment  should  be  the  progress  made  by  the
Member State concerned in achieving sustainable
convergence.  However,  the  participation  period
should not be too long as, in such a case, there is
a risk that convergence momentum is lost and the
commitment to the euro may fade.
The  choice  of  the  appropriate  monetary  and
exchange rate strategy would influence the timing
of ERM II entry and the outcome of the whole
effort for meeting the Maastricht convergence cri-
teria.  Available  evidence  suggests  that  both
exchange rate-based monetary regimes as well as
inflation targeting regimes can lead to a success-
ful outcome, if accompanied by sound economic
and fiscal policies.
Macroeconomic stabilisation, pursued in order to
achieve the nominal convergence, criteria, is also
compatible with real convergence, i.e. the capacity
to achieve, in parallel, high enough rates of real
GDP growth in order to maintain progress towards
real convergence. Experience has shown that the
two processes can be mutually supported, notably
if  the  process  of  nominal  convergence  acquires
enhanced credibility, thus affecting the formation
of key variables such as interest rates, wages and
prices.  Moreover,  convergence  of  new  Member
States’ economies to the EU average will be sup-
ported by funds allocated through the EU budget.
Particular attention was paid to policy issues and
risks associated with the free movement of cap-
ital. Risks of destabilising capital movements can
be considerably reduced by the implementation
of  sound  and  sustainable  economic  policies.
Furthermore, transparency and openness in eco-
nomic policy reduce uncertainty about current
policies and future plans, contributing to a stable
economic  and  financial  environment.  Capital
movements also provide useful and timely infor-
mation to the authorities about inconsistent and
unsustainable  policies,  enabling  timely  correc-
tive action.
However, massive short-term capital movements
may occur and the authorities should be in a posi-
tion  to  cope  with  such  a  situation.  Monetary
authorities  have  at  their  disposal  ways  to  deal
effectively with the undesirable effects of massive
capital movements; such instruments include, in
particular, interest rate changes and sterilisation
operations.  Such  measures  may  not  constitute
lasting solutions but make it possible to cope with
a  difficult  situation,  gaining  time  in  order  to
develop more sustainable solutions by adapting
economic policies and improving the policy mix.
Finally, it emerges from the analysis that existing
Community  institutions,  rules  and  mechanisms
provide a helpful framework to guide the conver-
gence effort of new Member States towards EMU.
It is therefore essential that new Member States
make full use of the institutions, mechanisms and
assistance  available  through  EU  instruments  in
order to enter EMU.
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Annex
*  Joined ERM II with effect from 28 June 2004.
Sources: ECB, Annual Report 2002, and national central banks.
Cyprus      
Czech Republic  
Estonia*      







Peg to the euro,
with a ±15% fluctuation band
Free float
Currency board to the euro
Peg to the euro,
with a ±15% fluctuation band
Peg to the SDR
(euro weight: 29%)
Currency board to the euro

















Exchange rate regime combined
with inflation targeting: 4.0%
by end-2005
Exchange rate band ±1%
Introduced in 1994. Repegged
from the US dollar to the euro
in February 2002
Currency basket (euro: 70%,
US dollar, pound sterling)
Exchange rate fluctuation 
band: ±0.25%
Inflation targeting: 2.5% (with
±1 percentage point tolerance)
after 2003
Prominent role of monetary
aggregates; the euro is used
informally as reference currency
Table A
Exchange rate and monetary regimes in new Member States
Exchange
rate strategy  Currency Features EMU strategies for new Member States: the role of Exchange Rate Mechanism II
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The question of income distribution has always
been at the forefront of economic debate. Of fun-
damental  importance  to  both  social  peace  and
development, income distribution continues, as in
the past, to be a matter of theoretical debate and
controversy,  as  well  as  a  source  of  ideological
conflict.  Researchers  first  focused  on  what  is
known  as  the  functional distribution  of  income
(i.e. how total income is distributed among fac-
tors of production: labour, capital and land). The
literature on the personal distribution of income
(i.e. the distribution of income among family units
or households) is relatively more limited and frag-
mentary,  with  attention  usually  targeted  at
explaining the shape of the income distribution
curve. More recently, however, efforts have been
made  to  interpret  the  rising  inequality  trends
observed in several developed countries over the
past two decades.
In recent years inequality and poverty have also
been at the centre of Greek political debate. How-
ever, the arguments frequently put forward with
regard  to  the  size,  structure  and  evolution  of
inequality are insufficiently documented or con-
tradict the findings of available empirical studies.
Furthermore, too much emphasis seems to have
been placed on secondary or even less important
determinants  of  economic  inequality  (demo-
graphic,  regional,  etc.),  while  far  too  little  has
been said about the decisive role of education.
This study will attempt to resolve this confusion
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Heather Gibson, Vassilios Droukopoulos and Isaac Sabethai for
their helpful comments and suggestions.as much as possible. Furthermore, the increase in
economic inequalities observed over the last few
decades  in  several  EU  countries,  and  more
recently  in  Greece,  warrants  a  more  thorough
investigation of this phenomenon and its determi-
nants.1 The present study will therefore focus on
the  structure  and  determinants  of  inequality,
mainly in Greece and the EU countries. Particular
attention is given to the regional dimensions of
inequality  and  to  highlighting  the  fundamental
role of education.
Section  2  presents  the  statistical  data  and
describes some of the methodological issues asso-
ciated  with  the  analysis  of  inequality.  Section  3
presents the methodology and technique used to
estimate the contribution of individual factors to
aggregate  inequality.  Section  4  analyses  the
empirical findings relating to the role of regional
and  educational  inequalities.  The  structure  and
the determinants of inequality in the countries of
the EU are examined in Section 5, while our con-
clusions and certain policy proposals are formu-
lated in Section 6.
2. Data and methodology
The  data  used  in  this  study  came  from  two
sources. Firstly, micro-data was drawn from the
last Household Budget Survey (HBS) of the entire
population  of  Greece  conducted  from  October
1998  to  September  1999  by  the  National
Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG). For the pur-
poses of this study, we used data on both con-
sumption  expenditure  and  household  income.2
Consumption expenditure was defined as includ-
ing  the  value  of  goods  and  services  purchased
plus  imputed  consumption  expenditure  (con-
sumption  of  own  production,  income  in  kind,
imputed rent, etc.). These expenditures were also
added to the current income of households. Some
adjustments were made to the initial HBS data so
that the population’s level of well-being could be
better  approximated.  More  specifically,  all  con-
sumption  expenditure  and  income  figures  were
expressed at constant 1999 prices, a certain num-
ber of households (only 54 out of 6,276) were
removed  from  the  initial  sample  because  the
information they provided was considered either
insufficient  or  unreliable,  and  the  sample  was
reweighted  based  on  the  results  of  the  1999
Labour Force Survey. Also, the values of imputed
car services were estimated and added to both
consumption expenditure and household income
(while the value of cars purchased was subtracted
from consumption expenditure).
For almost all of the EU countries, our findings
were  consistent  with  the  latest  data  from  the
European  Community  Household  Panel  (ECHP)
survey. This second source of data was used to
examine the structure of inequality and analyse
inequality determinants in the EU-15. The main
purpose of the ECHP income survey is to provide
recent  and  comparable  information  on  house-
holds and their members, in terms of personal
income,  employment  and  working  conditions,
health  and  various  other  social  indicators  con-
cerning their living conditions, by recording vari-
ous  household  characteristics  (composition,
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1 On the recent evolution of inequality in Greece, see Mitrakos
and Tsakloglou (2003) and Mitrakos (2003). As shown by these
studies, the high and rather steady level of inequality observed
since the early 1980s continued into the early or mid-1990s  and
since then may even have increased.
2 For a comparative analysis of income and consumption data
from earlier HBSs and corresponding national accounts data, see
Kanellopoulos (1986) and Sarris and Zografakis (1993).employment, education, income, etc.) over con-
secutive years. The ECHP is thus a recurring and
ongoing survey, which at various points in time
(waves) collects information from the same initial
sample of households and individuals, even when
individuals  move  or  otherwise  join  or  form
another  household.  The  fact  that  the  question-
naires were designed in close consultation with
the  Member  States,  under  Eurostat  supervision
and  guidelines,  seems  to  have  ensured  a  high
degree of data comparability across the EU.3 This
sample  survey  has  been  conducted  every  year
since 1994 and interviews a total of some 60,000
households  and  128,000  individuals  aged  16
years and over in the EU-15. The seventh wave of
the ECHP survey, used in the present study, con-
cerns the year 2000.4
Any  attempt  to  empirically  examine  economic
inequality  must  inevitably  address  a  series  of
methodological issues. One such issue is the level
of analysis: Should the analysis of inequality take
place at the level of the individual or at that of the
household?  Owing  to  the  considerable  differ-
ences in size usually observed between rich and
poor households, it is easy to see how the selec-
tion of the analysis level could influence results.
Two other important facts, regardless of the unit
of analysis chosen, need to be taken into account:
the existence of economies of scale in household
consumption,  and  the  difference  in  needs
between adults and minors, which call for the use
of what are known as “family equivalence scales”.
In the present study, we chose the individual as
the  unit  of  analysis,  while  the  distribution  data
were  equivalised  to  make  allowances  for
economies  of  scale  and  differences  in  needs
between adults and minors. More specifically, the
distributions we chose to use concerned the per
capita equivalent  consumption  expenditure  and
equivalent current (disposable) income, both of
which were calculated by dividing the expenditure
and income of each household by the number of
equivalent adults, and assigning the quotient to
each member of the household. In order to calcu-
late  the  number  of  equivalent  adults  in  each
household, we used Eurostat’s family equivalence
scales  (Hagenaars  et  al.,  1994),  which  assign
weights of 1 to the household head, 0.5 to each
additional adult in the household and 0.3 to each
child (aged up to 13 years). It is interesting to note
that  the  results  presented  in  the  following  sec-
tions were only slightly affected when alternative
equivalence scales were used.
Choosing a measure of inequality and, in particu-
lar, a suitable way to estimate the structure and
dimensions of inequality are another major diffi-
culty.  There  are  two  general  approaches  in  the
international  literature  on  how  to  estimate
inequality between the members of a community
or population.5 The first approach always consists
in a full ranking of the distributions to be com-
pared, since it attempts to describe and incorpo-
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3 For  a  detailed  presentation  of  the  methodology  used  in  the
ECHP survey, see Eurostat (1996), Volume 1.
4 The eighth wave of the ECHP, made available only recently, was
also the last (problems caused by the non-replacement of house-
holds that had left the survey seem to be the main reason why the
ECHP survey was stopped). Since 2003, Eurostat has been con-
ducting  a  new  survey  entitled  “European  Union-Statistics  on
Income  and  Living  Conditions  (EU-SILC)”  across  the  EU.  The
NSSG  has  already  conducted  two  waves  of  the  SILC  study  in
Greece (for 2003 and 2004) and, before that, extended the previ-
ous ECHP survey by one year by conducting an extra (ninth) wave
for the year 2002.
5 The literature on how to measure inequality is very extensive.
Particularly  interesting  overviews  can  be  found  inter  alia in
Atkinson  (1970),  Sen  (1973,  1992),  Champernowne  (1974),
Kakwani (1980), Kanbur (1984), Foster (1985), Jenkins (1991),
Lambert (1993), Cowell (1995). For a presentation of the tech-
niques widely used to measure inequality in Greece on the basis
of Greek data, see Mitrakos (2003).rate the characteristics and the dispersion into a
simple  statistical  inequality  index.  The  second
standard approach (using the Lorenz curves) often
leads to a partial ranking of the distributions to be
compared. Since different indices can lead to dif-
ferent  results,  we  are  therefore  faced  with  the
problem  of  which  index  to  choose.  Moreover,
since each index places emphasis on a different
type  of  inequality,  depending  on  the  weighting
system used by the specific index to co-estimate
the respective differences in the various parts of
the distribution, we must bear in mind that all
inequality indices involve some element of sub-
jectivity. Each index corresponds directly or indi-
rectly to a different function of social well-being
and,  since  there  is  no  unanimously  acceptable
function of social well-being, there can be no uni-
versally accepted inequality index. The form and
properties  of  the  social  well-being  function
selected each time are decisive factors and lead to
the construction of different “normative” inequal-
ity  indices,  which  do  not  necessarily  yield  the
same results.
Since there is no general consensus on one suit-
able  index  for  measuring  and  analysing  the
inequality of a distribution, we decided for the
purpose  of  the  present  study  to  adopt  two
widely used inequality indices: the Theil index
(T) and  the  mean  logarithmic  deviation  (N).
These two indices were selected on the basis of
the following criteria: First, the indices satisfy all
the  axioms  that  are  considered  particularly
desirable in the relevant literature (symmetry,
mean independence, population size indepen-
dence, and the principle of transfers).6 Second,
the  Theil  index  is  relatively  more  sensitive  to
transfers  in  the  upper  tail  of  the  distribution,
while the mean logarithmic deviation is more
sensitive  in  the  lower  tail  (Champernowne,
1974;  Cowell,  1975).  Third,  these  indices
enable the dissociation between the “between-
group  inequality”  component  of  aggregate
inequality and the “within-a-population-group”
component. This property of decomposability is
presented and systematically put to use in the
following sections of the study.
3. Methodology used to estimate the contri-
bution of respective factors to inequality
In  the  past  few  years,  much  of  the  literature 
on the structure of inequality has systematically
focused  on  decomposing  overall  inequality 
into  various  components.  The  view  has  been
advanced  that  some  inequality  measures  have
the particularly useful feature of being decom-
posable in such a way as to estimate the contri-
bution  to  aggregate  inequality  from  respective
factors (inequality decomposition by population
subgroups).7
Indeed, a number of inequality measures can be
used to decompose overall or aggregate inequal-
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6 As  already  stressed,  the  approach  of  inequality  measures  is
axiomatic. In other words, an inequality measure is considered
suitable if it satisfies the following axioms: symmetry (the mea-
sure  of  inequality  must  remain  unchanged  when  individuals
switch places in the income order), mean independence (the mea-
sure must remain unaffected by the income unit measure), popu-
lation independence (the measure must remain unaffected if two
or more identical population groups merge) and the Dalton-Pigou
principle of transfers (any progressive transfer of income between
two members of the population that does not modify their income
order must lead to a decrease in index value).
7 For some useful applications of aggregate inequality decompo-
sition,  see  inter  alia Cowell  (1980),  Shorrocks  (1980,  1984),
Anand (1983), Kanbur (1984), Cowell and Jenkins (1995), Jenkins
(1995). For the application of the same techniques on Greek data,
see  Tsakloglou  (1993),  Mitrakos  and  Tsakloglou  (1997,  2000,
2003), Mitrakos, Panopoulou and Tsakloglou (2001).ity  into  its  between-group  and  within-group
components  once  the  population  has  been
divided  into  mutually  exclusive  sub-groups  on
the basis of various criteria (region, age group of
the household head, occupation, etc.). The share
of between-group inequality can be defined as
the value of the inequality measure once all the
within-group income differences have been arti-
ficially eliminated. In other words, it is the value
of  the  inequality  measure  for  the  hypothetical
distribution where the earnings of each individ-
ual  within  the  same  group  are  equal  to  the
group’s mean. Thus, within-group inequality is
eliminated, and what remains are the between-
group  income  differences.  Similarly,  within-
group inequality can be defined as the value of
the  inequality  measure  when  between-group
income  differences  are  eliminated,  but  the
within-group income differences remain steady.
In other words, it is the value of the inequality
measure  for  a  hypothetical  distribution  where
each group mean is equal to the overall mean.
Such a situation can arise when the income of all
individuals within the same group changes pro-
portionally and only has meaning when the spe-
cific inequality measure satisfies the mean inde-
pendence axiom. Whenever an inequality mea-
sure can be expressed as the sum of the two
respective  inequalities  (within  and  between
groups), as previously defined, it is considered
“additively decomposable”. Using such indices,
it is possible e.g. to estimate the percentage con-
tribution to aggregate inequality of each region,
as well as that of interregional (between-region)
inequality.
The Theil index (T) and the mean logarithmic devi-
ation (N) selected for the present study belong to
this  category  of  “additively  decomposable”
inequality  measures.  These  indices  can  be























yi is the expenditure or the income of individual i
(i= 1, ...., n),
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Ì is the arithmetic mean of the adopted distribu-
tion.8 When the population is decomposed into J
non-overlapping  groups,  these  indices  can  be






























nj is the size of the population, Ìj is the arithmetic
mean of the adopted distribution, and ∆j and Nj
are the T and N indices of group j. When using
equations 3 and 4, the adopted inequality mea-
sures are additively decomposable. Indeed, aggre-
gate inequality can be expressed as the weighted
sum of the indices themselves for the various sub-
groups (“within-group” inequality), plus the value
of the index if all members within one same group
have  incomes  equal  to  the  group  mean
(“between-group” inequality).
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8 It is apparent from these equations that the T and N indices will
take on values ranging between zero and ln (n) and between zero
and infinity, respectively. It should be noted that the absolute val-
ues of the two indices are not intercomparable and that only the
values of the same index can be compared.4. Empirical results
In this section we perform a series of succes-
sive  decompositions  of  overall  inequality  into
“between-group”  and  “within-group”  compo-
nents, using two variables: current consumption
expenditure and the current income of house-
holds,  as  drawn  from  1998/99  HBS  data.  As
already noted, we chose the individual as the
unit of analysis and converted the distributions
into  equivalent  per  capita terms  using  the
Eurostat equivalence scales.
The  results  of  our  inequality  decompositions
presented in Tables 1-4 contain estimates for the
T  and  N  indices  for  the  respective  groups,
together with population shares and the mean
relative  equivalent  consumption  expenditure/
income of these groups (national mean: 100.0).
The  values  quoted  in  parentheses  under  the
respective index values represent the percentage
contribution of “within-group” inequality. These
contributions for the T and N indices are equal to
100(njÌj/nÌ)∆j/T  and  100(nj/n)Nj/N, respec-
tively. The last row of each table indicates the
size of aggregate inequality, while the percent-
age contributions of between- and within-group
inequality are given in the two previous rows.
4a. The role of regional inequalities
In this first sub-section, we present the results of
our  decomposition  of  overall  inequality  into
intraregional and interregional components. The
population was divided into groups depending on
the region and the type of locality, as determined
by  the  size  of  the  households’  municipality  or
community of residence.
The results of our overall inequality decomposi-
tion by household region of residence are pre-
sented  in  Table  1.  The  differences  between
regions in the relative mean values of equivalent
expenditure and income seem very important.
The  ratio  of  the  highest  average  equivalent
expenditure  (Athens  region)  to  the  lowest
(Western  Macedonia)  is  1.64,  which,  at  first
glance,  seems  to  denote  relatively  important
regional disparities. The corresponding income
distribution  ratio  is  1.45.  This  result  not  only
coincides with the conclusions of earlier studies
for  Greece  (Geronymakis,  1970;  Prodromidis,
1975; Voloudakis and Panourgias, 1980),9 but
also  supports  the  widely  accepted  view  that
Greece presents significant regional disparities
in terms of well-being. However, interregional
inequality was found to account for only 6.1%-
11.1%  of  overall  inequality  depending  on  the
distribution and the index used. This important
finding suggests that even a total elimination of
interregional inequalities would only have a lim-
ited  effect  on  the  level  of  overall  inequality.
What this means in more practical terms is that
even if a government were to redistribute total
expenditure (income) and make each region’s
mean  expenditure  (income)  equal  to  the
national  mean,  the  overall  inequality  in  the
expenditure (income) distribution would not fall
by more than 11.1% (6.4%) so long as the level
of intraregional inequality remained unchanged.
It is also worth noting that the two inequality
indices used (T, N) produced only slightly dif-
ferent results, whereas the selection of the vari-
able  (expenditure,  income)  seems  to  have  a
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9 For  more  recent  studies,  see  Petrakos  and  Saratsis  (1997),
Vassilopoulos and Bila (1995) and the bibliographical references
contained in the latter.more decisive impact. The figures in Table 1 do
not point to any clear relationship between the
regions’  absolute  level  of  inequality  and  their
mean expenditure and income (i.e. their stan-
dards of living).
Our estimates of the contribution of locality to
overall inequality are presented in Table 2. Here,
inequality was decomposed on the basis of the
size of the individuals’ municipality or community
of residence. Depending on their place of resi-
dence,  the  HBS  households  were  grouped  into
three  main  categories:  urban,  semi-urban  and
rural (note: urban households were then further
divided into two sub-categories). The results indi-
cate that the mean values of the two distributions
are  clearly  and  positively  correlated  to  locality
size,  whereas  the  level  of  inequality  (T  and  N
indices) is not. The mean equivalent expenditure
of  Greece’s  two  major  urban  centres  is  62.9%
Education and economic inequalities
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 23   7/04 33
Table 1
Measurement and decomposition of inequality by region
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99.
Greater Athens 34.2 123.8 0.151 0.147 119.3 0.190 0.170
(39.2) (31.8) (41.4) (32.9)
Greater Salonika  8.8 106.2 0.124 0.120 104.8 0.124 0.125
(7.1) (6.7) (6.1) (6.3)
Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 5.5 76.9 0.143 0.146 82.5 0.213 0.202
(3.7) (5.1) (5.2) (6.3)
Central Macedonia  7.8 83.0 0.138 0.139 84.0 0.157 0.154
(5.5) (6.9) (5.5) (6.8)
Western Macedonia 2.8 75.5 0.111 0.112 82.2 0.167 0.160
(1.4) (2.0) (2.0) (2.5)
Epirus 3.1 77.6 0.168 0.172 82.9 0.140 0.148
(2.5) (3.4) (1.9) (2.6)
Thessaly6.0 80.3 0.141 0.140 85.3 0.195 0.178
(4.2) (5.4) (5.3) (6.1)
Ionian islands 2.1 89.7 0.106 0.107 100.4 0.204 0.187
(1.2) (1.4) (2.3) (2.2)
Western Greece  5.9 82.0 0.224 0.157 84.1 0.155 0.153
(6.6) (5.8) (4.1) (5.1)
Mainland Greece  4.6 90.6 0.146 0.140 90.1 0.154 0.152
(3.8) (4.1) (3.4) (4.0)
Rest of Attica 4.8 95.4 0.145 0.154 88.3 0.200 0.211
(4.1) (4.7) (4.6) (5.8)
Peloponnese 5.0 88.9 0.144 0.141 91.2 0.179 0.172
(3.9) (4.5) (4.3) (4.8)
Northern Aegean 2.1 ˙83.7 0.113 0.119 93.9 0.208 0.188
(1.2) (1.6) (2.2) (2.2)
Southern Aegean 3.1 99.4 0.103 0.106 91.8 0.148 0.145
(2.0) (2.1) (2.3) (2.6)
Crete 4.2 84.1 0.136 0.135 97.3 0.153 0.152
(2.9) (3.6) (3.3) (3.6)
"Within" group inequality  89.3% 88.9% 93.9% 93.6%
"Between" group inequality  10.7% 11.1% 6.1% 6.4%
National total 100.0 100.0 0.163 0.158 100.0 0.187 0.177
Population
shares (%)



















of residencehigher  than  the  corresponding  expenditure  of
rural regions, while, in terms of mean equivalent
income, the interregional disparities were found
to be smaller (51.8%). In spite of the important
differences in the mean values obtained for the
variables, inequality between areas with a differ-
ent locality size does not account for more than
11.6% of overall inequality.
In summary, the analytical results of Tables 1 and
2 indicate that the contribution of regional factors
to  aggregate  inequality  in  Greece  is  fairly  lim-
ited.10 This finding is particularly reliable: not only
does  it  remain  valid  when  we  used  a  different
inequality  measure,  distribution,  equivalence
scale, unit of reference, but it also remains valid
through time.11 However, it contradicts the widely
accepted  view  that  interregional  inequalities  or
disparities between urban and rural regions are
responsible  for  a  significant  share  of  economic
inequality in Greece.
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Table 2
Measurement and decomposition of inequality by size of municipality/commune
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99.
Greater Athens & 
Salonika 43.0 120.2 0.148 0.143 116.3 0.179 0.163
(46.9) (39.0) (47.9) (39.5)
Other urban areas 
(over 10,000 inhabitants) 23.1 93.4 0.133 0.134 95.4 0.163 0.164
(17.5) (19.5) (19.1) (21.3)
Semi-urban areas 
(2,000-10,000 inhabitants) 12.2 88.4 0.174 0.148 92.9 0.186 0.174
(11.5) (11.4) (11.2) (11.9)
Rural areas
(up to 2,000 inhabitants)  21.8 73.8 0.134 0.134 76.6 0.170 0.162
(13.2) (18.5) (15.2) (20.0)
"Within" group inequality  89.0% 88.4% 93.3% 92.7%
"Between" group inequality  11.0% 11.6% 6.7% 7.3%
National total 100.0 100.0 0.163 0.158 100.0 0.187 0.177
Population
shares (%)



















10 Several  studies  in  the  international  literature  have  also
recorded  a  relatively  small  contribution  of  between-region
inequality  to  aggregate  inequality  (Bell  et  al.,  1994;  Jenkins,
1995; Parker, 1999, for the United Kingdom, del Rio and Ruiz-
Castollo, 1997, for Spain, Cardosa, 1997 for Portugal, etc.). In the
United Kingdom, for instance, differences between the country’s
12 regions were found to account for a mere 3.1%-3.7% of aggre-
gate  inequality  (Jenkins,  1995).  However,  the  contribution  of
regional inequalities seems to be relatively more important in less
developed and more inegalitarian rural economies (Tsui, 1993,
Cowell, 1995 for China; Anand, 1993, for Malaysia; Mishra and
Parikh, 1992, for India; Fields and Schultz, 1980, for Colombia,
etc.).  Obviously,  larger  countries  with  more  numerous  and
unevenly developed regions can be expected to present greater
interregional discrepancies.
11 In studies based on earlier HBS data (Tsakloglou, 1993, 1997;
Mitrakos and Tsakloglou, 1997), regional factors do not usually
account for more than 10% of aggregate inequality. One possible
exception is the study of Carantinos (1981), which estimated that
25.9% of aggregate inequality in 1974 was attributable to differ-
ences between urban and rural regions. This finding can most
likely be explained by the fact that Carantinos used sub-aggregate
data  on  consumption  expenditure  that  largely  conceal  intrare-
gional differences.4b. The role of education
Considerable international literature focuses on
the impact of education on the personal distribu-
tion  of  income  and/or  consumption.  Most  of
these studies examine income from labour and
draw on the theory of human capital. This theory
roughly concludes that, ceteris paribus, the earn-
ings of individuals with different education levels
in a perfectly competitive economy tend to differ,
whereas their consumption expenditure does not
differ significantly. Differences in levels of con-
sumption expenditure can arise either because of
imperfections  in  specific  markets  (goods,  pro-
duction factors, etc.) or because the education
level  of  individuals  is  related  to  other  features
that influence their consumption behaviour.12
To obtain the results presented in Table 3, we
used  the  same  decomposition  technique  as
before,  only  this  time  we  divided  the  sample
population into 5 groups depending on the edu-
cational level of the household heads, ranging
from “university graduates” at the upper end to
“primary education not completed” at the lower.
Since  the  educational  level  of  the  household
head seems to be closely related to that of the
other  household  members,  the  results  of  this
table  are  all  the  more  indicative  of  the  link
between education and inequality.
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12 For Greece, see Psacharopoulos (1982, 1988), Psacharopoulos
and Kazamias (1985), Lambropoulos and Psacharopoulos (1992),
Patrinos  (1992,  1995),  Chryssakis  (1993),  Kanellopoulos  (1996),
Kanellopoulos  and  Psacharopoulos  (1997),  Papatheodorou  and
Pichaud (1998), Tsakloglou and Antoninis (1999).
University graduate 15.2 155.1 0.151 0.140 160.0 0.165 0.150
(21.8) (13.5) (21.5) (12.9)
Upper secondary 
education completed  26.7 111.1 0.111 0.110 105.7 0.131 0.129
(20.0) (18.5) (19.7) (19.4)
Lower secondary 
education completed  10.9 93.7 0.133 0.133 95.0 0.181 0.169
(8.3) (9.2) (10.0) (10.4)
Primary education 
completed  36.6 80.6 0.113 0.112 82.1 0.148 0.139
(20.4) (26.1) (23.7) (28.8)
Primary education 
not completed  10.6 66.3 0.172 0.160 66.3 0.144 0.145
(7.4) (10.7) (5.4) (8.7)
"Within" group inequality  78.0% 78.2% 79.7% 79.8%
"Between" group inequality  22.0% 21.8% 20.3% 20.2%
National total 100.0 100.0 0.163 0.158 100.0 0.187 0.177
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99.
Table 3
Measurement and decomposition of inequality by educational level of household head
Population
shares (%)


















Educational levelThree interesting conclusions can be drawn from
the figures of Table 3. First, there is a strong posi-
tive correlation between the education level of the
household head and the mean values of the expen-
diture and income distributions. In addition, the
mean values obtained for the two variables differ
significantly from one education-level group to the
other. For instance, the mean equivalent expendi-
ture of households headed by a university gradu-
ate is more than double the expenditure of house-
holds whose head has not finished primary school.
This relationship is even stronger for the current
income  distribution,  with  the  ratio  of  mean
incomes reaching 2.41. Second, with nearly all of
the  indices  and  variables,  the  absolute  levels  of
inequality recorded for the various education-level
groups were significantly lower than the respective
level of inequality for the entire population. Third,
since the inequality within each of the respective
education-level groups is relatively low, whereas
intergroup differences, in terms of mean values,
were found to be particularly important, between-
group inequality can thus be termed significant,
especially considering that our population sample
was only divided into 5 groups. More specifically,
between-group inequality contributed 20%-22% to
aggregate  inequality,13 thereby  suggesting  that
educational inequalities are more closely related
than other determinants to economic inequalities.
This rather important finding further implies that
policies aimed at reducing educational inequalities
can  be  fundamentally  instrumental  in  reducing
aggregate inequality.14
4c. The influence of other demographic and occu-
pational factors
We still need to examine  whether the use of other
criteria to break down the population modifies the
previously  obtained  results.  The  answer  to  this
question  is  provided  in  Table  4,  for  which  the
population was broken down by a number of
demographic  characteristics  (household  head
gender and age group, household size) and occu-
pational characteristics (insurance, type of profes-
sion, occupational status and sector of activity).
Apart  from  the  percentage  contribution  of
between-group inequality obtained at this stage,
we  also  chose  to  reproduce  the  corresponding
results of Tables 1-3 in the top three rows of the
table to facilitate comparisons. In all of the new
classifications  based  on  the  households’  demo-
graphic characteristics, between-group inequality
never  accounts  for  more  than  5%  of  aggregate
inequality. More specifically, the highest contribu-
tions to inequality that can be attributed to house-
hold head gender, household size and household
head  age  group  are  just  0.2%,  2.8%  and  4.4%,
respectively. In contrast, the contribution of occu-
pational  factors  is  more  important,  with  the
household  head’s  insurance  organisation,  type 
of  profession,  occupational  status  and  sector 
of  activity  accounting  respectively  for  as  much 
as 17.5%, 16.8%, 6.4% and 11.9% of aggregate
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13 In other studies using similar population decomposition and
grouping  approaches,  education  characteristics  were  found  to
account for 22.1% of aggregate inequality in Spain (del Rio and
Ruiz-Castillo,  1997),  27.0%  in  Portugal  (Cardosa,  1997)  and
18.3% in the US (Johnson and Shipp, 1997).
14 The findings of a number of empirical studies have shown that
the  improvement  in  Greece’s  educational  system  in  recent
decades has led to a decrease in economic inequality. This was
mainly due to interventions at primary and secondary education
levels. The redistributional role of public tertiary education has
been seriously called into question, since its financing from tax
revenues and primarily through indirect taxation places a propor-
tionally higher burden on the lower-income classes whose partic-
ipation  in  this  level  of  education  is  comparatively  smaller
(Athanassiou,  1984;  Psacharopoulos  and  Kazamias,  1985;
Psacharopoulos,  1988;  Patrinos,  1992;  Lambropoulos  and
Psacharopoulos,  1992;  Chryssakis  1993;  Kanellopoulos  and
Psacharopoulos, 1997; Tsakloglou and Antoninis, 1999; Asteriou
and Agiomirgianakis, 2001).inequality. However, even these maximum per-
centage  contributions  fall  short  of  the  values
obtained for education, which alone accounts for
almost one fourth of aggregate inequality in spite
of our very basic decomposition of the population
into only 5 education-level groups.15
Finally, it is worth noting that our findings are cor-
roborated  by  the  results  of  the  multivariate
decomposition analysis of inequality. Even when
the population was broken down into as many as
560 small and extremely homogenous groups, the
four  variables  (locality,  household  composition
and the household head’s occupational status and
education level) jointly accounted for roughly 1/3
of aggregate inequality, whereas only the educa-
tion level of the household head seems to retain
its  significant  independent  explanatory  power.
Furthermore, this finding remains valid over time,
and  is  even  further  confounded  by  sensitivity
analysis with regard to the unit of reference and
the  equivalence  scales.  In  other  words,  educa-
tional inequalities seem to be more closely related
than other demographic and socio-economic fac-
tors to economic inequality.
5. The structure of inequality in the EU
countries
In  this  section,  we  examine  the  structure  of
inequality based on the distribution of dispos-
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15 Some of these classifications, with results similar to those pre-
viously  presented,  have  also  been  used  by  Mookherjee  and
Shorrocks (1982), Bell et al. (1994), Jenkins (1995) and Parker
(1999)  for  the  United  Kingdom,  Borooah  et  al. (1995)  for
Northern Ireland, Cowell (1984), Cowell and Jenkins (1995) for
the US, Burkhauser et al. (1997) for the US and Germany, and
Cardosa (1997) for Portugal.
Region of residence 15 10.7 11.1 6.1 6.4
Type of locality 4 11.0 11.6 6.7 7.3
Level of education 5 22.0 21.8 20.3 20.2
Gender 2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Household size 6 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.7
Age group 7 4.0 4.4 1.8 2.0
Insurance organisation 17 16.4 17.3 16.7 17.5
Type of profession 12 16.8 16.6 14.3 14.3
Occupational status  6 6.4 6.4 5.6 5.9
Sector of activity  19 11.8 11.9 8.9 9.0
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99.
Table 4
Aggregate results of the decomposition of overall inequality:














deviation Classification criterion:able  income  in  the  15  “older”  EU  countries,
meaning  that  we  will  once  again  attempt  to
determine how much of aggregate inequality can
be  attributed  to  income  disparities  within  and
between  the  various  population  groups.  The
inequality decomposition technique used in this
section is exactly the same as the one described
and applied in the previous sections for Greece
based on HBS data. The variable used to decom-
pose  aggregate  inequality  was  the  disposable
monetary income of households, as drawn from
the  European  Community  Household  Panel
(ECHP,  seventh  wave,  survey  year  2000).  The
unit  of  analysis  was  the  individual,  while  the
incomes of households were once again equiv-
alised using the Eurostat equivalence scales.
In order to decompose aggregate inequality, we
once again grouped the population on the basis of
demographic, occupational and educational crite-
ria for the households or, more specifically, for
the  “reference  persons”  of  households.16 The
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16 ∆he “reference person” is often referred to in this section as
the “household head”, even though the two terms are not always
interchangeable.
Austria 0.106 8.9 10.4 6.1
Belgium 0.164 10.2 9.3 12.2
Denmark 0.085 18.0 14.7 8.7
Finland 0.098 16.0 16.3 12.0
France 0.139 5.1 20.9 19.8
Germany1 0.112 6.4 3.3 10.5
Greece 0.198 5.1 16.5 23.4
Ireland 0.154 9.8 21.7 18.1
Italy0.166 3.1 13.5 10.4
Luxembourg1 0.113 7.9 13.1 22.9
Netherlands 0.112 13.8 9.0 -
Portugal 0.228 6.4 24.5 28.3
Spain 0.199 2.7 21.3 20.0
Sweden 0.114 16.7 - 6.5
United Kingdom1 0.186 14.7 13.0 6.6
1 These countries have incorporated primary data from other surveys conducted nationwide into the ECHP.
Group definitions:
ñ Type of household: one person aged 65 or over, one person aged 30-64, one person aged up to 30, one parent with children aged up to 16, childless couple with
one partner aged 65 or more, childless couple with both aged less than 65, couple with one child aged up to 16, couple with two children aged up to 16, couple
with children (one child at least aged 16 or more), other type of household.
ñ Occupational status of the reference person: manager or executive, self-employed, technical assistant, clerk, service or sales worker, skilled agricultural or fishery
worker, specialised technician, machine operator or assembler, unskilled worker, unemployed, pensioner, other type of economically inactive persons.
ñ Educational level of the reference person: Tertiary education graduate, upper secondary school graduate, graduate at most of lower secondary school. 
Source: Calculations based on primary ECHP data (7th wave, 2000).
Table 5





Percentage contribution (%) of "between-group"








(3 groups) Countryaggregate results of the decomposition of overall
inequality using the mean logarithmic deviation
(N) index for the 15 EU countries are presented in
Table 5.17 The first classification criterion used in
this table is the type of household. More specifi-
cally,  the  households  of  the  sample  were  all
divided into 12 non-overlapping groups, based on
the composition of the household and the age of
the household members. From the figures of col-
umn 3, we can see that there is no country where
“between household type” inequality accounts for
more than 18% of total inequality and that —with
the exception of Denmark, Sweden and Finland
(where this component scores 18.0%, 16.7% and
16.0% respectively)— this inequality is in fact less
than 15%. This specific component is particularly
small in Spain (2.7%), Italy (3.1%) and the other
southern  countries  (Greece  and  France  5.1%,
Portugal 6.4%). When further analysing the popu-
lation  shares  corresponding  to  each  type  of
household, we were able to draw an important
conclusion: in the less developed countries where
family  as  an  institution  is  still  comparatively
strong,  one-member  and  single-parent  house-
holds as well as younger couples without children
are comparatively fewer than in the more devel-
oped countries where the family institution has
weakened. For instance, one-member households
do not account for more than 20% of all house-
holds in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, but rep-
resent more than 30% in the other countries and
more  than  40%  in  the  Scandinavian  countries.
Ranking  the  different  types  of  households  by
mean  equivalent  disposable  income,  we  were
able to conclude that middle age group house-
holds with fewer children fared better than other
groups. In practically all countries, the mean dis-
posable income was found to be highest among
the  younger  households  without  children,  and
progressively  decreased  as  the  number  of  chil-
dren rose.
To  obtain  the  percentage  contribution  of
between-group inequality presented in the fourth
column of Table 5, we divided the population into
a total of 12 groups on the basis of the reference
person’s occupational status. Households whose
reference  person  was  currently  employed  were
placed in one of the first nine groups, while the
households whose head was outside the labour
market were placed in one of the last three (i.e.
unemployed,  pensioner,  housekeeper  or  other
economically  inactive  person,  see  explanatory
note at the bottom of Table 5). In 4 of the 15
countries, the occupational status of the house-
hold reference person was found to account for a
relatively high percentage of aggregate inequality.
More  specifically,  the  “between  occupation
group” inequality component represents 24.5% of
aggregate inequality in Portugal, 21.7% in Ireland,
21.3% in Spain and 20.9% in France. This specific
component,  however,  is  particularly  low  in
Germany  (3.3%)  and  ranges  around  10%  in
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. In several
cases,  the  population  shares  of  the  respective
occupational  groups  differ  significantly  across
countries. For instance, crop and animal farmers
account for a relatively high share of the total pop-
ulation in Greece and Portugal, as do manual pro-
fessions in the Mediterranean countries. In practi-
cally all of the EU-15, households whose refer-
ence person is either self-employed, a high-rank-
ing manager or executive or a technical assistant
were found to be in the best economic position.
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17 We have deliberately chosen to omit the results of the decom-
position obtained with the Theil index (T), since they do not differ
significantly from those presented in Table 5.Households, on the other hand, whose head is
unemployed were shown to be in the worst eco-
nomic  position,  followed  by  the  households
headed by crop/animal farmers and other manual
professions.
Finally,  the  percentage  of  aggregate  inequality
attributed to disparities between education-level
groups is presented in the last column of Table
5. More specifically, the households of the ECHP
sample  were  grouped  into  three  general  cate-
gories depending on the reference person’s edu-
cation: the higher (accredited tertiary) education
level, the middle (upper secondary) level and the
lower  secondary  level.  This  breakdown  of  the
population  into  only  three  education-level
groups  may  indeed  be  too  basic,  considering
that in several countries a large majority of the
population belongs to the third group. However,
even these basic findings are illustrative of the
relationship between education and inequality in
the EU, while these results must be interpreted
in the light of the human capital theory. The per-
centage of aggregate inequality that is attribut-
able  to  the  educational  differences  between
households,  in  spite  of  the  distinction  into
merely 3 groups, is 28.3% for Portugal, 23.4%
for Greece, 22.9% for Luxembourg and 20.0% for
Spain. These four countries all happen to have
the lowest level of inequality within their educa-
tion-level  groups  and  the  largest  group  differ-
ences in terms of mean income. In contrast, the
education factor seems to play a particularly lim-
ited  role  in  Austria  (6.1%)  and  the  United
Kingdom  (6.6%),  where  income  disparities
between  the  education-level  groups  are  rela-
tively small and where within-group inequality is
sometimes higher and in other cases lower than
aggregate inequality.
A number of interesting observations can be drawn
from  the  further  analysis  of  the  population  and
income  shares  of  the  respective  education-level
groups  used  to  calculate  the  figures  of  Table  5.
More specifically, the highest percentages of sec-
ondary and tertiary graduates are encountered in
the  United  Kingdom  (47.9%)  and  Belgium
(31.0%), while the educational level of the popu-
lation in the Mediterranean countries is consider-
ably lower than in the rest of the EU. It is worth
noting  that  84.4%  of  the  reference  persons  in
Portugal are concentrated in the lower education
level,  while  the  corresponding  percentages  for
Spain,  Italy  and  Greece  are  68.7%,  66.2%  and
60.1%. In addition, there is a strong positive cor-
relation  across  the  EU-15  between  the  educa-
tional level of the reference person and the house-
holds’ average disposable income. Thus, the aver-
age  disposable  income  of  households  with  the
highest educational level is more than three times
higher in Portugal and at least twice as high in
Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg and Greece than the
respective income of households with the lowest
educational  level.  Furthermore,  apart  from  very
rare exceptions in certain countries and groups,
the absolute levels of inequality within the various
education groups are significantly lower than the
absolute level of inequality for the population as a
whole. For instance, based on index N, the level
of inequality within the higher educational level
(university/college  graduates)  is  at  least  20%
lower in Greece, Ireland and especially Portugal
than for the population as a whole.
In  conclusion,  our  analysis  of  the  structure  of
inequality in the EU-15, using analytical income
data from the ECHP and the decomposition tech-
nique  of  the  mean  logarithmic  deviation  (index
N), showed that the occupational and in particu-
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 23   7/04 40lar the educational characteristics of the reference
persons often account for a significant percentage
of aggregate inequality. Each of these two factors
accounts for 20-28% of the existing income differ-
ences  in  all  of  the  Mediterranean  countries
(except Italy) and in Ireland.
The type of household contributes only 16-18% to
aggregate  inequality  in  Denmark,  Sweden  and
Finland,  while  none  of  the  other  mainly  demo-
graphic factors examined (gender, marital status,
age group, household size, etc.) was found to play
a significant role in aggregate inequality. Even the
combined contributions of these factors and the
application  of  multivariable  decomposition  tech-
niques,  as  well  as  the  sensitivity  analysis  with
regard to the equivalence scales used (Eurostat,
OECD) and to the reference unit (person or house-
hold), did not contradict the previous findings.18
6. Summary and conclusions
The  present  study  examined  the  structure  and
determinants  of  economic  inequality  in  Greece
and the EU-15 using micro-data from the latest
available Household Budget Survey (HBS) and the
7th wave of the ECHP survey.
Our  objective  was  to  examine  the  quantitative
dimensions, as well as the contribution of regional
inequalities to aggregate inequality in Greece. Our
findings  challenge  the  prevailing  view  that
regional inequalities play a particularly determi-
nant role in overall inequality and that further con-
vergence  between  Greece’s  regions  is  needed.
They also point to the possibly less known but
nonetheless  important  role  of  education  in  the
shaping of economic inequalities.
In spite of the significant mean differences pre-
sented by the various socio-economic groups of
the population in terms of consumption expendi-
ture  and  current  income,  aggregate  inequality
was found to be caused more by within-group
rather than by between-group disparities. These
results, which remained unchanged when differ-
ent population subgroups, inequality measures,
equivalence  scales  and  reference  units  were
used, also remained consistent over time. More
specifically,  when  dividing  the  population  by
region of residence, size of locality, demographic
characteristics  and  occupational  status  of  the
household head, within-group differences were
found to be accountable for over 83% of aggre-
gate inequality. Thus, no matter how much fund-
ing  is  allocated  to  completely  eliminating  the
between-group differences, aggregate inequality
will not be contained by more than 17% so long
as  within-group  differences  remain  unchanged.
However, when the population is broken down
into 5 basic groups depending on the household
heads’  education  level,  nearly  one  fourth  of
aggregate  inequality  is  attributed  to  disparities
between these education-level groups.
Turning to the question of the structure and deter-
minants of inequality in the 15 pre-enlargement
countries of the EU, the results of this analysis
show that, in Greece as most elsewhere, economic
inequalities are primarily due to within population
group disparities, which account for almost 3/4 of
aggregate inequality. Nevertheless, in most coun-
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18 As far as Greece is concerned, the results of the analysis pre-
sented in this section do not substantially contradict the results of
the same analysis conducted with micro-data from the Household
Budget Survey (HBS) and presented in previous sections. In both
analyses, only the educational and, to a lesser extent, the occupa-
tional characteristics of the population accounted for a relatively
higher share of aggregate inequality.tries (and first and foremost in the Mediterranean
countries  and  Ireland),  nearly  1/4  of  aggregate
inequality was found to be attributable to differ-
ences  between  the  population  groups  defined
according to their educational characteristics —
even  though  only  3  basic  groups  were  estab-
lished— and to a lesser extent to the occupational
characteristics of the household head.
Based on these conclusions, we can formulate cer-
tain proposals that could increase the efficiency of
policies targeted at reducing economic inequali-
ties,  although  certain  remarks  must  be  made
beforehand. First, the analysis conducted in this
study was based on the structure of income and
consumption  expenditures,  as  drawn  from  the
analytical data of the Household Budget Surveys
(HBSs)  and  the  ECHP.  Thus,  the  validity  of  our
findings depends on how reliably data has been
recorded by the specific surveys. Second, the pop-
ulation sample used in both the HBS and ECHP
surveys is made up of private households and thus
by definition excludes certain small, but possibly
very  poor  segments  of  the  population  (persons
who are homeless, confined to institutions or asy-
lums, etc.). Third, it is most likely that the non-
negligible  immigrant  share  of  the  population  in
Greece and other EU countries —particularly in
terms  of  illegal  entrants—  has  been  seriously
underestimated  in  the  sample  of  both  surveys.
Finally,  the  economic  and  fiscal  situation  of  the
country must always be taken into consideration
when  formulating  policy  proposals.  As  demon-
strated by the redistribution policies implemented
in Greece in the 1980s and from the experience of
several other countries, incomplete redistribution
policies can ultimately lead to economic stagna-
tion and serious undesired side-effects, after gen-
erating an initial phase of euphoria.
Taking these facts into consideration and based
on the findings of this study, we formulate cer-
tain proposals which could make social and eco-
nomic policy measures more effective in alleviat-
ing economic inequalities in both the short and
the long term. First, since inequality in the EU
stems primarily from differences within the vari-
ous  socioeconomic  groups,  policies  aimed  at
alleviating inequality should be “general” rather
than  “specific”.  General  policies  (for  instance,
tax policies, general welfare policies, etc.) apply
to the entire population and do not take specific
group characteristics into account. Specific poli-
cies (such as regional or agricultural policies), on
the other hand, are targeted at specific popula-
tion groups. Although specific policies may be
warranted for other reasons, our analysis indi-
cates that they are not very effective in reducing
economic inequality. Educational policies, how-
ever, stand out as a possible exception to this
general  finding.  Since  educational  inequalities
were more than any other factor shown to be
closely  linked  to  economic  inequality,  policies
aimed  at  reducing  educational  disparities  and
improving  the  human  capital  within  the  more
disadvantaged  groups  of  the  population  could
help reduce economic inequality in the long run.
Educational  policy  objectives  to  be  considered
include:  increasing  the  length  of  compulsory
education,  encouraging  participation  in  post-
compulsory levels of education and setting up
special tutoring schemes to assist the more dis-
advantaged groups of the population. Finally, as
shown by the results of this study, the possibly
greater  effectiveness  of  educational  policies  in
alleviating economic inequalities, far from being
specific to Greece, may very well also apply to
most of the EU-15, especially the Mediterranean
countries.
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Becker’s  human  capital  theory  interprets  differ-
ences in the earnings of women and men as the
result of differences in their abilities, knowledge
and acquired skills (or productive characteristics),
commonly called human capital (which includes
among other things the education and experience
of  the  employed).  According  to  this  theory,
returns on investment in productive characteris-
tics  or  “investment  in  human  capital”  are
expected to be the same for all employees, men
and women. However, studies for various coun-
tries and time periods have shown that returns on
investment in human capital are not the same for
the  two  genders  (Blau  and  Kahn,  1996;  Altonji
and Blank, 1999).
Various studies focus on the existence of wage
differentials between men and women. Particu-
larly after the seminal contributions of Oaxaca
(1973)  and  Blinder  (1973),  numerous  studies
were  carried  out  worldwide,  aiming  mainly  at
interpreting wage differentials —that is, the fact
that men receive higher earnings than women—
and examining whether such differentials reflect
differences in skills or constitute the unexplained
part of earnings differentials, in which case they
are often attributed to a “discrimination against
women”.
According to data drawn from the quarterly sam-
ple  surveys  on  earnings  conducted  by  the
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those  of  the  Bank  of  Greece.  Warm  thanks  are  extended  to
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their valuable comments and advice. Any errors are the responsi-
bility of the author.National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) —
most recent data concern 1998— the ratio of
female to male pay in key branches of the Greek
economy’s  secondary  sector  was  69.7%.1
Moreover, according to the European Community
Household  Panel  (ECHP)  —a  sample  survey  of
households  conducted  in  European  Union  (EU)
countries— the ratio of average gross hourly earn-
ings of women to those of men in the whole eco-
nomy was 86.8% in Greece (data from the 1998
survey), i.e. higher than the corresponding figure
in the EU, which was 83.8% (European Commis-
sion, 2002).2
This study aims at probing the existence of wage
differentials between male and female employees
in Greece and determining the factors that can
explain  them.  Specifically,  the  Oaxaca-Ransom
decomposition  analysis  is  used  to  explain  the
components  of  wage  differentials  and  verify
whether earnings differentials reflect differences
in  productive  characteristics  or  constitute  the
“unexplained  part”  of  earnings  differentials.
Using  the  quantile  regression  estimation  tech-
nique,  the  differences  between  men’s  and
women’s earnings in various deciles of the wage
distribution  are  estimated.  Then,  for  the  entire
spectrum of the wage distribution, the part of the
differential that is due to differences in the pro-
ductive characteristics of the employees and the
one constituting the “unexplained part” of earn-
ings differentials are estimated. The analysis uses
statistical data for Greece from the 1999 ECHP
referring to 1998 income data.
The study is divided into six sections. The second
section briefly describes some basic features of
the  Greek  labour  market  and  the  position  of
women in it. The third section specifies the vari-
ous theoretical and empirical approaches applied
in  the  study  and  analysis  of  wage  differentials
between men and women. The fourth section pre-
sents the variables and the methodology used in
the  empirical  analysis,  while  the  fifth  section
reports  the  empirical  results.  The  last  section
summarises the conclusions.
2. Some  key  features  of  the  Greek  labour
market
Although the Greek labour market and the posi-
tion of women in it present a number of peculiar-
ities, in many aspects they are similar to those of
the other EU countries.3 Throughout this section,
data refer to 2002 unless otherwise indicated.
Female labour supply in Greece has increased over
the last decades. Nevertheless, the rate of female
labour force participation (see Table 1), despite an
increase  over  the  years,  remains  considerably
lower (50.1%) than the average participation rate
of  women  in  the  EU  as  a  whole  (60.9%).
Moreover, women’s participation rate in Greece
remains considerably lower than men’s (76.6%).
The employment rate of women in Greece (42.5%)
is considerably lower than in the EU as a whole
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1 Averages  of  monthly  earnings  in  mining/quarrying/saltworks,
industry/small-scale  manufacturing  and  power/water  supply  for
the second quarter of 1998. Monthly earnings are regular earnings
plus overtime pay and other types of remuneration for 26 work-
ing days.
2 Analysis is based on the special sample survey (ECHP) of the EU
for 1998. Income data refer to 1997, although this is not men-
tioned in the European Commission report that presents them
(DG Employment and Social Affairs, Employment in Europe 2002,
Recent Trends and Prospects, p. 35).
3 Throughout this study EU data refer to the EU-15 (not the 25
Member States after the enlargement of the EU).(55.6%) and even lower than the target (60.0%) set
at the European Council of Lisbon for 2010.
In  Greece,  unemployment  especially  affects
women and the young. The unemployment rate of
women (15.0%) is considerably higher than that
of men (6.6%) and also considerably higher than
the  EU  average  for  women  (8.7%).  The  unem-
ployment rate of women aged 15-24 (34.3%) is
more than double the corresponding figure for the
EU as a whole (15.5%).
Considerable  divergences  are  observed  in  the
rates of female employment, labour force partici-
pation and unemployment across different educa-
tion  levels.4 Women’s  employment  and  labour
force participation rates increase as the level of
education rises. The employment and participa-
tion rates of women holding a university degree
are more than double those of women with lower
education levels. Among women, secondary edu-
cation graduates show the highest unemployment
rate while tertiary education graduates the lowest.
The degree of women’s integration into the labour
market  is  low,  as  evidenced  by  the  full-time 
Gender wage differentials in Greece
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4 For a detailed presentation of employment rates by education
level and gender in Greece and in the EU, see Papapetrou (2003).
Table 1
Employment indicators in Greece and in the European Union (2002)
(Breakdown by gender)
Greece ∂U
1 Employed persons aged 15-64 as a percentage of the population aged 15-64.
2 Unemployed persons aged 15 or over as a percentage of the labour force.
3 Labour force aged 15-64 as a percentage of the population aged 15-64.
4 As a percentage of total employment.
Source: European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs, Employment in Europe 2003, Recent Trends and Prospects.
Total:
— Employment rate1 56.7 64.3
— Unemployment rate2 10.0 7.7
— Labour force participation rate3 63.1 69.7
— Employment rate (full-time equivalent)1 56.3 58.9
— Part-time employment rate4 4.5 18.1
Men:
— Employment rate1 71.4 72.8
— Unemployment rate2 6.6 6.9
— Labour force participation rate3 76.6 75.4
— Employment rate (full-time equivalent)1 72.0 71.2
— Part-time employment rate4 2.3 6.5
Women:
— Employment rate1 42.5 55.6
— Unemployment rate2 15.0 8.7
— Labour force participation rate3 50.1 60.9
— Employment rate (full-time equivalent)1 41.3 46.8
— Part-time employment rate4 8.1 33.5equivalent employment rate (see Tables 1 and 2).5
In Greece, this rate is particularly low (41.3%), the
third lowest in the EU and well below the corre-
sponding  EU  average  (46.8%).  Moreover,  the
employment rate of women in Greece in full-time
equivalents falls considerably short of that of men
(72.0%), which in turn is slightly higher than the
corresponding EU average (71.2%).
Part-time employment —i.e. the number of those
employed part-time as a percentage of the total
number  of  the  employed—  is  more  than  three
times  higher  for  women  than  for  men  (8.1%
against 2.3%, respectively) but, overall, the share
of part-time employment in Greece (4.5%) is con-
siderably lower than the corresponding EU aver-
age (approximately 18%). Part-time employment
offers women the opportunity to reconcile work
with attending to the needs of their family, espe-
cially when the available child-care solutions are
insufficient or unaffordable. On the other hand,
part-time jobs are typically associated with limited
opportunities  for  career  advancement  and  with
lower remuneration (OECD, 1999).
Differences are also evident in the relative earn-
ings of men and women. According to NSSG 1998
data for Greece, the ratio of female employee aver-
age monthly earnings to male employee average
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1 Employed persons aged 15-64 as a percentage of the population aged 15-64, in full-time equivalents.
Source: European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs, Employment in Europe 2003, Recent Trends and Prospects.
Belgium 55.4 67.6 43.2 24.4
Denmark 69.7 76.7 63.1 13.6
Germany 58.1 69.9 46.4 23.5
Greece 56.3 72.0 41.3 30.7
Spain 56.2 72.2 40.1 32.1
France 60.4 70.4 50.9 19.5
Ireland 60.7 74.4 47.0 27.4
Italy 53.6 68.4 39.2 29.2
Luxembourg 60.9 76.0 45.7 30.3
Netherlands 63.0 74.8 51.4 23.4
Austria 63.0 74.8 51.4 23.4
Portugal 67.1 76.7 58.0 18.7
Finland 65.8 69.3 62.4 6.9
Sweden 68.1 72.9 63.4 9.5
United Kingdom 62.1 74.0 50.8 23.2
Total (EU-15) 58.9 71.2 46.8 24.4
Countries
5 The employment rate in full-time equivalent units is the total of
hours  worked  divided  by  the  average  annual  working  time
(hourly) of full-time employees, as a percentage of the population
aged 15 to 64.monthly  earnings  in  key  branches  of  the  Greek
economy’s secondary sector was 69.7%6 – more
specifically, 84.2% in mining-quarrying, 70.8% in
manufacturing and 62.7% in power/water supply.
According to 1998 data from the ECHP, in Greece
the  ratio  of  average  gross  hourly  earnings  of
women to those of men in the whole economy
was 86.8% (as already mentioned), while in the
EU  as  a  whole  it  was  83.8%  (see  Table  3).7
According  to  these  data,  the  ratio  of  female  to
male pay is higher than the EU average. A possi-
ble  explanation  mentioned  is  that,  in  countries
like Greece with low female labour force partici-
pation  rates,  the  women  participating  in  the
labour market are of a high education level, and as
a  result  wage  differentials  between  men  and
women are relatively narrow. In contrast, in coun-
tries  where  a  larger  proportion  of  women  of  a
lower level of education and skills participate in
the  labour  market,  wage  differentials  between
men and women tend to be wider (OECD, 2002).
Finally, according to OECD data (OECD, 2002),
working women in Greece have strong presence
in 14 occupations (out of a total of 115) which are
female-dominated (with a female share of 69% in
total on average).8 In contrast, three quarters of
working men have strong presence in 29 occupa-
tions.9
3. Theoretical framework and empirical 
evidence on the gender wage differential
Studies explaining the existence of wage differen-
tials between men and women follow one of two
different  approaches.10 The  first  approach  uses
quantitative  methods  to  determine  the  relative
strength of the various factors affecting the wage
differentials between the two genders. This is the
most  widely  used  empirical  approach  for  the
determination and analysis of these differentials.
One  such  quantitative  method  is  the  Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition, which is applied in order
to estimate the components of wage differentials
between men and women and examine whether
earnings  differentials  reflect  differences  in  the
skills of those employed, and thus in their produc-
tivity, or constitute the “unexplained part” of the
earnings  differentials.  Some  researchers  refer  to
this unexplainable part of wage differentials as the
“discrimination factor”. Others call it the “unex-
plained residual”, arguing that it reflects the effect
of certain differences between men and women
which  may  be  affecting  their  productivity  (and
therefore earnings) but cannot be observed. In that
sense, this residual includes the effects of “unob-
served heterogeneity”. Researchers using the term
“discrimination factor” consider that such discrim-
ination between men and women is truly at play in
the labour market and constitutes a social prob-
lem. In contrast, those opting for the term “unex-
plained residual” hold that the observed wage dif-
ferentials result from the perfect functioning of the
input market (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer,
2003).  According  to  the  proponents  of  this
method,  analysis  of  wage  differentials  between
Gender wage differentials in Greece
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6 See footnote 1.
7 See footnote 2.
8 OECD (2002), “Women at work: Who are they and how are
they  faring?”  in  Employment  Outlook  2002,  Chapter  2,  Table
2.11, p. 89, Paris.
9 For a breakdown of men and women in Greece by occupation
according to ECHP data for 1999 see Section 4, “Methodology
and statistical data”.
10 For a bibliographical overview of theoretical as well as empir-
ical studies on wage differentials between men and women see,
inter  alia,  Grimshaw  and  Rubery  (2002),  Weichselbaumer  and
Winter-Ebmer (2003) and Borjas (2000).men and women enables economic policy makers
to identify the factors explaining wage differentials
and thus to address these factors through appro-
priate policies. In contrast, critics of this method
argue that such analysis is based on some simpli-
fying  assumptions  concerning  the  operation  of
markets,  and  for  that  reason  remain  sceptical
towards its findings.
The second approach to the analysis of gender
wage differentials is the comparative institutional
approach. In this respect, differences in the earn-
ings  of  men  and  women  result  from  the
entrenched  institutional  norms  in  the  various
societies and reflect the structure and operation of
labour markets, the functioning of the market in
general, and the relative value attached to individ-
ual  occupations  within  each  society  (Grimshaw
and  Rubery,  2002).  Furthermore,  this  approach
posits  that  differences  in  wage  structures,  both
across  countries  and  over  time,  can  largely
explain the earnings differentials between the two
genders. These differentials are not explained by
differences in productivity and abilities, but reflect
contemporary and historical effects of social and
institutional  processes.  Labour  market  features,
such as a classification of occupations according
to  gender,  can  explain  the  wage  differentials
between the two genders better than an analysis
based on the skills of those employed. In order to
analyse  wage  differentials  between  men  and
women, this approach examines how societal dif-
ferences have led to a gender separation of occu-
pations and how relative earnings are determined
in female-dominated occupations. Critics of this
method argue that, according to the human capi-
tal theory, women rationally choose certain occu-
pations  and  avoid  others.  The  occupations
favoured by women require abilities that need not
be renewed often and therefore do not become
obsolete very quickly.
Studies probing the existence of wage differentials
between men and women in Greece are relatively
scarce. Psacharopoulos (1983) estimates earnings
differentials between women and men and posits
that these do not reflect differences in productive
characteristics.  Patrinos  and  Lambropoulos
(1993) show that, despite an increase in women’s
earnings in relation to men’s over time, earnings
differentials  attributable  to  productivity  differ-
ences account for little of the gross earnings gap.
Kanellopoulos and Mavromaras (2002) examine
the labour market participation process of the two
genders and the wage differentials between them
in Greece in 1988 and 1994. Following the “sam-
ple selection methodology” they study the factors
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Table 3
Gender pay ratios in the EU, 1998   
(average gross earnings)
Ratio of women’s average 
earnings to men’s average 
earnings
Note: Ratio  of  women’s  average  gross  hourly  earnings  with  respect  to
men’s  average  gross  hourly  earnings,  ECHP  (1998)  data  (for  all  of  the
employed working 15 hours or more). No data are available in 1998 for
Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden.
Source: European  Commission,  DG  Employment  and  Social  Affairs,














Countriesaffecting the decision to participate in the labour
market. Then, using this decision as an indepen-
dent variable in the wage equation, they examine
wage  differentials  between  men  and  women.
Karamessini  (2002)  argues  that  the  position  of
women in the Greek labour market has improved,
as reflected in the increased ratio of female-to-
male pay in most economic sectors during the last
two decades.
Equally limited is the number of studies exploring
the earnings differentials between men and women
in Greece in comparison with other countries. Rice
(1999), using ECHP 1995 data for eight EU coun-
tries  (Denmark,  Greece,  France,  Germany,  Italy,
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom),11 looks
into  the  case  of  Greece  compared  to  the  other
European countries. Finally, a recent study by the
OECD (OECD, 2002) on European and other coun-
tries includes Greece among the countries showing
the narrowest wage differentials between men and
women,  but  also  among  those  with  the  lowest
female employment rates. According to this study,
the relatively narrow differential in the earnings of
men and women is attributable to the fact that in
countries  with  low  female  participation  in  the
labour market the employed women have a higher
education level compared with the employed men,
as already mentioned.
However,  the  studies  explaining  wage  differen-
tials between men and women in Greece have not
looked at the earnings differentials between men
and women across the entire range of the wage
distribution and have not investigated the extent
to which the observed wage differentials reflect
differences  in  human  capital  or  constitute  the
unexplained part of the earnings differentials. The
present study seeks to fill this gap.
4. Methodology and statistical data
The method followed in this study for the empiri-
cal  approach  and  analysis  of  wage  differentials
between  men  and  women  is  a  variant  on  the
decomposition  technique  suggested  by  Oaxaca
and Ransom (1994).12 According to this method,
as a first step, three equations of wages are esti-




men Χ + Â
men (1)
and another for women
W
women = ‚
women Χ + Â
women (2)
where Wmen and Wwomen are the logarithms of the
men’s  and  women’s  wages  respectively,  X  is  a
vector of variables that describe the characteris-
tics  of  the  employed  (such  as  demographic,
human capital, or labour characteristics), ‚men and
‚women are the coefficients of the variables vector
Χ,13 and Âmen and Âwomen are the error terms for the
employed  men  and  women  respectively.  Once
wage equations (1) and (2) —i.e. one for men and
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11 As  well  as  Hungary,  based  on  data  from  the  Hungarian
Household Panel, a national survey on household budgeting.
12 Several researchers have used this triple equation methodology
and have applied the Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) decomposition
method  to  explain  components  of  wage  differentials.  Weichsel-
baumer  and  Winter-Ebmer  (2003)  provide  an  extensive  biblio-
graphical overview of studies that use the regression equation esti-
mation methodology, as well as the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
technique.  For  the  variation  of  the  Oaxaca  and  Ransom  (1994)
decomposition that is used in this study, see, inter alia, the study by
Christofidis and Pashardes (2000) for Cyprus.
13 In the equations of men’s and women’s earnings, the coeffi-
cients of the variables vector X, ‚men and ‚women, show the extent to
which  the  earnings  of  the  males  and  females  increase  with  an
increase in one human capital variable by one unit when all other
factors  remain  unchanged  (e.g.  the  extent  to  which  men’s  or
women’s earnings increase with one additional year of education).one  for  women—  are  estimated,  a  third  wage
equation is then estimated for all the employed,
men  and  women  together  (non-discriminatory
wage  structure).  This  triple  equation  estimation
technique for the estimation of wage differentials
between men and women enables a decomposi-
tion based on the modified Oaxaca and Ransom
(1994) methodology. It is thus possible to investi-
gate the extent to which differences between the
earnings of men and women are due to the differ-
ent productive characteristics and the extent to
which they constitute the “unexplained part” of
the earnings differentials – that is, the part which
remains unaccounted for and which many econo-
mists describe as “discrimination factor” or “dis-
criminations”.14 Furthermore, this method allows
for  the  decomposition  of  this  unexplained  part
into two constituents, the “male advantage” and
the “female disadvantage”.
To further illustrate the above, a more thorough
examination  of  the  Oaxaca-Ransom  (1994)
decomposition would be necessary. This decom-
position is based on the following equation:
 Wmen –  Wwomen= ( Χ men –  Χ women)
∧
‚total +










where the estimated ‚total are obtained employ-
ing the non-discriminatory wage structure. This
structure  is  estimated  by  pooling  male  and
female employees together. The symbol (∧) over
the variables indicates estimated values. The left
side of equation (3) estimates the difference in
average wages between men and women. The
first term on the right side of equation (3) esti-
mates the total difference between the two gen-
ders in the means of the independent variables
weighted by the estimated regression coefficient
of the estimated non-discriminatory wage struc-
ture. This term represents the part of the loga-
rithm of the earnings differential between gen-
ders attributable to the observed differences in
human  capital  or  productive  characteristics  of
the employed and is referred to as the “charac-
teristics  differential”  or  “justifiable  earnings”.
The second term on the right side of equation (3)
measures the total difference between the men
regression and the pooled regression for male
and female employees in the coefficients of the
estimated  wage  equations,  weighted  by  the
means of the regressors in the equation for men.
This term represents the part of the earnings dif-
ferential that is attributable to the “male advan-
tage”  –  i.e.  the  part  of  the  positive  difference
between the earnings of men and the average
earnings  of  men  and  women  together  that  is
solely due to the fact that they are men and not
to characteristics differentials. The third term on
the right side of equation (3) measures the total
difference  between  the  pooled  regression  for
men and women in the coefficients of the esti-
mated wage equations and women, weighted by
the means of the regressors in the equation for
women. This term shows which part of the earn-
ings differential is attributable to the “female dis-
advantage” – i.e. which part of the negative dif-
ference between the earnings of women and the
average earnings of men and women together is
solely due to the fact that they are women and
not to characteristics differentials.
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14 The unexplained part of earnings differentials can be seen as a
measure of the extent to which the earnings of an employed per-
son, man or woman, are different from those justifiable by his or
her qualifications.In  our  analysis,  the  decomposition  technique
suggested by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) along
with a quantile regression analysis is applied, in
order to estimate the differences between men’s
and women’s earnings in various deciles of the
wage  distribution  and  explain  which  part  of
these differences is due to characteristics differ-
entials  and  which  is  the  unexplained  part  of
earnings differentials, across the entire range of
the wage distribution.
The  empirical  analysis  uses  statistical  data  for
Greece  drawn  from  the  European  Community
Household  Panel  (ECHP).  This  questionnaire
dataset comprises information from all EU coun-
tries for eight time periods (i.e. the years 1994,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001).
The  survey  includes  questions  that  refer  to  the
household as a whole (demographic information,
income,  financial  standing  and  place  of  resi-
dence), as well as to the individual members of
each  household  (age,  marital  status,  education,
income, occupation, employment and health).
Out of this database, the following analysis draws
data  from  the  survey  conducted  for  Greece  in
1999 and referring to 1998 income. In 1999, the
total number of Greek interviewees was 9,574.
Excluding those still pursuing studies, the sample
was reduced to 2,070 observations collected from
(759  female  and  1,311  male)  informants  who
stated  that  they  worked  as  wage  earners.  The
study also excluded those interviewees who had
not  answered  all  of  the  questions  used  in  the
empirical investigation.
Table 4 presents the average values of the most
significant variables used in the empirical analysis,
broken down by gender. Wages are calculated as
the  logarithm  of  the  informant’s  regular  annual
income from wages.15 Experience is approximated
as the difference between the informant’s age and
the age at which he/she started working.
The statistical data reported in Table 4 show that
average annual income from wages is higher for
men. Women receive on average approximately
75% of the earnings received by men.16 A statisti-
cally significant difference is detected in the vari-
ables of age, experience, tertiary (college) educa-
tion and hours of work. Table 4 also reveals that
the  average  age  of  male  employees  is  about 
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15 This income does not include earnings from overtime employ-
ment.  Table  4  shows  that  women’s  average  annual  earnings
amount to 2,280,716 drachmas while men’s come to 3,048,011
drachmas.
16 This ratio refers to annual earnings and is lower than the ratio
mentioned in the introduction with reference to hourly earnings
(86.8%). As noted further below, men typically work more hours
than women, a fact that explains, at least partly, the difference





Note: Definitions of the variables can be found in the Appendix.
Source: Calculations based on ECHP (1999) data.




Secondary education 0.41 0.38
College education 0.34 0.25
Marital status
(unmarried) 0.24 0.26
Public sector 0.42 0.39
Hours of work 37.09 41.51
Number of children
less than 16 years old 0.72 0.78
Variables3  years  higher  than  the  average  age  of  female
employees. Moreover, working men’s experience
appears to be greater than that of women’s (on
average  by  5  years).  The  percentage  of  tertiary
education graduates is higher among women than
among men. In contrast, no statistically significant
difference is detected between the percentages of
male and female secondary education graduates.
Male employees seem to work at least four hours
more per week than women.17 Furthermore, no
statistically significant differences are detected in
relation to marital status and number of children.
For the most part, employed men and women are
married and have on average one child less than
16 years old.
Table 5 shows the breakdown of men and women
by  occupation.  Women  form  the  larger  part  of
clerks (52.5%) and unskilled workers (52.2%). The
employment  of  women  as  senior  officials  and
managers is particularly low compared with that
of men, given that only 20% of such positions are
occupied  by  women  while  only  1.3%  of  all
employed  women  hold  managerial  posts.  As  a
percentage of the total employees for the specific
gender considerably more women (26.7%) than
men (14%) work as clerks. Therefore, significant
differences  are  detected  between  the  genders
with respect to basic characteristics and type of
employment,  which  justify  separate  estimations
for men and women.
Table 6 shows the distribution of wages of males
and females in the 10th, the 25th, the 50th, the
75th and the 90th percentile. It also presents a
measure of wage dispersion, the 0.9-0.10 spread.
This spread is wider for female employees than
for male ones, which means that men’s earnings
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 23   7/04 56
17 In the sample at hand, 7.4% of women and 3.2% of men work
as  part-time  employees.  The  difference  between  men’s  and
women’s hours of work remains statistically significant even when
the sample is divided into those employed part-time and those
employed full-time. Specifically, this difference of four hours for
full-time employees is reduced to approximately two hours for
those employed part-time.
Table 5
Breakdown of men and women by occupation
Female Male
Note: Non-parenthesised: For each occupation category, percentages out of total covered by men and women respectively.
Parenthesised: For each gender, percentage working in individual occupation categories.
Source: Calculations based on ECHP (1999) data.
Legislators, senior officials and managers 20.0 (1.3) 80.0 (3.1)
Professionals 45.7 (21.7) 54.3 (15.0)
Technicians and associate professionals 49.7 (12.3) 50.3 (7.2)
Clerks 52.5 (26.7) 47.5 (14.0)
Service workers and shop and market sales employees 42.1 (14.5) 57.9 (11.5)
Skilled agricultural workers and fishery workers 31.8 (0.9) 68.2 (1.1)
Craft and related trade workers 16.4 (7.5) 83.6 (22.1)
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 8.3 (2.5) 91.7 (16.0)
Elementary occupations 52.2 (12.4) 47.8 (6.6)
Occupationare  more  compressed.  It  appears  that,  for  all
deciles of the wage distribution, men earn more
than women (for the corresponding deciles of the
wage  distribution).  The  same  table  also  shows
that the difference between the earnings of men
and women declines as we move from the 1st
decile of the wage distribution towards the 5th
decile (or 2nd quartile), and then increases again
up to the 9th decile of the wage distribution.
Furthermore,  non-parametric  methods  (kernel
density  estimators)  are  used  to  examine  the
wage distributions between the two genders. In
particular,  distributions  were  calculated  based
on  the  “kernel  estimator”.  The  chart  presents
men’s and women’s wage distributions respec-
tively  and  shows  that  earnings  for  men  are
higher and less dispersed than for women.18
Empirical analysis estimates three wage models
(one for the entire sample, one for men and one
for women), using variables referring to the per-
sonal  and  productive  characteristics  of  the
employed.19 Aside  from  such  variables,  wage
estimation  models  also  include  variables  refer-
ring to the interviewee’s occupation and place of
residence.20
5. Empirical results
Separate  wage  equations  for  the  entire  sample
(men and women pooled together), for men and
women  have  been  estimated.21,22 The  results
show that, for both genders, annual earnings from
wages are affected by the personal characteristics,
the  human  capital,  the  working  hours,  the
employment sector, the type of employment, the
occupation  and  the  location  of  work.  For  most
variables,  the  estimated  coefficients  are  statisti-
cally significant for all three equations.
Comparison between the estimated coefficients
reveals that the effect of secondary and tertiary
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18 The logarithm of average earnings and the standard deviation
are, respectively, 14.93 and 0.618 for male employees, and 14.64
and 0.662 for female employees.
19 Specifically, the analysis estimates wage equations as outlined
in Section 3.
20 The dependent and independent variables of the wage models
used in the empirical analysis of wage differentials between men
and  women  are  presented  in  the  Appendix.  Specifically,  the
Appendix presents all the variables used as independent variables
in the wage estimation equations.
21 The standard deviations, and thus the t statistics calculated for
the estimated coefficients, have been corrected for heteroscedas-
ticity following White’s method.
22 The  results  of  the  wage  equations  estimation  carried  out
according to the ordinary least squares method are not presented
here, but are available from the author.
Table 6
Wage differentials between genders
90%-10%
spread 90% 75% 50% 25% 10%
Quartile or decile
Note: Figures in logarithmic form.
10% = 1st decile, 25% = 1st quartile, 50% = 2nd quartile, 75% = 3rd quartile, 90% = 9th decile, 90%–10% spread = difference between the 9th and the
1st decile.
Source: Calculations based on ECHP (1999) data.
Male 14.426 14.746 14.978 15.174 15.384 0.958
Female 14.047 14.463 14.732 14.916 15.085 1.038education  on  earnings  is  stronger  for  women
than for men. The estimated coefficients show
that compared with men, women have higher
returns on education for a given level of educa-
tion attainment. Work experience has a particu-
larly significant effect on earnings for men and
women alike. The results show that the wage-
experience curve is bell-shaped. On the basis of
the  estimated  coefficients,  work  experience
seems  to  be  raising  the  earnings  of  women
more  than  those  of  men.  Therefore,  these
results  suggest  that  the  effects  of  experience
and education on wages are greater for women
than for men. Full-time employment increases
earnings  for  both  genders,  but  its  effect  is
greater  for  men.  Marital  status,  age,  working
hours, professional skills and place of residence
have  statistically  significant  coefficients  and
affect earnings for both genders. Finally, most
occupation  coefficients  are  statistically  signifi-
cant for both genders.
Wage decomposition
The Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) decomposition
analysis can be used to attribute gender wage
differentials  to:  (i)  observed  differences  in  the
human capital or productive characteristics and
(ii) the part that remains unexplained, in particu-
lar differences stemming from some “advantage”
that  men  have  and  from  some  “disadvantage”
that women have.
Table 7 presents a breakdown of the differences
in wages between the two genders for the entire
sample, as well as for the 1st and the 9th deciles
and by quartile. This analysis provides important
information on the differences between the earn-
ings of the two genders, as it decomposes wage
differentials  into  one  part  attributable  to  differ-
ences in endowment, one part reflecting a pre-
sumed “male advantage” and another part reflect-
ing a presumed “female disadvantage”.
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that, for the entire sample, the most influential
factor behind the differences in employee earn-
ings between the two genders is the unexplained
part  of  the  earnings  differential,  as  further
decomposed  into  a  “male  advantage”  and  a
“female disadvantage”. In contrast, differences in
endowment seem to explain a smaller fraction of
the  wage  differential.  That  is,  only  the  smaller
part of wage differentials stems from differences
in  the  productive  characteristics  of  men  and
women. Specifically, for the entire sample, differ-
ences  in  the  employees’  characteristics  explain
40.6% of the gender wage differential, while the
remaining 59.4% is the unexplained part. Out of
this, 21.9 percentage points are characterised as
the  “male  advantage”,  i.e.  the  fact  that  men
receive higher wages compared with the total of
the employed men and women, even when both
men and women have the same productive char-
acteristics. The remaining 37.5 percentage points
are the “female disadvantage”, i.e. the fact that
women receive on average lower earnings com-
pared with the total of the employed (both gen-
ders), even when they have the same productive
characteristics.
In a next step, wage differentials are examined as
we move from the 1st to the 9th decile. These
results suggest that the difference between men’s
and women’s earnings is sizeable in the 1st decile,
tends to decrease towards the higher deciles up to
the 5th, and increases again thereafter. In the 1st
decile, differences in the abilities, skills and knowl-
edge of the employed explain 39.5% of the gender
wage  differential,  while  60.7%  represents  the
unexplained part. Out of this “unexplained resid-
ual”,  35.6  percentage  points  constitute  the
“female disadvantage” and 25.1 percentage points
the “male advantage”. In the 1st quartile, approxi-
mately 37% of the wage differential is attributable
to the characteristics differential and the remaining
63% is the unexplained part. The 35 percentage
points of this unexplained part of the earnings dif-
ferential constitute the “female disadvantage” and
the approximately 28 remaining percentage points
are the “male advantage”. In the 5th decile (or 2nd
quartile)  the  difference  between  men’s  and
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Table 7
Decomposition of wage differentials between male and female employees (1999)
90% 75% 50% 25% 10% Total
Quartile or decile
Note: Figures in logarithmic form.
10% = 1st decile, 25% = 1st quartile, 50% = 2nd quartile, 75% = 3rd quartile, 90% = 9th decile.
Source: Calculations based on ECHP (1999) data.
Wage gap 0.288 0.379 0.283 0.246 0.258 0.299
Differences in the 
productive characteristics  
of the employed 0.117 0.149 0.104 0.087 0.104 0.103
Male advantage 0.063 0.095 0.079 0.055 0.039 0.067
Female disadvantage 0.108 0.135 0.100 0.104 0.115 0.129women’s earnings takes the lower value (0.246)
and the earnings differential explained by differ-
ences in the productive characteristics is 35.4%,
while the unexplained part of the earnings differ-
ential is 64.6%. In the 3rd quartile, 40.3% of the
earnings differential is attributable to the produc-
tive characteristics and the remaining 59.7% is the
unexplained part. In the 2nd and 3rd quartile of
the wage distribution, the “female disadvantage”
forms the larger part of the unexplained part of the
earnings differential. In the 9th decile, the gender
wage differential takes the second highest value
(0.299). Differences in the productive characteris-
tics of the employed explain 34.4% of this differ-
ential and the unexplained part is 65.6%, of which
22.4  percentage  points  constitute  the  “male
advantage”  and  43.2  percentage  points  are  the
“female disadvantage”.
The foregoing analysis indicates that: (i) both for
the entire sample and for the various quantiles of
the  wage  distribution,  men  receive  on  average
higher earnings than women; (ii) the wage differ-
ential between men and women decreases as we
move  up  to  the  5th  decile  and  then  increases;
(iii) only the smaller fraction of the wage differen-
tial is a result of the fact that working men and
women have different productive characteristics;
and (iv) the unexplained part of the wage differ-
ential,  to  which  many  economists  refer  as  the
“discrimination factor”, is explained mainly by the
“disadvantage” that working women have and to
a lesser extent by the “advantage” that working
men have.
6. Conclusions
The aim of this study was to investigate the exis-
tence  of  wage  differentials  between  men  and
women across the entire range of the wage distrib-
ution  and  to  identify  the  factors  explaining  these
wage differentials. The empirical analysis has used
statistical data for Greece, drawn from the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP) for 1999.
Applying  quantile  regression  estimation  tech-
niques, the study estimated the wage differential
between genders across the entire range of the
wage distribution, as well as in its various deciles.
Finally,  applying  a  variant  of  the  Oaxaca  and
Ransom  decomposition  method,  it  sought  to
explain the extent to which the gender wage dif-
ferentials reflect differences in the abilities, skills
and knowledge (or productive characteristics) of
the employed, or constitute the unexplained part
of  the  wage  differential,  or  “discrimination  fac-
tor”, which is attributable to some “male advan-
tage” or some “female disadvantage”, both for the
entire sample as well as in various deciles of the
wage distribution.
The brief overview of the Greek labour market
and women’s position in it revealed in summary
the following: In Greece, female participation and
employment  rates  are  low,  while  the  female
unemployment  rate  is  high.  Women’s  employ-
ment  and  labour  force  participation  rates
increase  as  their  level  of  education  rises.
Women’s  integration  into  the  labour  market  is
low  and  their  employment  rate  in  Greece  falls
considerably short of the men’s employment rate
(in full-time equivalent units). Also, the ratio of
women’s earnings to those of men is higher than
the EU average.
The analysis of the data shows that male employees
are  older  and  more  experienced  than  female
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respect to the level of education. The percentage of
women with tertiary education is higher than that of
men. In contrast, no significant difference in per-
centages  is  detected  between  male  and  female
employees  with  secondary  education.  Non-para-
metric investigations show that the earnings of men
are higher and less dispersed than those of women.
Men’s earnings are on average higher than those of
women. The ratio of women’s average earnings to
men’s average earnings stands at 75% for the entire
sample of employees, i.e. the earnings of women
are on average 25% lower than those of men. Men
receive  on  average  higher  earnings  than  their
female counterparts in the same decile of the wage
distribution.  The  wage  differential  between  men
and women decreases as we move from the 1st
decile  (the  lower  end)  of  the  wage  distribution
towards  and  up  to  the  5th  decile,  and  then
increases again up to the 9th decile (the top end).
Women in the bottom decile of the wage distribu-
tion receive on average approximately 68% of the
earnings received by their male colleagues, i.e. they
receive 32% less than men. Women in the 1st and
the 2nd quartile of the wage distribution receive
respectively 75% and 78% of the earnings of their
male colleagues. Women in the two top quartiles of
the wage distribution receive respectively 77% and
74% of their male colleagues’ earnings.
The results of the quantile regression analysis
show that, for the entire sample, differences in
the productive characteristics of the employed
explain approximately 40% of the wage differen-
tial between the genders, while the unexplained
part of that differential (“unexplained residual”
or “discrimination factor against women”) is the
remaining some 60%. Out of this, about 22 per-
centage points are characterised as an “advan-
tage”  of  men,  i.e.  the  fact  that  working  men
receive higher earnings because they are men
and not because they have different productive
characteristics, and the remaining 38 percent-
age  points  are  the  “disadvantage”  of  women,
i.e.  the  fact  that  they  receive  lower  earnings
because they are women and not because they
have different human capital characteristics. The
same picture is drawn in all deciles of the wage
distribution, as it seems that the gender wage
differentials are not explained by the different
productive characteristics of the employed but
rather  constitute  the  unexplained  part  of  the
earnings differential or a discrimination against
women.
A future study should investigate how wage dif-
ferentials  between  men  and  women  in  Greece
have evolved over time. Further research in that
direction would be quite valuable and could lead
to useful conclusions and policy proposals.
Gender wage differentials in Greece
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As dependent variable in the wage equations esti-
mation models this study uses the logarithm of
the interviewee’s income from wages. A number
of variables referring to the interviewee’s personal
and  human  capital  characteristics  are  used  as
independent variables. The “marital status” vari-
able takes the value 1 for unmarried employees
and 0 otherwise. The “secondary education” vari-
able takes the value 1 when the interviewee has
completed secondary but not tertiary education
and 0 otherwise. The “college education” variable
takes the value 1 when the interviewee is a ter-
tiary  education  graduate  and  0  otherwise.  The
“age” variable measures the interviewee’s age in
years.
The  “experience”  variable  measures  the  infor-
mant’s  experience  in  years,  while  the  “experi-
ence2”  variable  is  equal  to  the  square  of  the
“experience”  variable.  The  “full-time  employ-
ment” variable is a dummy variable that takes the
value  1  when  the  interviewee  is  a  full-time
employee  and  0  when  he/she  is  a  part-time
employee.  The  “public  sector”  variable  is  a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the
interviewee  works  in  the  public  sector  and  0
when  the  interviewee  is  a  private-sector
employee.  The  “number  of  children  under  16”
variable is the number of children less than 16
years old who are members of the household to
which the interviewee belongs.
The “skills” variable is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 for interviewees who believe that they
are endowed with skills not utilised in their current
choice  of  employment.  Moreover,  the  variables
from  “legislators,  senior  officials  and  managers”
through to “elementary occupations” refer to the
informant’s  type  of  employment  (occupation).
Specifically, these are dummy variables that take the
value 1 for interviewees who stated that they are in
the corresponding occupation and 0 for those who
stated that they follow a different line of work. For
example, if the interviewee is a technician, then the
“technician” variable takes the value 1 and all other
occupation variables take the value 0. Finally, the
model  includes  variables  describing  the  infor-
mant’s location of work. Thus, the “islands” vari-
able is a dummy variable that takes the value 1
when the interviewee’s place of work is on one of
the Greek islands and 0 otherwise; the “central”
variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1
for interviewees who work somewhere in Central
Greece and 0 for those who work elsewhere; the
“north” variable takes the value 1 for interviewees
who work in Northern Greece and 0 for those who
work elsewhere.
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This study investigates cost efficiency in a panel of
Greek  banks  over  1993-1999,  a  period  charac-
terised by major changes in the banking sector. The
deregulation of the financial system, the liberalisa-
tion of external transactions and the completion of
the European internal market have led to intensified
competition  among  financial  institutions.  In  this
regard,  concerns  about  the  long-run  competitive
viability of various Greek banks in the new environ-
ment have been raised. Accordingly, the objective of
the paper is to investigate the efficiency of Greek
banks and how it has evolved in recent years. More
specifically, the aim is to shed light on the following:
(1)  whether  all  banks  are  cost  efficient,  that  is
whether all banks operate on or close to the best
practice cost frontier; (2) whether larger banks enjoy
a cost advantage over smaller competitors, that is,
whether the system is characterised by important
economies of scale; and (3) whether factor produc-
tivity has changed over time, that is, whether banks
have benefited from technical progress.
To measure cost efficiency, the distribution free
approach  is  employed,  whereby  a  fixed  effects
model is applied to the data. Technical progress
can be incorporated in the model. Furthermore,
the estimated parameters can be used to calculate
scale economies.
The  results  obtained  indicate  that  important
cost  X-inefficiencies  are  in  place.  Some  evi-
dence  is  provided  that  bank  characteristics
such  as  bank  size,  type  of  ownership  and 
risk  behaviour  affect  inefficiency.  Technical
progress  was  found  to  have  marked  effects 
in  particular  years  through  the  examined
period.  Examination  of  scale  economies  indi-
cates that the Greek banking industry experi-
ences  economies  of  scale,  though  they  have
declined throughout the observed period. This
suggests that competitive viability may be an
important factor for further consolidation in the
Greek banking industry.
Cost efficiency in Greek banking
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A large part of the empirical literature on mone-
tary transmission uses vector autoregressive mod-
els  (VARs).  However,  isolating  the  economic
effects of monetary policy shocks in these models
is  not  straightforward,  as  the  response  of  eco-
nomic  variables  to  monetary  policy  impulses
reflects the combined effect of the policy actions
and  of  the  variables  to  which  policy  responds.
This identification problem is addressed with the
imposition of a number of identifying restrictions
based on economic theory.
In many cases the empirical analysis made on the
basis of identified VARs leads to puzzling responses
of some of the variables included in the system to a
monetary policy innovation. The positive response
of the price level to a monetary policy tightening –
the price puzzle – is the most often cited puzzle in
the literature and is viewed as evidence of a serious
misspecification problem in the underlying system
and in particular in the model’s equation describing
the monetary policy reaction function.
Several proposals to solve the price puzzle have
been put forward. Most of them attempt to deal
with  the  major  disadvantages  of  the  VAR
approach, i.e. the inadequate description of the
central  bank’s  operating  procedures  and  the
insufficient amount of information incorporated in
the analysis due to the small number of variables
that can be included in a VAR system.
In  this  paper  we  suggest  a  VAR  specification
that  proves  to  be  successful  in  resolving  the
price puzzle featuring in monetary VARs for the
US. This specification addresses the disadvan-
tage of the VAR model associated with its abil-
ity to handle directly issues related to the for-
ward-looking behaviour of the central bank. We
show that augmenting a standard VAR with a
small number of variables that have forward-
looking informational content is capable of pro-
ducing  theory-consistent  responses  to  mone-
tary policy shocks. The VAR is estimated for the
US with data covering the period 1989-2001, a
period  characterised  by  a  relatively  homoge-
neous  monetary  policy  regime  and  a  pro-
nounced price puzzle in standard VAR specifi-
cations. Most important among these forward-
looking variables are (i) the federal funds rate
future reflecting expectations of future mone-
tary policy and (ii) a leading composite indica-
tor  providing  information  about  near-term
developments in economic activity. The signifi-
cant steps towards greater openness, account-
ability and transparency of monetary policy that
have  been  taken  during  the  last  fifteen  years
have  increased  the  ability  of  the  markets  to
anticipate policy actions and this makes finan-
cial  market  instruments,  such  as  the  federal
funds rate futures, ideal candidates for incorpo-
rating parsimoniously a large amount of infor-
mation into a low-dimension VAR.
Forward-looking information in VAR models and the price puzzle
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The paper, after reviewing briefly the early steps
of  European  monetary  integration  and  key  ele-
ments  of  the  EMU  project  as  reflected  in  the
Treaty of Maastricht, analyses the monetary inte-
gration  strategy  and  convergence  experience  of
Member  States,  notably  that  of  Greece,  in  the
1990s  which  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  euro.
From this analysis, a number of lessons are drawn
which may be useful, in the light of enlargement,
to future candidates for euro area membership in
designing their economic and monetary conver-
gence strategies.
Such  lessons  include  the  comprehensive  and
coherent character of the convergence effort, the
strong commitment to the objective of euro mem-
bership as a factor limiting uncertainty, the right
setting of priorities in pursuing the convergence
criteria and the importance of a sound financial
system in ensuring a safe and sustainable conver-
gence. It is argued that macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion, pursued in order to achieve the nominal con-
vergence criteria, is also compatible with real con-
vergence, as the two processes can be mutually
re-enforcing,  notably  if  the  process  of  nominal
convergence acquires enhanced credibility, thus
affecting the formation of key variables such as
interest rates, wages and prices. Moreover, con-
vergence of the economies of the new members
to the EU average will be supported by funds allo-
cated through the EU budget.
ERM II should be seen as a mechanism testing the
consistency  of  policies,  encouraging  necessary
adjustment and helping to achieve convergence. It
provides both more flexibility and stability com-
pared  with  earlier  versions  of  the  mechanism.
ERM II rules are flexible enough to accommodate
a number of new member states’ exchange rate
regimes,  except  those  of  free  floating  and  cur-
rency boards based on currencies other than the
euro. The alleged merits of free floating regimes
—notably the extra degree of monetary and eco-
nomic  policy  freedom—  must  be  carefully
weighed against the risks involved, i.e. loss of an
external  nominal  anchor  and  the  risk  that  the
exchange rate drifts away from fundamentals. The
choice of exchange rate regime should be made,
in each case, not on grounds of facility —e.g. to
avoid the ERM II constraint or because the current
regime served the country concerned well in the
past— but only as part of a plan to achieve spe-
cific policy objectives before joining ERM II.
Risks of destabilising capital movements can be
considerably reduced by the implementation of
sound and sustainable economic policies; fur-
thermore,  transparency  and  openness  in  eco-
nomic policy reduce uncertainty about current
policies and future plans, contributing to a sta-
ble economic and financial environment. Capital
movements also provide timely information to
the  authorities  about  inconsistent  and  unsus-
tainable policies, enabling corrective action to
be taken. However, massive short-term capital
movements  may  occur  and  the  authorities
should be in a position to cope with such a sit-
uation. Monetary authorities have at their dis-
EMU strategies: lessons from past experience in view of EU enlargement
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Theodoros S. Papaspyrouposal  instruments  to  deal  effectively  with  the
undesirable  effects  of  massive  capital  move-
ments, such as interest rate changes and sterili-
sation operations. Such measures may not con-
stitute lasting solutions, but make it possible to
cope with a difficult situation, gaining time in
order to develop more sustainable solutions by
adapting economic policies and improving the
policy mix.
Finally,  available  evidence  from  the  operation  of
monetary union so far, in particular the persistence
of relatively high inflation and sizeable fiscal imbal-
ances  —notably  high  public  debt—  in  some
Member  States,  suggest  that  the  effort  to  ensure
sound public finances and improve the competitive-
ness of the economy and its overall performance
must be a permanent process and not be limited to
satisfying the Maastricht convergence criteria.
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We compare monetary union to flexible exchange
rates in an asymmetric, three-country model with
active monetary policy. The features of our model
include nominal wage rigidities, active monetary
policy (Taylor rules), complete asset markets and
a variety of shocks (supply, fiscal and monetary).
Three  international  monetary  arrangements  are
considered: flexible exchange rates for all three
countries, a two-country monetary union with the
third country pursuing a floating regime (we call
this “mixed”) and a catholic monetary union. Our
main results can be summarised as follows:
In the benchmark case of perfect symmetry, coun-
tries are better off when they participate in a cur-
rency  union  and  the  benefits  increase  with  the
number of participants. The gains can be significant
when the degree of nominal wage rigidity is high,
but they tend to be small when rigidity is low. This
contrasts  with  the  traditional  optimum  currency
area (OCA) analysis as well as Friedman’s (1953)
case for flexible rates (namely, that they fare well
when wage rigidity is high) and obtains in spite of
the fact that policy is activist. The improvement in
welfare comes from three sources. First, from the
existence of nominal wage rather than price rigidi-
ties. Second, from the existence of important sup-
ply and monetary shocks. For fiscal shocks, flexible
rates fare better (for the reasons suggested in the
traditional OCA literature, see also Poole, 1970).
Third, from the fact that the model uses foreign
intermediate goods in domestic production. This
implies  that  an  exchange  rate  change  that  has
favourable  effects  on  the  demand  for  domestic
products  has  unfavourable  effects  on  the  supply
side  of  the  economy  as  it  increases  the  cost  of
domestic production.
We also show that asymmetries in wage flexibil-
ity across countries play a more important role in
the evaluation of alternative regimes than other
types of asymmetries (e.g. in the shocks, mone-
tary policy etc.). Countries with substantial wage
rigidities benefit from monetary union, especially
when their partners are equally rigid. Countries
with relatively more flexible wages are better off
when they stay out. When we take into account
the various sources of actual asymmetries that
exist in the EU, we find that substantially greater
wage flexibility in the UK relative to France and
Germany would discourage her from forming a
currency union. In contrast, France and Germany
always  benefit  from  forming  a  currency  union.
Whether they would also like to include the UK
or not depends on the type of monetary policy
rules considered.
To be published in The Economic Journal.
Wage rigidity and monetary union
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Conceptually and empirically, considerable atten-
tion has focused in recent years on the idea that
the  degree  of  inflation  persistence  depends  on
the  monetary  policy  regime.  Empirical  studies,
mainly dealing with the US economy and other
industrial  economies  and  applying  different
methodologies,  have  found  abundant  evidence
that post-war inflation in these countries exhibits
very high persistence.
We define inflation persistence as the “speed with
which inflation returns to baseline after a shock”
(Willis 2003). Following the typology proposed by
Batini and Nelson (2001) and Batini (2002), mea-
sures of inflation persistence refer, first, to posi-
tive serial correlation in inflation series, second, to
lags between systematic monetary policy actions
and their peak effect on inflation and, third, to
lagged responses of inflation to policy shocks.
This paper presents a model-free assessment of
the time profile of inflation persistence for the
Greek economy from 1975 to 2003. Greece is a
country with a high variance in inflation which
has  experienced  a  variety  of  policy  regimes
post-1975 that might have considerably affected
the behaviour of inflation process both in the
sense of the steady state inflation rate and its
autocorrelation properties. In particular, during
this period, major inflation peaks occurred, in
1979-80, 1985-86 and 1990; on each occasion,
inflation rose to at least 20%. By 1995, however,
the annual rate of inflation had fallen for the first
time during the period to single-digit levels and,
by  the  late  1990s,  had  fallen  even  further.
Moreover, the post-1975 period has also been
characterised by changes in the monetary policy
regime. Prior to 1990, monetary policy was not
effective at reducing inflation. Subsequently, the
effectiveness  of  monetary  policy  increased
while deregulation and expansion of the Greek
financial market was set in motion and, begin-
ning in 1995, monetary policy was successful in
curbing  price  pressures  and  bringing  inflation
down to a level consistent with the Maastricht
criterion.
Based on different definitions of persistence pro-
posed in the empirical literature, we offer purely
statistical evidence on the autocorrelation proper-
ties of the inflation series, as well as on the slug-
gish  response  of  inflation  to  monetary  policy
changes, using quarterly macro data for CPI infla-
tion  in  Greece.  To  this  end,  two  empirical
methodologies,  univariate  autoregressive  (AR)
modelling and second generation random coeffi-
cient (RC) modelling are employed. The advan-
tage  of  RC  modelling  is  that  it  estimates  time-
varying  inflation  persistence  and  relaxes  key
restrictions,  such  as  a  specific  functional  form,
often imposed in empirical literature. The empiri-
cal results from all the procedures employed and
definitions  used  indicate  that  Greek  inflation  is
rather  persistent  in  the  period  under  study.
Overall, the methods provide qualitatively similar
results, even though the RC estimation produces
slightly lower estimated values for the persistence
parameter.
Inflation persistence during periods of structural change: an assessment using Greek data
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In particular, according to the autoregressive esti-
mates  using  classical  analysis  and  the  RC  esti-
mates, CPI inflation persistence was high during
the inflationary period and the first six years of the
disinflationary period. Only after 1997 did it start
to decline. There appears to have been a sizeable
shift in the mean of Greek inflation over the past
twenty-five years, but only a small shift in inflation
persistence. However, concerning the normative
aspects of persistence, inflation persistence does
not have the same notion in an inflationary period
(vicious circle) as in disinflation (virtuous circle).
For example, the persistence of the 1970s and the
1980s  is  more  of  the  type  we  would  associate
with negative effects – a shock occurred which
raised  inflation  and  inflation  returned  only  very
slowly to its previous low level. By contrast, the
persistence  of  the  1990s  results  from  steadily
falling inflation which can hardly have a negative
connotation.
Rolling regressions were also applied as an alter-
native way of analysing the influence of structural
breaks  in  the  coefficients  of  the  autoregressive
process. We found that the sample mean of the
inflation  rate  had  dropped  dramatically  in  the
1990s, while the persistence parameter started to
decline only by the end of the sample.
We  are  also  interested  in  identifying  whether
inflation  responds  with  a  delay  to  changes  in
monetary  policy  and  whether  this  delay  varies
with monetary policy regime switches. We try to
determine the length of the response of inflation,
i.e. the number of periods it takes for a change in
monetary policy to have its peak effect on infla-
tion.  The  estimated  correlations  between  CPI
inflation and different policy stance measures sug-
gest that inflation, in the period under considera-
tion, responded with a certain delay to changes in
monetary policy. However, the lead-lag relation-
ships  seem  to  have  changed  little  over  time,
despite  several  shifts  in  the  monetary  policy
framework.
A summary version of this paper was published in
the Working Paper Series of the European Central
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Econometric modelling has a long tradition at the
Bank of Greece and this paper is a brief but com-
prehensive  overview  of  the  model-building
process at the Bank, as well as a description and
documentation of the use of models in forecasting
and policy analysis.
As model development at the Bank of Greece is an
ongoing and probably never-ending activity, dri-
ven  mainly  by  the  changes  that  the  Greek  eco-
nomy has undergone in recent years as well as by
consensual theoretical advances provided by acad-
emia, the aim of the paper is to portray in rather
descriptive terms the evolution and extensions of
the model over the years. Against this background,
the paper approaches the issue of modelling at the
Bank in an evolutionary perspective, starting from
the first attempts to model the Greek economy in
the mid-70s, when the development of the Bank's
first  model  of  the  Greek  economy  was  started
under the leadership of the now Governor of the
Bank Nicholas C. Garganas.
Until the mid-90s, the formulation of the model
was  predominantly  Keynesian.1 In  the  late  90s,
the model was drastically revised and the current
version of the model is more in line with the “neo-
classical synthesis”, taking explicitly into account
the  long-run  supply  side  of  the  economy.  The
long-run structure of the model is theory-based,
while the dynamics are data-instigated.
The  paper  proceeds  by  tracing  out  the  main
changes which the model has undergone over
time  and  provides  a  complete  if  discursive
description of the specification of the current
version  of  the  model.  The  properties  of  the
model are assessed through a set of standard
simulations results. The paper also gives a com-
plete description of the uses of model in the
context of the forecasting process at the Bank
of Greece (internal forecasting rounds as well
as the ESCB Broad Macroeconomic Forecasting
Exercise).  One  of  the  key  characteristics  of
forecasting practice at the Bank of Greece is the
blending  of  pure  model-based  forecasts  with
judgements about the course of the economy
from Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) mem-
bers and other experts in the Bank. The role of
the model in this process is central by combin-
ing realistic evaluation of the current economic
conditions and policy stances while maintaining
theoretical  coherence  and  consistency  of  the
numerical results. Furthermore, the usefulness
of the model as a story-telling device used by
the  MPC  members  of  the  Bank  in  order  to
shape their views about the prospects of the
Greek  economy  is  highlighted.  Last  but  not
least,  the  role  of  the  model  in  the  policy
process of the Bank, as an organising frame-
work necessary for processing and combining
information emanating from different sources is
fully explained.
Econometric modelling at the Bank of Greece
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1 A comprehensive presentation of the model, at it stood in 1991,
is included in a book written by Governor Garganas, entitled The
Bank of Greece Econometric Model of the Greek Economy.Monetary policy and
financial system
supervision measures
(January - July 2004)
Monetary policy measures of the
Eurosystem
8 January 2004
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the  minimum  bid  rate  on  the  main  refinancing
operations and the interest rates on the marginal
lending facility and the deposit facility will remain
unchanged at 2.0%, 3.0% and 1.0% respectively.
12 January 2004
The  Governing  Council  of  the  ECB  decides  to
increase  the  allotment  amount  for  each  of  the
longer-term  refinancing  operations  to  be  con-
ducted in the year 2004 from €15 billion to €25
billion. This increased amount takes into consid-
eration the higher liquidity needs of the euro area
banking system anticipated for the year 2004. The
Eurosystem  will,  however,  continue  to  provide
the bulk of liquidity through its main refinancing
operations.
5 February, 4 March, 1 April, 6 May, 3 June,
1 July 2004
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the  minimum  bid  rate  on  the  main  refinancing
operations and the interest rates on the marginal
lending facility and the deposit facility will remain
unchanged at 2.0%, 3.0% and 1.0% respectively.
Bank of Greece decisions concerning the
establishment  and  operation  of  credit
institutions  and  the  supervision  of  the
financial system
16 January 2004
The Bank of Greece approves the merger of the
Investment Bank of Greece and Marfin Hellenic
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by the former).
20 January 2004
In implementation of ECB decisions, the Bank of
Greece sets a framework for the reproduction of
euro banknotes.
21 January 2004
The rules governing credit institutions’ statistical
reporting to the Bank of Greece of all transactions
(capital movements and current transactions) in
euro and foreign exchange between Greek resi-
dents and non-residents are amended and codi-
fied into a single text.
4 February 2004
Under authorisation by Law 3148/2003, the Bank
of Greece specifies the terms and conditions for
granting  authorisation  to,  and  the  rules  for  the
supervision of, money transfer intermediaries. 
11 February 2004
With a view to providing more thorough infor-
mation to the Bank of Greece for compiling the
balance  of  payments  and  the  international
investment position, credit institutions shall sub-
mit,  on  a  monthly  basis,  detailed  lists  of  the
securities they either hold for their own account
or  keep  in  custody/manage  on  behalf  of  their
customers.
27 February 2004
– In the framework of Law 3066/2002 establishing
the “Credit Guarantee Fund for Small and Very
Small  Enterprises  SA”  (TEMPME),  the  Bank  of
Greece  lays  down  supervisory  rules  governing
TEMPME’s capital adequacy, liquidity and invest-
ment of its funds.
– The provisions relating to the authorisation of
bureaux de change in Greece and the rules for
their supervision by the Bank of Greece are codi-
fied into a single text and updated.
– The bank “Societé Générale S.A.” is authorised
to  acquire  the  majority  of  the  share  capital  of
General (Geniki) Bank.
23 March 2004
The Tirana-based “American Bank of Albania” is
authorised to establish and operate a branch in
Greece.
18 June 2004
Credit institutions are required to report to the
Bank of Greece quarterly data on their open posi-
tions in foreign exchange on both an individual
and a consolidated basis. Thus, the frequency of
reporting is harmonised with that for overall cap-
ital adequacy data.
23 June 2004
The ceiling on borrowing from credit institutions
and  members  of  the  Athens  Exchange  for  con-
ducting stock exchange transactions is increased
from €150,000 per customer to €1,000,000, fol-
lowing a proposal by the Hellenic Capital Market
Commission, in accordance with the provisions of
Law 2843/2000.
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Re: Amendment to, and codification of, pro-
visions on the reporting of data to the Bank
of Greece on transactions between residents
and non-residents in euro and foreign cur-
rency (Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2535/
21.1.2004)
The  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  Greece,  having
regard to:
a) Article  1  of  Law  1266/1982  “Authorities
responsible  for  the  conduct  of  monetary,
credit and exchange rate policies, and other
provisions”, in conjunction with Article 12(1)
of Law 2548/1997;
b) the provisions of the Statute of the Bank of
Greece,  in  particular  Articles  55A  and  55C
thereof, as currently in force;
c) Presidential  Decrees  96/23.3.93  and  104/
14.5.94, as well as Article 16 of Chapter III of
Law 3148/5.6.2003;
d) Law 2331/24.8.95 “Prevention and suppres-
sion of money laundering, and other criminal
provisions  —Supreme  Court  Plenum—
Arbitration and other provisions”;
e) Presidential Decree 33/2000 “Adjustment of
the  Greek  legislation  to  Directive
97/5/EC/27  January  1997  on  cross-border
credit  transfers”,  in  conjunction  with
Regulation  (EC)  No.  2560/2001  of  the
European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on
cross-border payments in euro, in particular
Article 6 thereof;
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sures for the implementation of Regulations
(EC)  1103/97,  974/98  and  2866/98  of  the
Council, as currently in force, on the intro-
duction of the euro”;
g) the  Bank  of  Greece  (Statistics  Department)
Balance of Payments Compilation Manual;
h) Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Acts  2302/
16.5.94,  2344/19.12.94,  2345/19.12.94  and
2416/28.7.97, as currently in force;
i) Banking  and  Credit  Committee  Decision
92/5/2001  “Operation  of  accounts  in  euro,
national currencies of the euro area Member
States and other currencies”;
j) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2523/12.6.03
“Amendments  to  the  provisions  of  Bank  of
Greece Governor’s Act 1955/91, as currently
in  force,  on  consumer  credit  and  personal
loans”; and
k) Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Act  2456/
3.2.2000 “Transactions in gold”, in particular
par. 3 thereof;
has decided:
to amend and codify as follows the provisions
regarding  credit  institutions’  reporting  to  the
Bank  of  Greece  of  data  relating  to  current
account  and  financial  account  transactions  of
any type in euro and foreign currency between
residents of Greece and non-residents (i.e. resi-
dents of European Union Member States and of
third countries):
I.  TRANSACTIONS  CARRIED  OUT  WITH  THE
INTERMEDIATION  OF  RESIDENT  CREDIT  OR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A. 1. Where  funds  exceeding  the  equivalent  of
€12,500  are  transferred  by  residents  of
Greece  to  non-residents,  the  intermediary
credit  or  financial  institution  shall  request
from the resident customer (originator) the
following information:
— particulars  (full  name,  address,  identity
card  number  etc.)  of  both  the  resident
originator and the non-resident recipient
(beneficiary);
— type of transaction;
— country  of  destination  of  the  funds  or
country of residence of beneficiary;
— country of origin of the goods, in the case
of imports;
— transaction value and currency of denom-
ination;
— initial  maturity  (less  than/equal  to/over
one year), in the case of loans;
— kind  of  good  –  Combined  Nomencla-
ture  Code  (CNC),  in  the  case  of  pur-
chases/imports of goods other than those
intended for covering personal needs;
— taxpayer’s  identification  number,  in
accordance  with  the  provisions  of
Presidential Decree 96/1993, as amended
by Law 3148/5.6.2003.
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abroad, credit institutions shall require the
above  data  from  resident  customers  who
have transferred such cheques to non-resi-
dents, provided that the cheques have only
one  endorsement  and  their  value  exceeds
the equivalent of €12,500.
B. Intermediary  credit  or  financial  institutions
shall:
1. report to the Bank of Greece, in accordance
with the current instructions of the Statistics
Department  (Balance  of  Payments  Statistics
Division), data on all the transactions exceed-
ing  the  equivalent  of  €12,500  which  they
carry out, either for their own account or on
behalf of their customers, with non-residents.
The above requirement shall not imply an
obligation  upon  credit  or  financial  institu-
tions to keep records.
2. inform their resident customers who wish to
carry out transactions with non-residents of
their obligations under this Act.
II.  TRANSACTIONS  CARRIED  OUT  WITHOUT
THE  INTERMEDIATION  OF  RESIDENT  CREDIT
OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Resident legal persons shall report directly to the
Statistics  Department  (Balance  of  Payments
Statistics Division), in accordance with the form
attached herewith and the current instructions of
the said Department, data on all the transactions,
irrespective of type and amount, with non-resi-
dents which they carry out without the intermedi-
ation  of  resident  credit  or  financial  institutions
(such as receipts and payments abroad, invest-
ments using funds held abroad etc.).
III. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. In the event of incomplete or delayed reporting
of data by the persons indicated in I.B and II
hereof, the sanctions provided for in the Statute
of the Bank of Greece (Articles 55A and 55C, as
currently in force) shall apply.
2. a) The following are hereby repealed:
i) Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Acts  2302/
16.5.94,  2417/28.7.97  and  Bank  of
Greece  Governor’s  Acts  2344/19.12.94,
2449/5.8.99 on the procedures for capital
movements  and  current  transactions
abroad, respectively;
ii) the provisions of par. 4 of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2345/19.12.94;
iii)the provisions of par. 3 of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2456/3.2.2000; and
iv)any other existing provision contrary to
this Act.
b) It is clarified that the provisions of this Act do
not prevent residents from fulfilling directly
all their obligations by using deposits held
with  non-resident  credit  institutions  or  the
proceeds  from  liquidation  of  investments
abroad, as well as from depositing such pro-
ceeds  in  a  foreign  currency  account  held
with resident credit institutions.
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prejudice  to  the  obligations  of  bank  cus-
tomers and credit or financial institutions vis-
à-vis the Bank of Greece as the supervisory
authority or vis-à-vis other authorities within
their respective fields of competence, or to
their obligations under the provisions of Law
2331/1995  as  applicable  and  the  relevant
Bank  of  Greece  Administra-tion’s  Circular
2/18.2.97.
*   *   *
Re: Requirements for granting authorisation to,
and rules for the supervision of, money transfer
intermediaries by the Bank of Greece (Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2536/4.2.2004)
The  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  Greece,  having
regard to:
a) the Statute of the Bank of Greece, in particu-
lar Article 55A thereof, as currently in force;
b) Article  1  of  Law  1266/1982  “Authorities
responsible  for  the  conduct  of  monetary,
credit and exchange rate policies, and other
provisions”;
c) Article 18 of Law 3148/2003 “Money transfer
intermediaries”;
d) Law 2331/1995 “Prevention and suppression
of money laundering and other provisions”, as
currently  in  force,  the  recommendations  of
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on the
obligations of money transfer intermediaries,
and  the  relevant  circulars  of  the  Bank  of
Greece  Department  for  the  Supervision  of
Credit and Financial Institutions (latest circu-
lar: 654/22 July 2003);
e) Presidential Decree 33/2000 on cross-border
credit  transfers,  in  conjunction  with
Regulation  (EC)  2560/2001  of  the  European
Parliament and the Council on cross-border
payments in euro;
f) Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Act  2501/31
October 2002 “Informing credit institutions'
customers on the terms and conditions apply-
ing to their transactions”;
g) the need to establish a regulatory framework
for money transfer intermediaries;
has decided the following:
I. TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR AUTHORISA-
TION
A.  The  Bank  of  Greece  can  authorise  sociétés
anonymes to operate as money transfer interme-
diaries, on the following terms and conditions:
1. a) The applicant société anonyme has a min-
imum initial share capital of one hundred
and fifty thousand euro (€150,000) fully
paid-in  in  cash  and  deposited  with  a
credit  institution  operating  in  Greece.
This amount shall remain in deposit until
the société anonyme has been officially
incorporated.
The  own  funds  of  undertakings  which
convert  into  sociétés  anonymes  for  the
purpose of operating as money transfer
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rent minimum amount.
b) Throughout  the  operation  of  the  above
mentioned sociétés anonymes, their own
funds may not fall below the above mini-
mum amount.
2. The  application  submitted  to  the  Bank  of
Greece shall contain the following informa-
tion  along  with  the  necessary  supporting
documents:
a) The registered name and the location of
the société anonyme.
b) Identification of the natural or legal per-
sons which hold, directly or indirectly, at
least 10% of the capital or voting rights of
the money transfer intermediary.
c) Information  on  the  main  shareholders
referred to in the preceding indent shall
include:
(i) complete curricula vitae;
(ii) copy of type A criminal record (for
shareholders  that  are  natural  per-
sons);
(iii) non-bankruptcy certificate;
(iv) declaration stating the sources of the
funds  with  which  they  will  acquire
their shares;
(v) in  the  event  that  any  of  the  main
shareholders is a legal person, identi-
fication  of  the  natural  persons  who
directly or indirectly control it.
d) Identification of the person in charge of
the company's operation, as well as the
person  responsible  for  the  company’s
compliance with anti-money laundering
legislation  (Article  4,  paragraph  10,  of
Law 2331/1995, as applicable). For these
persons, the following documents shall
be submitted to the Bank of Greece, at
the latest by the intermediary’s start of
operation:
(i) the  documents  referred  to  in  para-
graph 2 (i) to (iii). Curricula vitae shall
include  information  on  the  above
persons’  professional  background
and previous experience.
(ii) two  letters  of  recommendation  for
each  person;  these  must  not  come
from shareholders, prospective Board
members or (prospective or current)
executives  of  the  applicant  (under
establishment or existing) company.
e) Identification  of  the  company’s  Board
members along with the supporting docu-
ments referred to in paragraph 2 (i) to (iii).
f) For  companies  under  establishment,
Draft Articles of Association; for exist-
ing companies, copy of the Articles of
Association  incorporating  all  amend-
ments  up  to  date  or  amendments
envisaged considering the operation of
these  companies  as  money  transfer
intermediaries.
Decisions of the Bank of Greece
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 23   7/04 81g) Detailed  organisational  and  administra-
tive structure of the company as well as
number of personnel.
h) Description of the accounting system, the
IT system and the management informa-
tion system, as well as the procedures for
conducting money transfer transactions.
i) The société anonyme’s internal audit pro-
cedures aimed at monitoring compliance
with  this  Act,  Law  2331/1995,  as  cur-
rently  in  force,  the  relevant  circulars  of
the Bank of Greece and the provisions of
law governing the société anonyme’s spe-
cific area of activity.
j) An estimate of the amount of funds to be
transferred within the next six months.
k) Name  and  postal  address  of  the  com-
pany/companies with which the applicant
has contracted for the purpose of trans-
ferring money.
l) The selection criteria for the company’s
associates (natural and legal persons).
3. The  Bank  of  Greece  reserves  the  right  to
request  additional  information  and  data
before granting authorisation.
In the event that any data or information pro-
vided in compliance with this Act are inaccu-
rate  or  misleading,  the  Bank  of  Greece
reserves the right to revoke authorisation.
B. The authorisation granted to a money transfer
intermediary shall be valid for a period of six (6)
months  from  the  communication  of  the  relevant
decision  of  the  Bank  of  Greece  to  the  applicant,
unless a different period is specified in the decision.
To this end, said intermediaries shall notify the
Bank of Greece (Department for the Supervision
of Credit and Financial Institutions) of their start
of operation within fifteen (15) days from such
start, providing full addresses of their headquar-
ters  and  branches  (including  the  name  and
address of any agents), along with a list of the
credit  institutions  with  which  they  will  hold
accounts for clearing their transactions related to
money transfers.
II. RULES OF OPERATION – CUSTOMER INFOR-
MATION
1. Money transfers can be settled either on a one-
to-one basis or on a netting basis, at regular
intervals, through an account held by the inter-
mediary with a credit institution operating in
Greece.  Entries  in  this  account  shall  exclu-
sively  reflect  respective  flows  under  money
transfer orders.
2. For  the  funds  to  be  transferred,  the  proce-
dures on statistical reporting to the Bank of
Greece  (Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Act
2535/2004) shall be observed. 
3. The intermediary shall forward its customer’s
money transfer order to its associate or agent
on the same day it collects the corresponding
amount from the originator.
4. For every transaction, the money transfer inter-
mediary shall issue a transaction slip, delivered
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lowing information:
— name and address of the originator,
— the transacted amount,
— name and address of the beneficiary,
— date of the transaction,
— place of payment.
The intermediary shall keep records of its opera-
tions for at least five (5) years.
5. a) Money transfer intermediaries shall provide
their  customers  with  the  information
referred to in Articles 2 and 4 of Presidential
Decree 33/2000, irrespective of amount and
currency, and shall establish procedures for
the examination of customer complaints.
b) The provisions of this section shall be with-
out prejudice to the rights and obligations of
the  persons  involved  that  may  arise  from
other  legal  provisions  and/or  regulatory
decisions issued by other authorities within
their fields of competence.
III.  CAPITAL  REQUIREMENTS  –  RULES  FOR
INVESTMENTS
1. In the event that the intermediaries’ own funds
are lower than the average daily balance of funds
received during the preceding calendar half-year,
the shortfall shall be covered by a letter of guar-
antee issued by a credit institution for securing
fulfilment of the intermediary's obligations. In the
case of newly established intermediaries, the cal-
culation basis shall be the estimated amount of
funds to be transferred within the first six months
of operation, as reported to the Bank of Greece.
2. The intermediary shall at all times maintain
sufficient  liquidity,  in  the  form  of  sight
deposits, deposits with an agreed maturity of
up to 3 months, and securities issued by cen-
tral governments of EU Member States. The
composition  and  amount  of  these  liquid
assets  shall  be  determined  by  the  Bank  of
Greece  Department  for  the  Supervision  of
Credit  and  Financial  Institutions,  mainly  on
the  basis  of  the  intermediary’s  turnover  as
well as the internal procedures it has put in
place for securing the funds collected by its
agents (e.g. adequate coverage by bank guar-
antees issued in favour of the intermediary at
the agent’s instruction).
IV. REPORTING TO THE BANK OF GREECE
Money  transfer  intermediaries  shall  notify  the
Bank of Greece (Department for the Supervision
of Credit and Financial Institutions) in writing of
any change in the data referred to in section I.A.,
paragraph 2, excluding indent (j), at least fifteen
(15) days before the change. Specifically:
a) If the change relates to the persons referred to
in indents (d) and (e) of paragraph 2, Section
I.A., the notification shall be accompanied by
the documents referred to therein.
b) In the event of transfer of a shareholding stake
or voting rights which leads to a shareholder
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share capital, the party intending to acquire
such  holding  shall  submit  to  the  Bank  of
Greece the documents set out in Section I.A.,
paragraph 2, indents (b) and (c). If the Bank of
Greece  does  not  communicate  a  negative
response within forty-five (45) days from the
above submission, this shall mean approval of
the share transfer. The same obligation shall
apply  in  the  event  of  a  shareholding  stake
increase  leading  to  the  assumption  of  the
intermediary’s control.
V. SANCTIONS
The Banking and Credit Committee shall impose
as per the case the sanctions set out in Article 18
of Law 3148/2003.
Administrative  fines  shall  be  paid  within  one
month from the communication of the relevant
decision. Failure to pay such fine shall incur sus-
pension or even revocation of authorisation.
VI. OTHER PROVISIONS
1. Money transfer intermediaries already operat-
ing at the time when this Act enters into force
shall conform to the provisions of this Act; to
this  end,  they  shall  submit  to  the  Bank  of
Greece an application within four months from
the  Act’s  publication  in  the  Government
Gazette. The Bank of Greece shall determine
within  two  months  from  this  submission
whether the requirements set herein are met
and shall communicate its decision to the inter-
mediaries  concerned.  In  the  event  of  non-
authorisation,  companies  shall  discontinue
their  money  transfer  intermediation  activity
immediately.
If the aforementioned application and the sup-
porting documents referred to herein are sub-
mitted with a delay, the Bank of Greece shall
impose the sanctions set out in paragraph 2,
Article 18 of Law 3148/2003.
2. The provisions of Circular 654/22 July 2003
of  the  Bank  of  Greece  Department  for  the
Supervision  of  Credit  and  Financial  Insti-
tutions on the prevention and suspension of
money  laundering  (Law  2331/1995)  shall
apply  to  all  money  transfer  intermediaries
under this Act.
3. Mailing  companies,  which  are  subject  to  the
legal framework governing the supply of mail-
ing services and which, alongside their main
activity, take up business in the field of money
transfer intermediation, shall notify the Bank of
Greece thereof, so that the latter can determine
whether such companies fall within the scope
of this Act; in any event, the provisions of para-
graph 2 above shall apply.
4. The  Bank  of  Greece  Department  for  the
Supervision of Credit and Financial Institutions is
hereby authorised to provide clarifications and
instructions for the implementation of this Act.
*   *   *
Re: Rules for the supervision of the “Credit
Guarantee  Fund  for  Small  and  Very  Small
Enterprises SA” (TEMPME SA) by the Bank of
Greece – Supervisory treatment of credit insti-
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of TEMPME SA (Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2540/27.2.2004)
The  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  Greece,  having
regard to:
a) Article  55A  of  the  Statute  of  the  Bank  of
Greece;
b) Article  1  of  Law  1266/1982  “Authorities
responsible  for  the  conduct  of  monetary,
credit and exchange rate policies, and other
provisions”  in  conjunction  with  Article  12,
paragraph 1, of Law 2548/1997;
c) the  provisions  of  Section  A  of  Law
3066/2002  “Establishment  of  the  Credit
Guarantee  Fund  for  Small  and  Very  Small
Enterprises SA” (TEMPME SA), in particular
Article  9  thereof,  which  specifies  that  the
supervision of TEMPME in terms of capital
adequacy,  liquidity,  amount  and  type  of
holdings shall be exercised by the Bank of
Greece;
d) joint decision 12882/867/2003 of the Minister
of Economy and Finance and the Minister of
Development,  approving  the  Regulation  of
Guarantees and the Regulation of Operation
of TEMPME;
e) the Community regulatory framework govern-
ing the operation as well as the financing of
the Guarantee Funds (including TEMPME SA)
subsidised by EU Structural Funds;
f) Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Act  2053/18
March  1992  “Definition  of  own  funds  of
credit institutions established in Greece”, as
currently in force;
g) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2524/23 July
2003, “Codification of the provisions of Bank
of  Greece  Governor’s  Act  2054/18  March
1992, as amended, on the solvency ratio of
credit institutions established in Greece”;
h) the need to establish a supervisory framework
for  TEMPME  SA,  comparable  to  the  frame-
work applying to supervised financial institu-
tions undertaking similar risks;
Has decided as follows:
I. SUPERVISORY RULES
In the context of Article 9 of Law 3066/2002, the
following rules for the supervision of TEMPME SA
by the Bank of Greece are specified:
A. Capital adequacy
For  the  calculation  of  TEMPME  SA  capital  ade-
quacy, the provisions of Bank of Greece Governor's
Acts 2053/18 March 1992, as currently in force,
and 2524/23 July 2003, shall apply by analogy. In
particular:
1. a) TEMPME’s supervisory own funds shall be
the  key  asset  items  defined  in  Bank  of
Greece Governor's Act 2053/1992, as cur-
rently in force, plus reserves from the reval-
uation  of  fixed  assets,  less  the  items
deductible from own funds under the said
Act and less the amount of any shortfall in
the provisions for doubtful debts against the
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accordance with indent (b) below.
b) Minimum provisioning requirements for out-
standing guarantees provided by TEMPME SA
shall be calculated for the purposes of this Act
using the following ratios:
ñ 0.75% of total guarantees with an initial
maturity of less than one year;
ñ 1.0%  of  total  guarantees  with  an  initial
maturity  of  more  than  one  and  up  to
three years; and
ñ 1.25% of total guarantees with an initial
maturity of over three years.
(i) These ratios shall be raised by 20% in the
case of newly established enterprises, for
a period of two years from their estab-
lishment.
(ii) In the case of guarantees on loans over-
due for more than 180 days (loans in per-
manent delay), provisions shall amount
to at least 60% of the claim guaranteed
by TEMPME SA.
(iii) The provisioning ratios shall be lowered
by 50% where the guaranteed credit is
covered by collateral in the form of real
estate of an objective value equal to the
maximum limit laid down in Section IV
of the Regulation of Guarantees. If col-
lateral  coverage  is  smaller  than  the
limit,  the  lower  ratio  shall  apply  to  a
proportionately  smaller  part  of  the
guarantee.
(iv) In  the  event  that  part  of  the  credit  is
secured  by  assets  which,  for  the  pur-
poses of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2524/2003, bear zero risk weighting, no
provisioning  shall  be  required  for  the
amount  of  the  guarantee  which  corre-
sponds to the secured part of the credit.
(v) The minimum provisioning ratio shall be
raised to 80% in the event of a guarantee
on a “loan in permanent delay” for which
TEMPME  SA  has  waived  the  benefit  of
discussion,  in  accordance  with  Law
3066/2002  and  TEMPME  Regulation  of
Guarantees.
(vi) The Bank of Greece may:
ñ adjust the ratios laid down herein; or
ñ accept, alternatively to the application of
these ratios, for the purposes of this Act,
TEMPME’s  own  estimation  of  potential
losses  from  guarantees  and  counter-
guarantees provided, after the estimation
methodology  applied  by  TEMPME  has
been  evaluated  by  the  Bank  of  Greece
Department for the Supervision of Credit
and Financial Institutions.
2. TEMPME SA shall keep its solvency ratio at a
level not lower than 10%, applying by analogy
the provisions of Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 2524/23 July 2003. It is hereby clarified
that  the  guarantees  provided  to  financing
banks and other financial institutions for cov-
ering  credit,  leasing  and  factoring  deals,  as
well as counter-guarantees covering letters of
guarantee,  shall  be  deemed  high-risk  items
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weighting methodology set out in Section six
of  Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Act  2524/23
July 2003.
B. Rules for investment – Liquidity
1. TEMPME SA may invest its assets in holdings
with limited credit and market risks, as follows:
a) in securities with adequate liquidity, bearing
zero risk weighting, under Bank of Greece
Governor's Act 2524/2003,
b) in sight deposits and/or time deposits with
a  maturity  of  up  to  three  months,  with
credit  institutions  in  Zone  A  countries, 
as specified in Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act  2524/2003,  i.e.  the  countries  of  the
European Economic Area (EEA) and other
countries which are full members of the
OECD, provided that the latter countries
are rated at least “A” by Standard & Poor’s
or  are  given  a  comparable  rating  by
another recognised rating agency.
2. The part of the above holdings which consti-
tutes claims on the same legal entity as well as
on legal entities connected with it, within the
meaning  of  the  provisions  of  Section  42e  of
Law 2190/1920, as currently in force, shall not
exceed 25% of TEMPME’s own funds.
3. The sum total of TEMPME’s holdings as above
plus its cash holdings shall not fall below 20%
of  its  outstanding  guarantees.  Asset  and  risk
management  shall  conform  to  TEMPME’s
Investment Regulation, which shall be commu-
nicated to the Bank of Greece.
II. OTHER PROVISIONS
1. For the purpose of calculating the solvency ratio
of credit and financial institutions supervised by
the  Bank  of  Greece,  under  Bank  of  Greece
Governor’s Act 2524/2003, asset items covered
by a TEMPME SA guarantee shall be assigned a
20%  weight.  The  above  mentioned  reduced
weighting shall apply only if all terms and condi-
tions  set  out  by  law  for  the  operation  of
TEMPME SA and its financing by EU funds are
fulfilled. The application of this reduced weight-
ing shall be reconsidered after the EU monitor-
ing period has expired (31 December 2008).
2. The Department for the Supervision of Credit
and Financial Institutions of the Bank of Greece
is  hereby  authorised  to  provide  clarifications
and instructions on the application of this Act.
3. Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2434/3 June 1998,
setting out the supervisory framework for Mutual
Guarantees Companies, is hereby repealed.
*   *   *
Re: Codification and amendment of Bank of
Greece Governor's Act 2440/11 January 1999,
“Establishment and operation of bureaux de
change in Greece by sociétés anonymes other
than credit institutions”, as currently in force
(Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Act  2541/
27.2.2004)
The  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  Greece,  having
regard to:
a) The Statute of the Bank of Greece, in particu-
lar Article 55A, as currently in force, thereof;
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responsible  for  the  conduct  of  monetary,
credit and exchange rate policies, and other
provisions”;
c) Article  15  of  Law  2515/1997  “Bureaux  de
change”;
d) Law 2331/1995 “Prevention and suppression
of money laundering and other provisions”, as
currently in force, and the related circulars of
the  Bank  of  Greece  Department  for  the
Supervision  of  Credit  and  Financial  Insti-
tutions  (latest  relevant  circular:  654/22  July
2003);
e) Bank  of  Greece  Governor’s  Act  2440/11
January  1999,  as  currently  in  force,  on  the
establishment  and  operation  of  bureaux  de
change in Greece by sociétés anonymes other
than credit institutions;
f) the need to codify into a single text and to
update the provisions regarding the authorisa-
tion and supervision of bureaux de change by
the Bank of Greece;
g) the relevant recommendation of the Bank of
Greece  Department  for  the  Supervision  of
Credit and Financial Institutions;
Has decided:
I. TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR AUTHORISA-
TION
The  Bank  of  Greece  shall  authorise  a  société
anonyme to operate as bureau de change under
Law 2515/1997, as currently in force, as long as it
meets the following terms and conditions:
1. a) The société anonyme shall have a minimum
initial share capital of two hundred thousand
euro (€200,000), fully paid-in and deposited
with a credit institution operating in Greece
prior to the authorisation. This amount shall
remain in deposit until the société anonyme
has been officially incorporated.
b) Throughout  the  operation  of  the  société
anonyme, its own funds may not fall below
the above minimum amount. This shall also
apply  to  business  firms  converted  into
sociétés anonymes - bureaux de change.
The  aforementioned  minimum  own  funds
shall cover the establishment of up to six (6)
branches and shall be increased by twenty-
five thousand euro (€25,000) for each addi-
tional branch.
c) Own funds of the bureau de change shall
be considered, for purposes of supervision
by the Bank of Greece, the key items of
own  funds  specified  in  Bank  of  Greece
Governor’s Act 2053/1992, as currently in
force, plus reserves from the revaluation of
fixed assets less the items defined in the
said Act.
2. The  application  submitted  to  the  Bank  of
Greece shall contain the following informa-
tion  plus  the  necessary  supporting  docu-
ments:
a) The registered name and the location of the
société anonyme.
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which  hold,  directly  or  indirectly,  at  least
10%  of  the  capital  or  voting  rights  of  the
société anonyme.
Information on the above main shareholders
shall include:
(i) Complete curricula vitae.
(ii) Copy  of  type  A  criminal  record  (for
shareholders that are natural persons).
(iii) Non-bankruptcy certificate.
(iv) Declaration  stating  the  sources  of  the
funds with which they will acquire their
shares.
(v) For shareholders that are legal persons,
identification of the natural persons who
directly or indirectly control these legal
persons.
c) Identification of the person that will be in
charge  of  the  operation  of  the  société
anonyme, as well as of the person responsi-
ble for compliance with anti-money launder-
ing  legislation  (Article  4,  paragraph  10,  of
Law  2331/1995,  as  currently  in  force).  As
regards  these  two  persons,  the  following
documents shall be submitted to the Bank of
Greece,  latest  by  the  société  anonyme’s
start of operation:
(i) the supporting documents referred to
in  paragraph  2(b),  indents  (i)  to  (iii)
above.  Curricula  vitae  shall  include
information on the professional back-
ground and previous experience of the
said persons.
(ii) two letters of recommendation for each
person;  these  letters  must  not  come
from  shareholders,  Board  of  Directors
members  or  (prospective  or  working)
executives of the applicant (under estab-
lishment or existing) société anonyme.
d) Identification  of  the  Board  of  Directors
members and submission of the supporting
documents  referred  to  in  paragraph  2(b),
indents (i) to (iii), above.
These persons shall be reliable and suitable
for the sound and prudent management of
the bureau de change.
e) Draft Articles of Association of the société
anonyme  under  establishment  or  copy  of
the  codified  (applicable  or  prospective)
Articles of Association of the existing société
anonyme.
f) Detailed  organisational  and  administrative
structure  of  the  company  as  well  as  the
anticipated number of personnel.
g) Description of the accounting system, the IT
system  and  the  management  information
system, as well as the manuals on transac-
tion processing procedures.
h) The  société  anonyme’s  officially  applying
internal audit procedures aimed at monitor-
ing  fulfilment  of  the  obligations  that  stem
from this Act, Law 2331/1995, as currently
in force, the relevant circulars of the Bank of
Decisions of the Bank of Greece
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the société anonyme’s operation.
i) The exact number of branches to be estab-
lished and their location.
j) The registered name and the postal address
of  the  head  office  of  any  companies  with
which the applicant has contracted in order
to operate as an intermediary.
3. The Bank of Greece shall reserve the right to
request  additional  information  and  data  for
granting the authorisation. In the event that any
data or information provided for under this Act
are  inaccurate  or  misleading,  the  Bank  of
Greece shall reserve the right to revoke autho-
risation.
4. The  authorisation  shall  be  valid  for  six  (6)
months from the communication of the rele-
vant  decision  of  the  Bank  of  Greece  to  the
applicant,  unless  this  decision  sets  another
time limit.
II. OPERATIONS ALLOWED
1. Bureaux  de  change  operating  as  sociétés
anonymes may engage in the following foreign
exchange operations:
a) Purchase  of  banknotes,  travellers'  cheques,
personal  cheques  and  bank  cheques  in 
foreign currency, including those surrendered
by Hellenic Post SA, as well as by tourist and
other  businesses  accordingly  authorised  by
Currency Committee Decision 176/4/1997, as
currently in force.
b) Sale  of  foreign  banknotes  and  travellers’
cheques.
2. Bureaux de change may also offer the following
intermediary services, ancillary to the above oper-
ations:
a) Promotion  of,  and  intermediation  in,  the
supply of bank products and services, within
bilateral  agreements,  excluding  both  the
undertaking of any commitment on behalf of
credit  institutions  and  the  carrying  out  of
receipts or payments on behalf of such insti-
tutions. This limitation shall not affect the
operations referred to in paragraph 1 above
or indent (b) below.
b) Cooperation with credit card issuers domi-
ciled  in  Greece  or  abroad  for  supplying
credit  card  holders  with  cash,  up  to  the
respective cash advance limit.
c) Intermediation  in  fund  transfer  within
Greece or across borders, according to the
provisions of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2536/4 February 2004.
d) Acceptance  of  payment  of  bills  issued  by
non-credit institutions.
e) Sale of tickets for domestic and international
means  of  public  transport,  concerts  and
other cultural events.
f) Travel agency and travel insurance services,
sale of the products of Hellenic Post SA and
of  “Athens  2004”,  provided  that  any
required authorisation has previously been
granted by the competent authorities.
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 23   7/04 90g) Promotion and sale of mobile and fixed tele-
phony companies’ products and of internet
access providers' products.
3. A  bureau  de  change  may  participate  in  the
share  capital  of  another  bureau  de  change
operating as a société anonyme, provided that
it has notified accordingly the Bank of Greece
Department for the Supervision of Credit and
Financial Institutions at least fifteen (15) days
prior to acquiring such holding, without prej-
udice  to  the  provisions  of  Section  IV,  para-
graph 1.
III. RULES OF OPERATION
1. The  daily  ceiling  on  the  foreign  exchange
reserves of the bureau de change shall be five
times as high as its own funds. In calculating
this  ceiling,  any  credit  balances  in  foreign
exchange deposits shall be counted in.
2. Bureaux de change are allowed to:
a) Purchase,  daily,  foreign  banknotes  from
banks  authorised  to  carry  out  exchange
operations, from other bureaux de change
and  from  the  Bank  of  Greece  up  to  the
amount  of  the  daily  ceiling  for  each
bureau’s  foreign  exchange  reserves,  in
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  para-
graph  1  above  and  paragraph  2(a)  of
Section VI.
b) Issue  foreign  exchange  purchase  vouchers
or other equivalent documents certifying the
import of funds, according to applicable law
or competent authorities’ decisions.
3. Foreign exchange amounts in excess of the
daily  ceiling  for  each  bureau’s  reserves,  as
per paragraph 1 above and paragraph 2(a) of
Section  VI,  shall  be  surrendered  within  the
next working day either to the banks autho-
rised  for  the  conduct  of  foreign  exchange
operations or to the Bank of Greece. Formal
documentation  for  such  surrender  shall  be
kept  in  the  accounting  department  of  the
bureaux and shall remain at the disposal of
the  supervising  officials  of  the  Bank  of
Greece.
4. For the transactions referred to in paragraphs 1
and 2(b) of Section II, the bureaux de change
shall issue vouchers, which, in the event that
the  value  of  the  transaction  exceeds  the
amount of €1,000, shall include at least the fol-
lowing information:
— time when the transaction was carried out,
— name and address of the counterparty to the
transaction (as evidenced by his/her ID card
or passport or other official document),
— the transacted amount.
For transactions connected with fund transfer
intermediation,  any  documents  issued  shall
comply with the provisions of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2536/2004.
5. Each branch of the bureau shall each business
day post at a prominent position a table depict-
ing the exchange rates applicable for the day,
which  shall  be  freely  determined  by  the
bureau, same as the amounts or rates of any
commissions charged (also freely determined).
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its own financial data. The bureau de change
shall  keep  records  of  its  operations  for  five
years.
7. Bureaux de change shall apply the Greek Chart of
Accounts for Banks. A separate accounting pro-
cedure shall apply to the transactions pertaining
to the provisions of paragraph 2, Section II.
8. Bureaux de change shall comply with the circu-
lars of the Bank of Greece Department for the
Supervision of Credit and Financial Institutions
(latest  relevant  circular:  654/22  July  2003)
relating  to  the  implementation  of  Law
2331/1995  “Prevention  and  suppression  of
money  laundering  and  other  provisions”,  as
currently in force.
9. The provisions of this section shall apply with-
out prejudice to the rights and obligations of
bureaux  de  change,  which  may  stem  from
applicable  legislation  and/or  the  decisions  of
other authorities with regard to matters falling
within their field of competence.
IV. REPORTING TO THE BANK OF GREECE
1. In the event of transfer of a shareholding stake
or voting rights leading to a shareholder acquir-
ing more than 10% of the bureau’s share capi-
tal, the party intending to acquire such holding
shall submit to the Bank of Greece the docu-
ments set out in section I, paragraph 2(b). If the
Bank of Greece does not communicate a nega-
tive response within forty-five (45) days from
the above submission, this shall mean approval
of the share transfer.
2. For  the  establishment  of  new  branches,  an
application  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Bank  of
Greece Department for the Supervision of Credit
and Financial Institutions. If the Bank of Greece
does  not  communicate  a  negative  response
within three months from the submission, this
shall mean approval of the application.
3. Bureaux de change shall submit the following
data to the Bank of Greece Department for the
Supervision of Credit and Financial Institutions:
a) In writing, any changes relating to the contents
of Section I, paragraph 2, excluding indent (b),
at  least  fifteen  (15)  working  days  prior  to
effecting the change. If the change relates to
the persons referred to in indents (c) and (d) of
paragraph 2, Section I, the documents referred
therein shall also be submitted.
b) On  an  annual  basis  (at  the  latest  by  end-
April), financial statements and data on the
société  anonyme’s  business  activity
(monthly turnover per branch, broken down
by type of operation as set out in section II)
for the preceding financial year.
c) Within the first ten days after each calen-
dar quarter, a detailed list of daily balances
of:  purchases-sales,  reserves  in  foreign
banknotes, and cheques for the quarter (in
the form provided by the Bank of Greece
Department for the Supervision of Credit
and  Financial  Institutions).  This  list  shall
also  be  communicated  to  the  Bank  of
Greece Financial Operations Department.
d) List of the credit institutions with which the
bureau de change keeps its deposit accounts.
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exact  postal  address  of  the  bureau  de
change  and  any  authorised  new  branches
within fifteen (15) days from their start of
operation.
f) Any amendments to the bureau’s Articles of
Association.
V. SANCTIONS
1. The  Bank  of  Greece  may  impose  sanctions
(suspension  of  operation,  administrative
fines,  revocation  of  authorisation)  on  the
bureaux de change as well as on the persons
acting  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  this
Act, any decisions relating to the operation of
the bureaux and foreign exchange legislation
in  general.  In  the  event  that  bureau  share-
holders do not comply with the provisions of
Section IV, paragraph 1, the following sanc-
tions shall be imposed on them, individually
or collectively:
a) fine in favour of the Greek government up to
30% of the value of the shares transferred in
breach of the above mentioned provisions,
b) for  natural  persons,  barring  from  the
bureau’s Board of Directors as well as from
any other executive position in the bureau,
for a definite or an indefinite period of time.
2. Fines shall be paid within one month from the
communication  of  the  relevant  decision.  The
bureau’s failure to pay the fine imposed shall
incur suspension of operation or even revoca-
tion of authorisation.
VI. OTHER PROVISIONS
1. The provisions of this Act shall also apply to all
bureaux de change already operating in Greece
with the authorisation of the Bank of Greece.
2. The  Bank  of  Greece  Department  for  the
Supervision of Credit and Financial Institutions
is hereby authorised:
a) to determine a daily ceiling on the bureau’s
foreign  exchange  reserves  lower  than  the
levels referred to in Section III, paragraph 1,
taking  into  consideration,  indicatively,  the
bureau’s  turnover,  the  number  of  its
branches or its non-conformity with the rel-
evant decisions of the Bank of Greece,
b) to monitor compliance with the provisions
of this Act, to further specify requirements
on  reporting  to  the  Bank  of  Greece  for
supervisory purposes, and to provide clarifi-
cations  relating  to  the  implementation  of
this Act.
3. Bank  of  Greece  Governor's  Act  2440/11
January 1999, as amended by Bank of Greece
Governor’s  Act  2473/10  April  2001,  Banking
and  Credit  Matters  Committee  Decisions
112/8/5  November  2001  and  36/1/29  June
1999 is hereby repealed. Any reference to Bank
of  Greece  Governor’s  Act  2440/11  January
1999 or its amendments shall mean to refer to
this Act.
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Table I . 1
Consumer price index
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Source: Calculations based on National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) data (CPI 1999=100).
2000  . . . . . . . . 3.2 2.0 2.0 3.4 2.8 1.9 1.4 26.8
2001  . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.2 3.7 5.1 9.2 –4.8
2002  . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.2 4.3 5.3 13.8 –1.7
2003  . . . . . . . . 3.53.1 3.2 3.1 4.2 5 .0 10.7 3.9
2001 I   . . . . . . 3.3 3.8 3.8 2.9 3.9 1.9 –5.7 3.4
II  . . . . . . 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.7 4.6 7.4 2.4
IIπ   . . . . . 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.6 6.2 14.0 –4.4
IV   . . . . . 2.7 3.4 3.6 2.2 3.6 7.8 23.7 –18.7
2002 I   . . . . . . 4.0 3.4 3.3 4.0 3.9 9.9 43.2 –7.4
II  . . . . . . 3.53.9 3.9 3.0 4.4 4.7 9.0 –4.9
III   . . . . . 3.53.6 3.7 2.7 4.6 4.0 4.5 –0.4
IV   . . . . . 3.6 3.53.53.0 4.52.9 1.0 6.7
2003 I   . . . . . . 3.8 3.4 3.6 3.4 4.52.3 –5 .4 15 .9
II  . . . . . . 3.7 3.0 3.1 3.4 4.1 8.3 27.6 –2.4
III   . . . . . 3.4 2.9 3.0 2.9 4.1 6.1 19.2 0.9
IV   . . . . . 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.54.3 3.3 4.6 1.9
2004 I   . . . . . . 2.7 3.2 3.3 1.8 4.0 3.3 2.6 –5.7
II  . . . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.3 3.9 –0.7 –16.3 11.7
2002 Jan.   . . . . 4.4 3.2 3.3 5.2 3.3 12.9 59.0 –6.4
Feb.  . . . . 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.9 8.6 38.1 –10.3
March   . . 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.8 4.4 8.1 33.4 –5.5
Apr.  . . . . 3.8 3.53.4 4.0 3.6 7.2 26.7 –2.9
May  . . . . 3.8 4.3 4.2 2.4 4.9 3.0 –0.6 –6.8
June   . . . 3.3 3.8 3.9 2.54.5 3.9 2.2 –4.8
July   . . . . 3.3 3.53.7 2.7 4.4 3.9 1.7 –1.0
Aug.   . . . 3.53.6 3.6 2.9 4.5 4.2 6.1 0.5
Sept.   . . . 3.53.8 3.7 2.7 4.8 3.9 5 .8 –0.8
Oct.   . . . 3.7 3.6 3.53.2 4.6 4.1 8.1 4.3
Nov.   . . . 3.6 3.53.53.1 4.54.0 6.3 4.0
Dec.   . . . 3.4 3.53.52.8 4.3 0.8 –9.1 12.1
2003 Jan.   . . . . 3.1 3.6 3.7 2.1 4.7 –1.4 –19.6 13.7
Feb.  . . . . 4.3 3.53.8 4.1 4.7 3.7 –0.5 18.6
March   . . 4.1 3.1 3.4 4.1 4.1 4.7 5.5 15.4
Apr.  . . . . 3.4 3.1 3.4 2.6 4.55 .8 10.9 –1.9
May  . . . . 3.8 2.8 2.9 3.9 3.7 10.3 40.2 –3.7
June   . . . 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.6 4.2 8.9 34.6 –1.6
July   . . . . 3.6 2.9 2.9 3.2 4.1 7.4 28.50.5
Aug.   . . . 3.3 2.9 3.0 2.8 4.0 5.6 17.0 1.6
Sept.   . . . 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.8 4.2 5.2 12.6 0.7
Oct.   . . . 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.54.2 3.7 4.9 1.1
Nov.   . . . 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.9 4.1 3.3 5.6 6.3
Dec.   . . . 3.1 3.4 3.3 2.2 4.53.0 3.2 –1.4
2004 Jan.   . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.2 2.3 3.9 3.54.9 –3.0
Feb.  . . . . 2.53.1 3.1 1.54.0 3.7 4.7 –8.7
March   . . 2.7 3.3 3.4 1.8 4.2 2.8 –1.3 –5.4
Apr.  . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.2 2.3 3.9 0.4 –10.2 8.3
May  . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.4 3.8 –1.0 –17.4 14.9
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Source: NSSG.
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.2 2.8 0.50.6
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 1.55 .2 12.3 6.4
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 10.0 2.7 0.7 1.9
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 11.2 2.6 1.9 0.4
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 8.6 2.7 0.1 1.1
2002 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 34.7 2.6 2.4 0.6
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 6.9 2.2 1.2 0.2
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 4.8 2.4 1.3 0.2
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 0.6 3.1 2.7 0.6
2003 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 –2.53.6 1.1 1.5
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 19.6 1.9 –2.0 0.9
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 12.2 2.4 0.2 1.0
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 7.1 3.1 1.0 0.8
2004 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 4.6 2.8 1.6 0.0
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 44.4 2.7 2.4 0.8
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 29.52.0 1.9 0.5
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 30.53.0 2.8 0.5
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 23.3 2.7 2.8 0.4
ªay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.4 2.1 1.2 0.2
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –3.4 1.8 –0.3 0.0
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 –0.7 2.3 0.5–0.1
∞ug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 9.2 2.51.7 0.4
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 6.0 2.51.7 0.4
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 5.6 3.1 3.2 0.3
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 4.52.9 2.2 0.5
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 –6.8 3.2 2.7 0.9
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5–14.2 3.5 1.4 1.4
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 2.54.1 1.9 1.6
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 4.9 3.0 0.0 1.4
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 6.51.8 –2.2 1.0
ªay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 28.1 1.7 –3.3 0.9
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 26.6 2.2 –0.3 1.0
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 20.9 2.2 0.7 1.2
∞ug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 10.6 2.50.7 1.0
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.55 .6 2.5 –0.7 0.9
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 7.52.7 0.2 0.9
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 7.9 3.51.8 0.9
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 5.9 3.0 1.1 0.6
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 10.6 2.7 1.9 0.0
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 4.7 2.50.5 –0.1
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 –0.7 3.1 2.3 0.0
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 –2.3 5.0 4.6 0.7
ªay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 –8.55 .9 7.50.7
Table I . 2
Wholesale price index
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Table I . 3
Industrial production index (1995=100)
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period






















2000 . . . . . . . . . . . .  7.2 5.1 13.4 11.5 12.3 6.2 7.3 12.7 1.9
2001 . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.0 1.8 –1.4 –0.3 –0.3 –1.0 5.1 –1.8 4.1
2002 . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.8 1.2 9.1 2.0 2.3 0.8 –5.1 –13.9 5.9
2003 . . . . . . . . . . . .  1.3 –0.4 –4.8 6.9 5.3 0.2 –3.8 –1.2 –0.7
2002 II. . . . . . . . . . .  4.0 2.9 10.7 5.8 5.0 3.4 –2.3 –13.7 7.2
III . . . . . . . . . .  –0.2 –0.50.6 0.6 0.1 –0.2 –1.6 –10.50.6
IV . . . . . . . . . .  3.1 2.9 14.4 1.6 2.51.5 0.2 –16.2 9.0
2003 I . . . . . . . . . . .  0.0 –1.6 –10.6 6.0 4.6 –0.2 –15.0 –4.5 –0.9
II. . . . . . . . . . .  2.0 0.4 –6.2 8.1 6.0 –1.8 1.6 –5.2 2.4
III . . . . . . . . . .  2.4 –0.2 –3.59.7 8.7 –0.4 2.8 1.7 –2.4
IV . . . . . . . . . .  0.7 –0.50.9 3.8 1.9 3.4 –4.6 2.9 –1.9
2004 I . . . . . . . . . . .  2.6 0.0 5.2 8.1 6.7 –1.3 2.4 0.3 1.5
2001 July. . . . . . . . .  2.7 4.1 3.0 –0.4 0.2 –0.6 2.2 3.8 10.0
Aug. . . . . . . . .  –0.2 –0.1 1.8 –0.8 0.1 –0.6 –19.8 –3.1 4.0
Sept.. . . . . . . .  3.2 2.6 10.2 2.9 3.0 2.7 1.1 –0.1 4.6
Oct. . . . . . . . .  2.2 1.2 2.7 4.8 5.9 –0.4 –4.2 –0.8 3.4
Nov. . . . . . . . .  1.0 2.7 –7.3 –1.4 –0.3 –4.3 –1.5–6.4 11.2
Dec. . . . . . . . .  –4.1 –5.4 –24.4 2.3 1.4 –14.0 7.4 –9.5 –4.1
2002 Jan.. . . . . . . . .  –1.4 –5.9 9.9 6.8 6.2 –8.3 –30.9 –25.1 8.1
Feb. . . . . . . . .  –1.0 –0.9 17.0 –4.7 –2.3 1.1 –23.7 –11.1 8.4
March. . . . . . .  2.9 4.0 10.7 –1.51.4 1.4 6.0 –10.3 6.7
∞pr. . . . . . . . .  8.3 9.2 9.0 5.7 5.2 12.9 4.1 –7.1 9.7
May . . . . . . . .  0.7 –0.4 11.51.4 1.0 –2.4 –6.8 –15 .7 7.8
June . . . . . . . .  3.3 0.2 11.6 9.9 8.50.7 –4.2 –18.1 4.3
July. . . . . . . . .  2.7 0.6 3.7 7.3 5.5 0.5 –3.9 –13.2 4.6
Aug. . . . . . . . .  –1.6 –2.9 7.7 –0.8 0.2 –1.0 –1.8 –18.3 –3.6
Sept.. . . . . . . .  –1.7 0.3 –7.3 –5.6 –5.9 –0.2 1.0 –3.6 0.7
Oct. . . . . . . . .  –1.2 –0.54.9 –4.1 –3.0 –0.6 –3.8 –10.6 2.0
Nov. . . . . . . . .  4.0 2.4 15.6 6.1 6.9 –0.8 –2.5 –14.6 9.9
Dec. . . . . . . . .  7.0 7.6 28.2 3.0 3.57.4 5 .8 –22.2 16.5
2003 Jan.. . . . . . . . .  0.0 5.1 –6.0 –8.9 –7.7 10.2 –7.0 10.3 1.6
Feb. . . . . . . . .  0.8 –4.1 –16.517.3 12.9 –3.7 –19.7 –10.7 –2.2
March. . . . . . .  –0.7 –4.5 –8.8 11.8 9.8 –5.3 –15.7 –8.0 –1.9
∞pr. . . . . . . . .  –1.5–4.3 –2.0 6.2 6.5 –7.1 –14.5 –18.9 1.2
May . . . . . . . .  4.4 2.1 –7.9 13.8 12.0 –0.4 0.9 2.9 2.4
June . . . . . . . .  3.3 3.6 –8.1 4.8 0.4 2.3 19.4 1.6 3.5
July. . . . . . . . .  1.4 1.1 –6.7 3.7 3.1 1.4 0.8 3.7 –0.7
Aug. . . . . . . . .  –0.9 –6.3 –4.510.6 9.2 –5 .4 –1.2 0.9 –10.0
Sept.. . . . . . . .  6.3 3.2 0.516.4 15 .1 1.5 7.3 0.2 2.7
Oct. . . . . . . . .  3.1 1.0 1.7 9.2 5.7 2.3 –1.4 8.7 2.2
Nov. . . . . . . . .  –2.2 –3.2 –10.52.0 –1.1 2.5 –5 .6 0.6 –7.5
Dec. . . . . . . . .  1.3 0.7 15.1 0.8 1.4 5.7 –6.3 –0.4 0.3
2004 Jan.. . . . . . . . .  –0.3 –7.1 –4.9 15.9 13.6 –11.2 1.3 –22.2 –5.2
Feb. . . . . . . . .  2.9 2.1 8.4 3.52.9 1.4 –0.1 4.2 5 .1
March. . . . . . .  4.9 4.1 11.5 5.7 4.4 5.5 5.2 13.8 4.1
Apr. . . . . . . . .  2.2 3.0 9.7 –1.3 –1.4 4.3 –0.7 17.6 3.9
ªay* . . . . . . .  0.3 3.51.8 –7.7 –6.4 5 .7 3.0 14.9 0.9
* Provisional data.
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Sources: NSSG and Eurostat. Revised index of retail sales volume (excluding VAT).
Table I . 4
Retail sales volume (2000=100)












2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.8 7.4 13.3 11.58.3
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 2.3 3.3 4.7 5.9
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.54.5 2.8 4.4 5 .2
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 5.4 1.6 4.0 7.5
2002 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 –0.7 6.57.8 4.0
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 4.1 –0.7 1.8 7.4
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 7.6 0.9 5.7 6.3
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 7.0 3.9 2.9 3.3
2003 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 7.7 –3.513.7 7.2
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 1.3 10.5–1.7 11.5
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 4.7 7.8 3.6 8.8
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.57.7 –4.9 1.7 3.2
2004 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 6.2 0.7 5.7 6.6
2001 Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –2.6 –1.4 2.7 4.4
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 1.6 –0.56.57.3
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5–0.2 –0.3 5 .2 6.8
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –3.4 2.0 6.6 3.8
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5–1.8 10.8 10.0 6.5
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 3.4 7.2 6.8 1.7
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.9 –4.7 –3.2 1.7 2.2
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.9 10.8 2.1 –0.1 12.8
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 7.7 –0.6 3.6 7.7
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 4.6 1.6 1.9 7.0
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 9.7 –8.8 6.7 3.3
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 8.7 10.0 9.0 8.0
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 6.4 7.7 0.7 4.1
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 6.4 3.9 2.2 0.0
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 7.9 1.5 5.1 5.0
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 9.6 –4.2 19.8 11.6
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 7.0 –8.510.1 3.5
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 6.6 5.0 10.8 6.3
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 4.2 12.3 –8.0 21.2
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 –0.8 12.3 1.8 8.1
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 0.3 6.2 1.4 5.3
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 –0.1 5.5 2.0 3.0
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 9.1 12.56.9 12.6
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 5.3 6.4 2.2 11.2
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 6.8 –5.6 5.7 1.2
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.59.4 1.3 2.8 9.5
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 7.2 –8.7 –2.4 0.5
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 7.2 –3.9 –3.4 2.2
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 4.8 5.6 13.0 10.1
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 6.5 0.2 9.1 8.1
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 8.5 –3.4 9.4 2.6
Food-beverages-
tobaccoStatistical section
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Table I . 5
Gross value added at basic prices and gross domestic product at market prices
Annual percentage change




Source:NSSG/National Accounts (provisional estimates for 2000-2003), May 2004.
1.1 Primary sector (agriculture) 7,277 2.3 3.5–3.7 –3.8 –1.1 –5 .2
1.2 Secondary sector 16,550 7.2 2.4 5.4 6.3 2.8 8.9
1.2.a Mining and quarrying 476 13.0 –17.9 23.1 2.2 8.5–9.7
1.2.b Manufacturing 9,572 5.3 1.3 4.6 3.3 3.0 4.1
1.2.c Electricity-town gas-water supply 1,751 6.8 13.4 4.8 0.2 2.9 6.3
1.2.d Construction 4,751 10.6 2.3 5.7 12.9 2.0 18.0
1.3 Tertiary sector 50,031 3.1 2.0 5.0 4.9 4.4 5.6
1.3.a Trade 10,018 3.6 –0.8 3.1 11.7 1.2 11.7
1.3.b Hotels - restaurants 4,821 3.7 –5.7 5.4 6.2 4.0 –3.5
1.3.c Transport - communications 4,978 4.1 33.4 16.2 1.3 5.9 7.3
1.3.d Financial intermediaries 3,112 11.511.0 10.0 5 .9 –0.3 9.0
1.3.e Real estate management and
other activities 12,577 2.5 –5.9 3.3 3.0 4.0 4.7
1.3.f Public administration - security 5,308 –0.6 0.9 –2.8 2.3 6.0 1.8
1.3.g Education 3,298 –0.7 –2.2 1.6 –1.2 11.0 4.1
1.3.h Health 3,855 1.2 –2.0 3.0 0.9 7.9 7.3
1.3.i Other activities 2,064 6.5 9.6 7.6 15.0 6.3 5.4
1.4 Gross value added 73,858 3.9 2.1 4.4 4.6 3.7 5.6
1.5 Imputed bank services –2,17516.52.8 13.8 12.1 1.6 11.5
1.6 Gross value added at basic prices 71,683 3.6 2.1 4.1 4.3 3.7 5.3
2.1 Final consumption 70,655 3.2 2.4 2.1 2.3 3.3 3.4
2.1.a Private consumption 58,405 3.5 2.5 2.0 2.9 2.8 3.5
2.1.b Public consumption 12,250 1.7 2.1 2.2 –1.0 5.8 2.9
2.2 Gross fixed capital formation 14,867 10.6 11.0 8.0 6.5 5.7 15.8
2.2.a Residential 4,031 8.8 3.7 –4.3 4.8 8.8 8.3
2.2.b Non-residential construction 5,391 9.4 6.6 8.9 8.2 0.7 13.7
2.2.c Equipment 4,680 16.521.4 14.1 4.9 6.9 22.7
2.2.d Other investment 765–14.0 –2.4 7.6 20.1 20.8 –0.8
2.3 Stocks and statistical discrepancy
(percentage of GDP) 251 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1
2.4 Domestic final demand 85,774 4.6 3.8 3.7 2.9 3.9 6.2
2.5∂ xports of goods and services 14,087 5.3 18.1 14.1 –1.0 –7.7 –0.2
2.5.a ∂xports of goods 8,344 2.7 6.3 8.7 –1.6 –7.1 5.8
2.5.b ∂xports of services 5,743 7.7 29.0 18.2 –0.7 –8.1 –4.4
2.6 Final demand 99,861 4.7 6.1 5.6 2.1 1.7 5.1
2.7 Imports of goods and services 19,934 9.2 15.0 8.9 –3.4 –4.7 8.0
2.7.a Imports of goods 18,084 9.4 8.57.6 –4.2 1.1 11.1
2.7.b Imports of services 1,849 8.55 2.9 14.4 –0.3 –26.6 –8.0
2.8 GDP at market prices 79,927 3.4 3.4 4.4 4.0 3.9 4.3
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998I CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (I.A+I.B+I.C+I.D)
I.A TRADE BALANCE (I.A.1– I.A.2)
Non-oil trade balance
Oil trade balance
I.A.1 Exports of goods
Oil
Other
I.A.2 Imports of goods
Oil
Other
















I.D TRANSFERS BALANCE (I.D.1– I.D.2)
I.D.1 Receipts
General government (EU transfers)




II FINANCIAL ACCOUNT (II.A+II.B+II.C+II.D)
II.A DIRECT INVESTMENT 1
By residents abroad
By non-residents in Greece







II.D CHANGE IN RESERVE ASSETS 2
III ERRORS AND OMISSIONS
RESERVE ASSETS 3
–4,463,4 –5,067,2 –4,038,3 –741,3 –738,0 –681,0
–9,365,6 –9,420,6 –10,080,4 –1,827,1 –1,877,2 –2,022,8
–7,958,4 –7,470,2 –8,289,6 –1,576,6 –1,613,8 –1,621,6
–1,407,2 –1,950,4 –1,790,8 –250,5 –263,4 –401,2
4,243,2 4,488,9 4,898,5 892,7 861,4 962,9
493,0 595,4 528,3 99,1 83,1 99,3
3,750.2 3,893.5 4,370.2 793.6 778.3 863.6
13,608.8 13,909.6 14,978.9 2,719.8 2,738.6 2,985.8
1,900.2 2,545.8 2,319.1 349.6 346.5 500.5
11,708.6 11,363.8 12,659.8 2,370.2 2,392.1 2,485.3
2,288.9 2,624.9 4,008.5 945.0 1,018.6 1,381.9
6,409.4 6,341.6 8,403.8 1,915.2 1,774.2 2,230.3
1,755.7 1,610.2 1,852.0 980.5 832.2 954.0
3,642.7 3,820.3 5,361.3 765.1 772.4 1,079.2
1,011.0 911.2 1,190.5169.7 169.6 197.1
4,120.4 3,716.7 4,395.3 970.2 755.6 848.4
701.1 651.9 809.5 275.1 168.1 194.0
2,187.8 1,947.52,269.7 465 .9 371.6 418.5
1,231.6 1,117.3 1,316.1 229.3 215.9 235.9
–887.5 –1,041.6 –1,107.4 –200.1 –208.6 –269.8
689.5 688.9 642.6 117.4 108.2 104.2
231.3 137.9 114.8 39.6 28.1 20.0
458.2 551.1 527.8 77.8 80.0 84.2
1,576.9 1,730.5 1,750.0 317.4 316.8 374.0
115.4 64.4 72.5 23.9 12.8 17.5
1,461.51,666.1 1 677.5293.5 304.0 35 6.6
3,500.7 2,770.1 3,141.0 340.9 329.2 229.7
4,619.6 3,765.0 4,233.4 535.4 522.3 447.8
3,722.9 2,804.7 3,223.3 352.1 335.5 244.9
896.7 960.3 1,010.0 183.2 186.8 202.9
1,118.8 994.9 1,092.4 194.5 193.1 218.1
840.1 777.3 827.7 129.515 1.6 170.3
278.8 217.6 264.7 64.9 41.6 47.8
4,338.6 5,439.7 4,704.7 1,042.9 1,236.9 1,046.5
–271.7 –768.6 439.0 15.7 –332.9 –46.9
–199.8 –336.9 –209.9 –6.5–33.9 –5 2.1
–71.9 –431.7 649.0 22.2 –299.0 5.1
5,556.5 10,138.0 5,675.3 636.0 3,457.5 –3,041.8
–1,054.4 –4,563.8 –5,172.2 12.0 120.2 –3 237.8
6,610.9 14,701.8 10,847.4 623.9 3,337.3 195.9
584.9 –8,147.7 –2,609.6 555.2 –2,132.7 4,021.2
–5,109.2 –3,595.0 –3,701.4 1,048.7 –1,061.8 1,931.6
5,694.1 –4,552.7 1,091.8 –493.5 –1,070.9 2,089.6
–1,927.0 –1,628.0 –207.0 –1,465.7 –136.8 –52.6
–1,531.0 4,218.0 1,200.0 –164.0 245.0 114.0
124.7 –372.4 –666.4 –301.7 –498.9 –365.5
8,562.0 4,796.0 3,412.0
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Table I I . 1
Balance of payments
(Million euro)
1 (+) net inflow, (–) net outflow.
2 (+) decrease, (–) increase.
3 Reserve assets, as defined by the European Central Bank, include only monetary gold, the reserve position in the IMF, the special drawing rights and the Bank of Greece claims
in foreign currency on residents of non-euro area countries. Conversely, reserve assets do not include claims in euro on residents of non-euro area countries, claims in foreign
currency and in euro on residents of euro area countries, and the Bank of Greece participation in the capital and reserves of the ECB.
* Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Greece.
January – May May
2002 2003 2004* 2002 2003 2004*Statistical section
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* The effective exchange rate is the value of a representative basket of foreign currencies, each of which is weighted on the basis of its importance in the country’s
external trade. Up to end-2000, the effective exchange rate of the drachma was calculated weighting the individual bilateral exchange rates of the drachma against
the other currencies, as these rates were formulated in the foreign exchange market. On 1 January 2001, Greece adopted the euro. In the present table, the
weighting of the euro exchange rate vis-à-vis the other currencies is calculated on the basis of the country’s non-oil external trade. As from January 2001, the change
in the index is limited, since trade with the 11 other euro area countries (which accounts for a large share of total trade) is conducted in euro. This index should
not be confused with the effective exchange rate of the euro, which is calculated on the basis of the external trade of the euro area as a whole.
1 A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a depreciation.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table I π . 2







1995  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66.3  –3.5  –3.5 
1996  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65.5  –1.1  –1.1 
1997  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64.3  –1.9  –1.9 
1998  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.5  –5.9  –5.9 
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.9  –0.9  –0.9 
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.2  –6.2  –6.2 
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9  –0.6  –0.6 
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.4  0.9  0.9 
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.0  2.9  2.9 
2002 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9  0.0  –0.3 
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.2  0.5  1.0 
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.6  0.7  1.4 
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.8  0.4  1.6 
2003 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.5  1.2  2.8 
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2  1.2  3.5 
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1  –0.2  2.6 
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2  0.3  2.5 
2004 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.5  0.5  1.8 
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2 –0.6 0.01
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.0  0.0  –0.3
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9  –0.2  –0.2
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9  0.0  –0.4
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9  0.1  0.0
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.2  0.4  1.0
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.5  0.6  1.9
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.7  0.3  2.0
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.6 –0.2  1.1
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.6  0.1  1.1
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.7  0.2  1.2
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.8  0.2  1.8
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.0  0.3  1.8
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.3  0.6  2.4
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.6  0.4  3.0
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 57.7  0.2  3.2
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.8  0.2  3.3
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4  1.1  3.9
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4  0.1  3.4
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2 –0.3  2.8
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 –0.3  2.7
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.0 –0.2  2.4
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 0.3  2.5
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 –0.1  2.2
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.5  0.7  2.6
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.6  0.2 2.3
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.6  –0.1  1.8
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4  –0.4  1.3
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1  –0.5  0.5
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.3  0.4  –0.2
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2 –0.1 –0.3
Previous













Table I I . 3
Bilateral exchange rates of the euro*
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages)
* To 31 December 1998, rates for the ECU; from 1 January 1999, rates for the euro. A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a
depreciation. On 1 January 2001, Greece adopted the euro. Therefore, the evolution of the exchange rate of the drachma vis-à-vis the currencies of non-euro area
countries is identical with the evolution of the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis these currencies. Up to end-2001, however, the differentiation observed in the
annual rates of change is attributable to the deviation of the drachma from its central parity in 2000. 
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB). 
1995  . . . . . . 1.308  123.0 7.33 0.829
1996  . . . . . . 1.270  –2.9  –2.9  138.1 12.3  12.3  7.36 0.4  0.4  0.814 –1.8  –1.8 
1997  . . . . . . 1.134  –10.7  –10.7  137.1 –0.7  –0.7  7.48 1.7  1.7  0.692 –14.9  –14.9 
1998  . . . . . . 1.121  –1.1  –1.1  146.4 6.8  6.8  7.50 0.2  0.2  0.676 –2.3  –2.3 
1999  . . . . . . 1.066  –4.9  –4.9  121.3 –17.2  –17.2  7.44 –0.8  –0.8  0.659 –2.6  –2.6 
2000  . . . . . . 0.924  –13.3  –13.3  99.5–18.0  –18.0  7.45 0.1  0.1  0.609 –7.6  –7.6 
2001  . . . . . . 0.896  –3.1  –3.1  108.7 9.3  9.3  7.450.03  0.03  0.622 2.1  2.1 
2002  . . . . . . 0.945  5.5  5.5  118.1 8.6  8.6  7.43 –0.3  –0.3  0.629 1.1  1.1 
2003  . . . . . . 1.131  19.7  19.7  131.0 10.9  10.9  7.43 0.003  0.003  0.692 10.1  10.1 
2001 I  . . . . . 0.923  6.2  –6.5  109.0 14.1  3.2  7.46 0.1  0.2  0.633 5.3  2.9 
II . . . . . 0.873  –5.4  –6.5  107.1 –1.7  7.6  7.46 –0.1  0.04  0.615 –2.8  0.8 
III  . . . . 0.891  2.0  –1.6  108.3 1.1  11.1  7.44 –0.2  –0.2  0.619 0.8  1.1 
IV  . . . . 0.896  0.5  3.0  110.6 2.2  15.8  7.44 –0.03  –0.2  0.621 0.2  3.4 
2002 I  . . . . . 0.876  –2.1  –5.1  116.0  4.8  6.4  7.43  –0.1  –0.4  0.615  –1.0  –2.8 
II . . . . . 0.919  4.9  5.3  116.5 0.4  8.8  7.43 0.04  –0.3  0.629 2.3  2.3 
III  . . . . 0.984  7.0  10.4  117.3 0.7  8.3  7.43 –0.1  –0.2  0.6351.0  2.6 
IV  . . . . 1.000  1.7  11.7  122.54.4  10.7  7.43 0.000  –0.2  0.636 0.2  2.5  
2003 I  . . . . . 1.074  7.3  22.5  127.7  4.2  10.1  7.43  0.03  –0.02  0.670  5.3  9.0 
II . . . . . 1.136  5.9  23.7  134.7  5.5  15.6  7.43  –0.1  –0.1  0.701 4.7  11.6 
III  . . . . 1.124  –1.1  14.3  132.1 –1.9  12.7  7.43 0.1  0.04  0.699 –0.4  10.0 
IV  . . . . 1.189  5.8  18.9  129.5 –2.0  5.7  7.44 0.1  0.1  0.697 –0.2  9.6 
2004 I  . . . . . 1.251  5.2  16.5  134.0 3.5  5.0  7.45 0.2  0.3  0.680 –2.5  1.5 
II . . . . . 1.204 –3.7 6.0 132.1 –1.4 –1.9 7.44 –0.1 0.2 0.667 –1.9 –4.9
2002 Jan.  . . . 0.883 –1.0  –5.9 117.1 3.3  6.9 7.43 –0.1  –0.4 0.617 –0.6  –2.9
Feb. . . . 0.870 –1.5  –5.6 116.2 –0.8  8.5 7.43 –0.04  –0.4 0.612 –0.8  –3.5
March  . 0.876 0.6  –3.7 114.6 –1.4  3.9 7.43 0.03  –0.4 0.616 0.7  –2.1
Apr. . . . 0.886 1.2  –0.7 115.8 1.0  4.9 7.43 0.02  –0.4 0.614 –0.3  –1.2
May . . . 0.917 3.5  4.9 115.9 0.4  8.8 7.44 0.02  –0.3 0.628 2.3  2.4
June  . . 0.954  4.1  11.8 117.8 1.6  12.8 7.43 –0.03  –0.3 0.644 2.5  5.6
July  . . . 0.992  4.0  15.3 117.1 –0.6  9.2 7.43 –0.04  –0.2 0.639 –0.8  5.0
Aug.  . . 0.978  –1.5  8.6 116.3 –0.7  6.4 7.43 –0.04  –0.2 0.636 –0.4  1.5
Sept.  . . 0.981  0.3  7.7 118.4 1.8  9.4 7.43 0.001  –0.2 0.631 –0.9  1.2
Oct.  . . 0.981  0.03  8.3 121.6 2.7  10.7 7.43 0.04  –0.1 0.630 –0.1  1.0
Nov.  . . 1.001  2.1  12.7 121.7 0.1  11.9 7.43 –0.02 –0.2 0.637 1.1  3.0
Dec.  . . 1.018  1.7  14.1 124.2 2.1  9.57.43 –0.02 –0.2 0.642 0.8  3.6
2003 Jan.  . . . 1.063  4.4  20.3 126.2 1.6  7.8 7.43 0.1  –0.004 0.657 2.4  6.6
Feb. . . . 1.077  1.4  23.8 128.6 1.9  10.6 7.43 –0.01  0.02 0.670 1.9  9.5
March  . 1.081  0.3  23.4 128.2 –0.3  11.8 7.43 –0.1  –0.1 0.683 1.9  10.8
Apr. . . . 1.085  0.4  22.5 130.1 1.5  12.4 7.43 –0.03  –0.1 0.689 0.9  12.2
May . . . 1.158  6.8  26.3 135.8 4.4  17.2 7.42 –0.01  –0.1 0.713 3.5  13.5
June  . . 1.166  0.7  22.2 138.1 1.6  17.2 7.43 0.01  –0.1 0.702 –1.5  9.1
July  . . . 1.137  –2.5  14.6 135.0 –2.2  15.3 7.43 0.1  0.04 0.700 –0.3  9.7
Aug.  . . 1.114  –2.0  13.9 132.4 –1.9  13.8 7.43 –0.01  0.1 0.699 –0.2  9.9
Sept.  . . 1.122  0.7  14.4 128.9 –2.6  8.9 7.43 –0.1  0.003 0.697 –0.3  10.5
Oct.  . . 1.169  4.2  19.2 128.1 –0.6  5.4 7.43 0.04  0.01 0.698 0.1  10.7
Nov.  . . 1.170  0.1  16.9 127.8 –0.2  5.1 7.44 0.1  0.1 0.693 –0.7  8.7
Dec.  . . 1.229  5.0  20.7 132.4 3.6  6.6 7.44 0.1  0.2 0.702 1.3  9.3
2004 Jan.  . . . 1.261  2.7  18.7 134.1 1.3  6.3 7.450.1  0.2 0.692 –1.4  5 .3
Feb. . . . 1.265  0.3  17.4 134.8 0.5  4.8 7.45 0.04  0.3 0.677 –2.2  1.1
March  . 1.226  –3.0  13.5133.1 –1.2  3.9 7.45 –0.02  0.3 0.671 –0.8  –1.7
Apr. . . . 1.199  –2.3  10.5129.1 –3.0  –0.8 7.44 –0.1  0.2 0.665 –0.9  –3.4
May . . . 1.201  0.2  3.7 134.54.2  –1.0 7.44 –0.04  0.2 0.672 0.9  –5 .8
June  . . 1.214 1.1 4.1 132.86 –1.2 –3.8 7.43 –0.1 0.1 0.664 –1.1 –5.4
Period


























Table I I . 3(continued)
Bilateral exchange rates of the euro*
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages)
* To 31 December 1998, rates for the ECU; from 1 January 1999, rates for the euro. A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a
depreciation. On 1 January 2001, Greece adopted the euro. Therefore, the evolution of the exchange rate of the drachma vis-à-vis the currencies of non-euro area
countries is identical with the evolution of the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis these currencies. Up to end-2001, however, the differentiation observed in the
annual rates of change is attributable to the deviation of the drachma from its central parity in 2000. 
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB).
1995  . . . . . . 9.33 1.546 8.29
1996  . . . . . . 8.51 –8.8  –8.8  1.568 1.4  1.4  8.20 –1.1  –1.1  1.623 1.731
1997  . . . . . . 8.65 1.6  1.6  1.644 4.9  4.9  8.02 –2.2  –2.2  1.528 –5.9  –5.9  1.569 –9.4  –9.4 
1998  . . . . . . 8.92 3.1  3.1  1.622 –1.3  –1.3  8.47 5.6  5.6  1.787 17.0  17.0  1.665 6.1  6.1 
1999  . . . . . . 8.81 –1.2  –1.2  1.600 –1.4  –1.4  8.31 –1.8  –1.8  1.652 –7.6  –7.6  1.584 –4.9  –4.9 
2000  . . . . . . 8.45 –4.1  –4.1  1.558 –2.6  –2.6  8.11 –2.4  –2.4  1.589 –3.8  –3.8  1.371 –13.4  –13.4 
2001  . . . . . . 9.26 9.5  9.5  1.510 –3.1  –3.1  8.05 –0.8  –0.8  1.732 9.0  9.0  1.387 1.1  1.1 
2002  . . . . . . 9.16 –1.0  –1.0  1.467 –2.9  –2.9  7.51 –6.7  –6.7  1.737 0.2  0.2  1.483 6.9  6.9 
2003  . . . . . . 9.12 –0.4  –0.4  1.521 3.6  3.6  8.00 6.5  6.5  1.738 0.1  0.1  1.582 6.7  6.7 
2001 I  . . . . . 9.00 4.6  5.9  1.533 1.1  –4.6  8.20 2.0  1.1  1.740 6.6  11.3  1.410 6.3  –1.7 
II . . . . . 9.13 1.4  10.3  1.528 –0.3  –2.3  8.01 –2.3  –2.3  1.704 –2.1  7.5  1.346 –4.5  –2.6 
III  . . . . 9.42 3.2  12.1  1.506 –1.4  –2.5  8.01 –0.1  –1.2  1.737 1.9  10.1  1.376 2.2  2.5 
IV  . . . . 9.48 0.6  10.2  1.474 –2.2  –2.8  7.97 –0.5  –0.9  1.749 0.7  7.1  1.415 2.9  6.7 
2002 I  . . . . . 9.16  –3.4  1.7  1.473  –0.001  –3.9  7.81  –2.0  –4.8  1.692  –3.3  –2.8  1.397  –1.3  –0.9 
II . . . . . 9.16 –0.02  0.3  1.465–0.6  –4.1  7.5 2 –3.7  –6.2  1.666 –1.5   –2.2  1.428 2.2  6.1 
III  . . . . 9.23 0.8  –2.0  1.464 –0.1  –2.8  7.40 –1.6  –7.6  1.796 7.8  3.5  1.536 7.6  11.7 
IV  . . . . 9.09 –1.5  –4.0  1.467 0.2  –0.5  7.32 –1.1  –8.2  1.792 –0.3  2.4  1.570 2.2  10.9 
2003 I  . . . . . 9.18  1.0  0.3  1.466  –0.02  –0.5  7.58  3.5  –3.0  1.809  1.0  6.9  1.620  3.2  16.0 
II . . . . . 9.14  –0.4  –0.1  1.518 3.5  3.6  7.96  5.0  5.8  1.774 –1.9  6.5  1.589 –1.9  11.3 
III  . . . . 9.16 0.2  –0.7  1.545 1.8  5.6  8.25 3.7  11.5  1.709 –3.7  –4.9  1.553 –2.2  1.1 
IV  . . . . 9.01 –1.7  –0.9  1.554 0.6  5.9  8.22 –0.3  12.4  1.661 –2.8  –7.3  1.566 0.8  –0.2 
2004 I  . . . . . 9.18 1.9  –0.01  1.569 0.9  7.0  8.64 5.0  14.0  1.633 –1.7  –9.7  1.649 5.3  1.8 
II . . . . . 9.15 –0.4 0.03 1.538 –2.0 1.3 8.26 –4.3 3.9 1.689 3.4 –4.8 1.637 –0.8 3.0
2002 Jan.  . . . 9.23 –2.2  3.6 1.475 –0.03  –3.6 7.92 –0.9  –3.8 1.709 –1.5  1.2 1.413 0.4  0.3
Feb. . . . 9.18 –0.5  2.3 1.477 0.2  –3.8 7.79 –1.7  –5.2 1.696 –0.8  –1.6 1.388 –1.8  –1.0
March  . 9.06 –1.3  –0.7 1.468 –0.6  –4.4 7.72 –0.9  –5.4 1.670 –1.5  –7.6 1.390 0.2  –1.9
Apr. . . . 9.14 0.8  0.3 1.466 –0.2  –4.1 7.62 –1.2  –6.1 1.654 –1.0  –7.3 1.401 0.8  0.8
May . . . 9.22 0.9  1.8 1.457 –0.6  –5.0 7.52 –1.3  –5.9 1.666 0.8  –0.9 1.421 1.4  5.5
June  . . 9.11 –1.1  –1.0 1.472 1.0  –3.3 7.40 –1.5  –6.7 1.678 0.7  2.0 1.462 2.9  12.3
July  . . . 9.27 1.7  0.1 1.462 –0.7  –3.4 7.41 0.01  –7.1 1.792 6.8  6.1 1.532 4.8  16.5
Aug.  . . 9.25–0.2  –0.7 1.464 0.1  –3.4 7.43 0.3  –7.8 1.8050.7  5 .1 1.5 33 0.1  10.7
Sept.  . . 9.17 –0.9  –5.2 1.465 0.1  –1.8 7.36 –0.9  –8.0 1.793 –0.7  –0.6 1.543 0.7  8.2
Oct.  . . 9.11 –0.7  –4.9 1.465 0.01  –1.0 7.34 –0.3  –8.2 1.783 –0.5  –0.7 1.548 0.3  8.8
Nov.  . . 9.08 –0.3  –3.6 1.467 0.2  0.1 7.32 –0.3  –7.6 1.7850.1  3.9 1.5 74 1.6  11.2
Dec.  . . 9.10 0.2  –3.6 1.468 0.04  –0.57.29 –0.3  –8.7 1.808 1.3  4.2 1.5 87 0.9  12.8
2003 Jan.  . . . 9.18 0.9  –0.51.462 –0.4  –0.8 7.34 0.6  –7.4 1.822 0.8  6.6 1.636 3.1  15 .8
Feb. . . . 9.15–0.3  –0.4 1.467 0.3  –0.7 7.5 4 2.8  –3.1 1.811 –0.6  6.8 1.630 –0.4  17.4
March  . 9.23 0.9  1.8 1.470 0.1  0.1 7.854.0  1.7 1.795 –0.9  7.5 1.5 94 –2.2  14.7
Apr. . . . 9.15–0.8  0.2 1.496 1.8  2.1 7.83 –0.2  2.7 1.781 –0.8  7.7 1.5 85 –0.6  13.2
May . . . 9.16 0.02  –0.7 1.516 1.3  4.0 7.87 0.5  4.7 1.787 0.3  7.2 1.602 1.0  12.7
June  . . 9.12 –0.4  0.04 1.541 1.7  4.7 8.16 3.7  10.2 1.755 –1.8  4.6 1.580 1.6  8.1
July  . . . 9.19 0.7  –0.9 1.548 0.4  5.8 8.29 1.6  11.9 1.718 –2.1  –4.1 1.569 –0.7  2.4
Aug.  . . 9.24 0.6  –0.1 1.540 –0.5  5.2 8.26 –0.4  11.1 1.711 –0.4  –5.2 1.557 –0.8  1.5
Sept.  . . 9.07 –1.8  –1.1 1.547 0.5  5.6 8.20 –0.7  11.3 1.697 –0.9  –5.4 1.533 –1.5  –0.7
Oct.  . . 9.01 –0.6  –1.0 1.549 0.1  5.7 8.23 0.4  12.1 1.687 –0.6  –5.4 1.549 1.0  0.1
Nov.  . . 8.99 –0.2  –1.0 1.559 0.7  6.2 8.20 –0.4  12.0 1.634 –3.1  –8.5 1.536 –0.8  –2.4
Dec.  . . 9.02 0.3  –0.8 1.554 –0.3  5.9 8.24 0.6  13.0 1.663 1.8  –8.0 1.613 5.0  1.6
2004 Jan.  . . . 9.14 1.3  –0.4 1.566 0.7  7.1 8.59 4.3  17.1 1.637 –1.5  –10.1 1.635 1.3  –0.1
Feb. . . . 9.18 0.4  0.3 1.573 0.5  7.2 8.78 2.1  16.3 1.626 –0.7  –10.2 1.682 2.9  3.2
March  . 9.23 0.6  0.1 1.567 –0.4  6.6 8.54 –2.7  8.9 1.637 0.7  –8.8 1.631 –3.0  2.3
Apr. . . . 9.17 –0.8  0.1 1.555 –0.8  3.9 8.30 –2.8  5.9 1.614 –1.4  –9.4 1.607 –1.5  1.4
May . . . 9.13 –0.4  –0.3 1.540 –0.9  1.6 8.21 –1.1  4.3 1.703 5.5  –4.7 1.654 2.9  3.3
June  . . 9.143 0.2 0.3 1.519 –1.4 –1.4 8.29 1.0 1.51.748 2.6 –0.4 1.649 –0.3 4.4
Period
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Table I I . 4















2003 2002 2001Statistical section
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2000  . . . . . . . . 348.4  1,784.4  2,077.1  991.8  1,165.5  4,290.0  174.9  300.0  135.7  4,900.7 
2001  . . . . . . . . 239.7  1,968.2  2,207.9  1,088.8  1,367.9  4,664.6  218.5  402.0  145.9  5,430.9 
2002  . . . . . . . . 341.2  2,158.3  2,499.4  1,075.7  1,406.3  4,981.4  226.9  470.5  127.7  5,806.4 
2003  . . . . . . . . 397.9  2,331.6  2,729.5  1,039.0  1,529.6  5,298.1 208.7  581.8  87.7  6,176.3 
2002 Jan. . . . . . 246.5  1,976.8  2,223.3  1,081.0  1,335.0  4,639.3  216.2  416.6  141.8  5,413.9 
Feb.  . . . . 240.3  1,972.2  2,212.5  1,076.8  1,339.1  4,628.4  221.1  427.0  138.8  5,415.2 
March  . . 254.3  1,984.4  2,238.7  1,088.5  1,343.1  4,670.2  229.6  431.2  137.2  5,468.4 
Apr.  . . . . 261.7  2,016.5  2,278.1  1,092.1  1,336.1  4,706.3 228.1  437.5  134.7  5,506.6 
May  . . . . 273.8  2,016.7  2,290.5  1,099.6  1,338.1  4,728.2  234.8  442.6  144.0  5,549.6 
June  . . . . 285.7  2,064.1  2,349.8  1,074.9  1,343.5  4,768.2  229.6  439.2  132.8  5,569.6 
July . . . . . 296.6  2,031.5  2,328.1  1,083.7  1,346.5  4,758.3  228.8  450.3  125.5  5,562.7 
Aug.  . . . . 301.1  2,000.3  2,301.5  1,096.9  1,351.9  4,750.3  236.5  463.4  126.5  5,576.7 
Sept. . . . . 306.7  2,057.8  2,364.4  1,073.6  1,354.1  4,792.1  238.3  460.4  131.3  5,622.7 
Oct.  . . . . 313.9  2,041.2  2,355.1  1,093.7  1,362.2  4,811.0  235.6  463.1  133.7  5,643.4 
Nov. . . . . 321.4  2,093.1  2,414.5  1,086.3  1,374.6  4,875.5  229.6  477.6  131.1  5,713.8 
Dec. . . . . 341.2  2,158.3  2,499.4  1,075.7  1,406.3  4,981.4  226.9  470.5  127.7  5,806.4 
2003 Jan. . . . . . 312.1  2,128.7  2,440.8  1,077.2  1,405.5  4,923.5  232.8  534.9  109.2  5,800.5 
Feb.  . . . . 319.3  2,131.9  2,451.2  1,079.6  1,420.7  4,951.5  233.3  547.2  109.0  5,841.1 
March  . . 327.2  2,170.3  2,497.5  1,072.9  1,435.8  5,006.2  224.0  550.8  99.4  5,880.3 
Apr.  . . . . 336.3  2,190.9  2,527.2  1,082.1  1,443.1  5,052.4  230.5  563.0  123.9  5,969.8 
May  . . . . 343.8  2,217.7  2,561.5  1,097.4  1,450.5  5,109.4  231.7  571.1  105.0  6,017.2 
June  . . . . 351.0  2,254.4  2,605.4  1,060.6  1,464.0  5,130.1  215.0  571.0  97.0  6,013.1 
July . . . . . 361.5  2,223.3  2,584.8  1,064.1  1,475.3  5,124.3  219.9  585.6  90.9  6,020.6 
Aug.  . . . . 362.7  2,210.5  2,573.2  1,070.1  1,482.7  5,126.0  217.1  587.8  89.6  6,020.5 
Sept. . . . . 364.8  2,250.7  2,615.6  1,038.6  1,482.8  5,136.9  211.5  576.9  91.3  6,016.6 
Oct.  . . . . 371.3  2,249.1  2,620.4  1,049.6  1,487.9  5,157.9  224.7  582.3  100.9  6,065.8 
Nov. . . . . 379.2  2,288.6  2,667.8  1,043.5  1,494.8  5,206.1  224.7  584.7  101.0  6,116.5 
Dec. . . . . 397.9  2,331.6  2,729.5  1,039.0  1,529.6  5,298.1  208.7  581.8  87.7  6,176.3 
2004 Jan. . . . . . 389.1  2,314.0  2,703.1  1,021.3  1,547.2  5,271.6  214.6  591.6  91.0  6,168.8 
Feb.  . . . . 393.5  2,310.3  2,703.8  1,016.0  1,553.8  5,273.6  228.6  599.2  91.2  6,192.6 
March  . . 399.5  2,347.8  2,747.3  1,004.7  1,559.2  5,311.1  217.5  600.6  89.3  6,218.6 
Apr.  . . . . 409.3  2,363.2  2,772.5  1,005.7  1,567.5  5,345.6  225.5  611.5  94.3  6,276.9 
May*  . . . 416.5  2,370.3  2,786.8  1,012.7  1,573.3  5,372.9  221.6  609.6  88.3  6,292.3 
1 Monetary aggregates comprise monetary liabilities of MFIs and central government (Postal Savings Bank, Ministry of Finance) vis-à-vis non-MFI euro area residents
excluding central government. 
2 Euro area-11 up to end-2000. Euro area-12 from 1 January 2001 onwards. 
3 M3 and its components do not include non-euro area residents' holdings of money market fund units, money market paper and debt securities with an initial
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2000  . . . . . . . 61.2 13.3 47.9 28.9 2.0 18.515 .4 0.2 126.2
2001  . . . . . . . 70.8 16.1 54.7 29.4 2.4 24.2 9.7 0.1 136.7
2002  . . . . . . . 71.7 15.2 56.5 28.9 2.3 20.0 10.7 0.2 133.8
2003  . . . . . . . 79.517.6 61.9 32.3 2.0 10.8 15 .7 0.5140.8
2002 Jan. . . . . . 69.2 14.3 54.9 26.5 2.4 23.9 9.8 0.1 131.9
Feb.  . . . . 68.9 13.8 55.1 27.3 2.4 23.0 9.4 0.1 131.1
March  . . 67.4 12.55 4.9 27.2 2.4 24.2 9.3 0.1 130.7
Apr.  . . . . 69.3 13.7 55.6 26.9 2.4 22.9 8.9 0.0 130.4
May  . . . . 69.0 13.3 55.7 26.6 2.4 22.8 8.9 0.0 129.8
June  . . . . 70.6 14.2 56.4 26.0 2.3 22.6 8.7 0.0 130.2
July . . . . . 70.8 14.3 56.5 26.0 2.3 22.5 8.9 0.0 130.6
Aug.  . . . . 71.3 14.1 57.2 26.3 2.3 22.8 8.9 0.1 131.7
Sept. . . . . 72.3 14.7 57.6 25.4 2.3 22.9 9.1 0.1 132.2
Oct.  . . . . 70.0 13.55 6.526.6 2.3 23.2 9.0 0.1 131.2
Nov. . . . . 69.1 13.3 55.8 27.3 2.3 22.0 9.1 0.2 130.0
Dec. . . . . 71.7 15.2 56.5 28.9 2.3 20.0 10.7 0.2 133.8
2003 Jan. . . . . . 70.3 14.2 56.1 28.9 2.2 20.2 12.0 0.2 133.7
Feb.  . . . . 71.8 14.4 57.4 27.1 2.2 19.2 12.9 0.2 133.5
March  . . 72.514.9 5 7.6 27.3 2.2 16.8 14.1 0.2 133.2
Apr.  . . . . 72.7 14.6 58.1 28.7 2.2 16.3 14.4 0.3 134.7
May  . . . . 71.9 14.5 57.4 28.8 2.0 15.7 14.7 0.3 133.4
June  . . . . 74.9 16.7 58.2 29.7 2.1 13.5 15.7 0.4 136.3
July . . . . . 72.9 15.8 57.1 32.0 2.1 13.0 15.8 0.4 136.3
Aug.  . . . . 74.0 16.1 57.9 33.0 2.2 12.2 15.7 0.4 137.5
Sept. . . . . 74.9 17.1 57.8 32.7 2.1 12.0 15.6 0.4 137.7
Oct.  . . . . 74.0 16.2 57.8 33.3 2.1 11.8 15.6 0.5 137.3
Nov. . . . . 74.1 15.4 58.7 32.9 2.1 11.6 15.5 0.5 136.7
Dec. . . . . 79.517.6 61.9 32.3 2.0 10.8 15 .7 0.5140.8
2004 Jan. . . . . . 79.517.2 61.6 32.5 2.1 10.6 15 .2 0.5139.7
Feb.  . . . . 79.6 17.3 62.3 32.1 2.1 10.515 .2 0.5139.9
March  . . 82.1 17.8 64.3 31.8 2.1 9.515 .8 0.4 141.6
Apr.  . . . . 81.4 17.8 63.6 33.52.2 9.1 15 .9 0.4 142.5
May  . . . . 82.5 17.0 65.5 32.2 2.1 8.9 15.6 0.4 141.8
1 The Greek contribution begins upon Greece’s entry into the euro area (1 January 2001). For statistical reasons, however, the data on monetary aggregates were extended
to cover previous years as well.
2 Including savings deposits in currencies other than the euro.
3 The Greek M3 (and likewise any euro area national M3) can no longer be accurately calculated, since part of the quantity of euro banknotes and coins that have been
put into circulation in a euro area country is held by residents of other euro area countries and/or by non-residents. Due to these technical problems, the compilation of
the Greek M0, M1, M2 and M3 was interrupted in January 2003.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table III.2
Greek contribution to the main monetary aggregates of the euro area1
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2000  . . . . . . . . . . . 90,737.8 73,720.2 17,017.6 11,007.0 50,917.8 28,813.0
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . 101,809.5 79,566.0 22,243.5 13,385.2 58,323.1 30,101.1
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . 104,761.1 87,732.3 17,028.8 13,367.3 60,406.1 30,987.7
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . 115,750.1 98,119.3 17,630.8 15,395.8 65,141.1 35,213.2
2002 Jan. . . . . . . . . 97,542.0 78,693.6 18,848.4 11,839.1 58,355.2 27,347.7
Feb.  . . . . . . . 98,302.4 79,029.9 19,272.4 11,356.7 58,674.4 28,271.3
March . . . . . . 96,741.8 77,970.2 18,771.6 10,267.55 8,309.6 28,164.7
Apr.  . . . . . . . 98,685.7 80,274.3 18,411.5 11,584.4 58,979.2 28,122.2
May  . . . . . . . 97,779.9 79,934.6 17,845.3 10,795.2 59,174.0 27,810.7
June  . . . . . . . 98,751.5 81,549.4 17,202.1 11,758.3 59,654.1 27,339.2
July . . . . . . . . 99,132.9 81,816.4 17,316.4 11,888.0 59,768.1 27,476.8
Aug.  . . . . . . . 99,924.1 82,255.7 17,668.4 11,656.2 60,475.4 27,792.5
Sept. . . . . . . . 101,076.4 84,497.2 16,579.2 12,328.6 61,820.2 26,927.6
Oct.  . . . . . . . 100,492.7 83,175.9 17,316.8 11,399.8 60,572.9 28,519.9
Nov.  . . . . . . . 100,771.6 83,612.4 17,159.2 11,686.3 59,933.8 29,151.4
Dec.  . . . . . . . 104,761.1 87,732.3 17,028.8 13,367.3 60,406.1 30,987.7
2003 Jan. . . . . . . . . 102,687.7 85,423.3 17,264.4 11,703.0 59,707.7 31,277.0
Feb.  . . . . . . . 102,455.9 85,527.5 16,928.4 12,419.8 60,981.4 29,054.7
March . . . . . . 103,684.4 86,637.517,046.9 12,996.7 61,203.6 29,484.0
Apr.  . . . . . . . 105,407.4 87,642.8 17,764.6 12,664.5 61,690.6 31,052.2
May  . . . . . . . 104,593.8 86,997.3 17,596.5 12,586.4 60,809.6 31,197.8
June  . . . . . . . 108,637.590,199.0 18,438.514,702.7 61,700.5 32,234.3
July . . . . . . . . 108,694.9 89,934.1 18,760.8 13,670.6 60,471.2 34,553.1
Aug.  . . . . . . . 110,793.2 91,498.3 19,294.9 14,035.9 61,242.3 35,515.0
Sept. . . . . . . . 111,384.5 92,881.7 18,502.8 14,958.4 61,151.5 35,274.5
Oct.  . . . . . . . 111,068.9 92,207.8 18,861.1 14,024.4 61,020.536,024.0
Nov.  . . . . . . . 110,668.9 92,383.7 18,285.2 13,157.4 61,846.9 35,664.6
Dec.  . . . . . . . 115,750.1 98,119.3 17,630.8 15,395.8 65,141.1 35,213.2
2004 Jan. . . . . . . . . 114,996.0 96,977.6 18,018.4 14,874.7 64,645.4 35,476.0
Feb.  . . . . . . . 115,491.9 97,036.0 18,455.9 15,089.7 66,332.2 34,070.0
March . . . . . . 117,571.4 98,647.3 18,924.1 15,479.0 67,322.0 34,770.4
Apr.  . . . . . . . 118,835.4 99,526.4 19,309.0 15,687.6 66,697.8 36,450.0
May  . . . . . . . 118,645.4 99,905.7 18,739.7 14,995.6 68,548.9 35,100.9
1 Other Monetary Financial Institutions (OMFIs) comprise credit institutions (other than the Bank of Greece) and money market funds.
2 Including (until 31 December 2001) deposits in drachmas and the other euro legacy currencies.
3 Including blocked deposits.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.3
Greece: Deposits of domestic firms and households with OMFIs,1 by currency and type
(Outstanding balances in million euro, not seasonally adjusted)
Total
deposits
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1 Comprising manufacturing and mining.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.4
Domestic MFI loans to domestic enterprises and households, by branch of economic activity
(Balances in million euro)
2000 . . . . . . .  59,330.0 50,065.6 9,264.4 3,884.9 11,823.7 12,374.2 11,271.9 1,814.3 5,511.3 12,649.7
2001 . . . . . . .  74,027.4 66,722.6 7,304.8 3,724.2 12,614.9 15,524.3 15,652.2 2,171.3 7,852.0 16,488.5
2002 . . . . . . .  86,510.5 80,099.7 6,410.8 3,224.7 14,364.0 15,670.8 21,224.7 2,903.2 9,755.4 19,367.7
2003 . . . . . . .  101,178.1 95,649.4 5,528.7 3,082.7 15,865.1 16,514.4 26,534.2 3,488.2 12,409.6 23,283.9
2002 Jan. . . . .  73,982.0 66,648.1 7,333.9 3,230.0 12,435.1 15,174.6 16,024.7 2,236.0 7,783.7 17,097.9
Feb.. . . .  75,202.2 67,723.9 7,478.3 3,030.3 12,724.5 15,846.7 16,417.5 2,267.5 7,944.7 16,971.0
March . .  76,235.3 69,080.0 7,155.3 3,139.4 13,168.1 15,788.0 16,891.9 2,316.4 8,129.8 16,801.7
Apr.. . . .  76,958.0 69,886.9 7,071.1 3,196.1 12,801.1 15,939.4 17,362.1 2,341.0 8,301.2 17,017.1
May  . . .  78,009.6 71,192.8 6,816.8 3,193.0 12,912.6 16,064.7 17,721.8 2,372.2 8,508.3 17,237.0
June . . .  79,960.9 73,475.3 6,485.6 3,167.7 13,360.0 16,516.2 18,194.3 2,414.5 8,678.1 17,630.1
July . . . .  81,233.9 74,622.8 6,611.1 3,167.7 13,720.8 16,570.9 18,759.9 2,411.6 8,868.0 17,735.0
Aug. . . .  82,041.4 75,311.8 6,729.6 3,191.4 13,625.4 16,580.6 19,304.9 2,399.3 8,997.7 17,942.1
Sept. . . .  82,662.6 75,930.7 6,731.9 3,212.8 13,785.6 16,059.8 19,503.8 2,560.0 9,228.1 18,312.5
Oct. . . .  83,996.1 77,164.1 6,832.0 3,221.6 13,961.2 16,161.2 19,914.7 2,635.0 9,420.9 18,681.5
Nov. . . .  85,614.8 78,732.9 6,881.9 3,167.1 14,528.2 15,663.2 20,416.6 2,761.1 9,612.9 19,465.7
Dec. . . .  86,510.5 80,099.7 6,410.8 3,224.7 14,364.0 15,670.8 21,224.7 2,903.2 9,755.4 19,367.7
2003 Jan. . . . .  88,241.8 81,751.6 6,490.2 2,964.2 14,529.2 16,321.5 21,599.4 2,978.4 9,884.9 19,964.2
Feb.. . . .  88,787.7 82,332.2 6,455.5 2,980.5 14,485.6 16,310.3 22,062.6 3,049.0 10,023.3 19,876.4
March . .  89,363.0 83,075.2 6,287.8 2,994.0 14,422.3 16,053.5 22,366.8 3,095.5 10,247.3 20,183.6
Apr.. . . .  90,770.3 84,710.6 6,059.7 3,043.0 14,565.0 16,113.4 22,747.1 3,149.2 10,344.7 20,807.9
May  . . .  92,497.1 86,811.4 5,685.7 3,027.6 14,866.7 16,488.6 23,183.1 3,085.8 10,432.6 21,412.7
June . . .  94,344.1 88,447.4 5,896.7 3,062.3 15,165.2 16,139.3 23,705.7 3,201.0 10,600.9 22,469.7
July . . . .  96,253.7 90,203.0 6,050.7 3,062.9 15,674.1 16,307.5 24,267.2 3,207.5 10,871.8 22,862.7
Aug. . . .  97,350.8 91,177.5 6,173.3 3,102.1 15,681.4 16,700.8 24,573.2 3,255.1 11,075.2 22,963.0
Sept. . . .  97,747.2 91,865.5 5,881.7 3,103.0 15,544.4 16,612.9 25,043.9 3,278.1 11,301.1 22,863.8
Oct. . . .  98,403.4 92,480.6 5,922.8 3,117.3 15,481.2 16,393.0 25,559.5 3,321.0 11,670.4 22,861.0
Nov. . . .  99,829.3 94,044.9 5,784.4 3,093.6 15,780.9 16,633.3 25,808.6 3,392.4 12,063.2 23,057.3
Dec. . . .  101,178.1 95,649.4 5,528.7 3,082.7 15,865.1 16,514.4 26,534.2 3,488.2 12,409.6 23,283.9
2004 Jan. . . . .  102,748.9 96,982.9 5,766.0 3,055.4 16,005.1 16,822.7 26,902.8 3,536.8 12,690.8 23,735.3
Feb.. . . .  103,899.7 98,214.0 5,685.7 3,042.0 15,948.2 17,060.8 27,334.5 3,587.7 13,041.9 23,884.6
March . .  105,263.2 99,372.4 5,890.8 3,095.5 15,831.8 17,012.4 27,894.2 3,661,6 13,442.3 24,325.4
Apr.. . . .  106,447.1 100,530.0 5,917.1 3,150.5 15,734.1 17,134.7 28,465.8 3,703.2 13,798.6 24,460.2













ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 23  7/04 113
Table πππ.5
ECB and Bank of Greece interest rates
(Percentages per annum)
1999 1 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 1999 14 Jan. 11.50 9.75 12.00 13.50
4 Jan.2 2.753.00 3.25 21 Oct. 11.00 9.75 11.5 0 13.00
22 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 16 Dec. 10.25 9.25 10.75 12.25
9 Apr. 1.50 2.50 3.50 27 Dec. 10.25 9.00 10.75 11.50
5Nov. 2.00 3.00 4.00
2000 4 Feb. 2.253.254.25 2000 27 Jan. 9.50 8.50 9.75 11.00
17 March 2.50 3.50 4.50 9 March 8.75 8.00 9.25 10.25
28 Apr. 2.75 3.75 4.75 20 Apr.  8.00 7.50 8.75 9.50
9 June 3.254.255 .25 29 June  7.25 – 8.259.00
28 June3 3.25 4.25 5.25 6 Sept. 6.50 – 7.50 8.25
1 Sept. 3.50 4.50 5.50 15 ¡ov. 6.00 – 7.00 7.75
6 Oct. 3.75  4.75  5.75  29 ¡ov.  5.50 – 6.50 7.25
13 Dec.  4.75 – 5.75 6.50
27 Dec.  3.75– 4.75 5 .75
2001 11 May 3.50  4.50  5.50 
31 Aug.  3.25  4.25  5.25 
18 Sept. 2.753.754.75
9 ¡ov. 2.253.254.25
2002 6 Dec. 1.752.753.75
2003 7 March 1.50 2.50 3.50
6 June 1.00 2.00 3.00
With
effect from1
























1 The date refers to the deposit and marginal lending facilities. For main refinancing operations, unless otherwise indicated, changes in the rate are effective from the first
operation following the date indicated. The change on 18 September 2001 was effective on that same day.
2 On 22 December 1998 the ECB announced that, as an exception measure between 4 and 21 January 1999, a narrow corridor of 50 basic points would be applied between
the interest rate for the marginal lending facility and that for the deposit facility, aimed at facilitating the transition of market participants to the new regime.
3 Until 21 June 2000: fixed rate tenders, from 28 June 2000: minimum bid rate in variable rate tenders.
4 On 29 June 2000 the second tier of the deposit facility was abolished; the interest rate thereafter applies to the unified deposit acceptance account.
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2000  . . . . . . . . . . . 6.22 5.99 5.98 6.05 6.10 6.26 6.35
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . 4.08 4.28 4.58 4.82 5.30 5.51 5.76
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . 3.50 4.06 4.45 4.78 5.12 5.24 5.52
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.34 2.82 3.37 3.83 4.27 4.32 4.91
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 3.48 4.27 4.51 4.95 5.24 5.36 5.55
Feb. . . . . . . . . 3.59 4.37 4.73 5.07 5.31 5.41 5.60
March  . . . . . . 3.81 4.58 5.00 5.27 5.51 5.58 5.78
Apr. . . . . . . . . 3.86 4.59 4.99 5.27 5.51 5.60 5.84
May . . . . . . . . 3.98 4.63 5.00 5.27 5.52 5.60 5.86
June . . . . . . . . 3.87 4.46 4.81 5.09 5.36 5.47 5.71
July  . . . . . . . . 3.65 4.23 4.59 4.90 5.21 5.33 5.57
Aug.  . . . . . . . 3.44 3.90 4.29 4.60 4.95 5.07 5.34
Sept.  . . . . . . . 3.24 3.59 3.98 4.33 4.73 4.86 5.18
Oct. . . . . . . . . 3.13 3.52 3.95 4.34 4.79 4.94 5.32
Nov.  . . . . . . . 3.02 3.40 3.87 4.26 4.76 4.90 5.33
Dec.  . . . . . . . 2.87 3.19 3.63 4.05 4.58 4.71 5.13
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 2.70 2.91 3.36 3.81 4.43 4.51 4.97
Feb. . . . . . . . . 2.50 2.65 3.31 3.89 4.24 4.27 4.83
March  . . . . . . 2.41 2.82 3.38 3.83 4.26 4.33 4.90
Apr. . . . . . . . . 2.46 2.99 3.50 3.96 4.38 4.45 5.02
May . . . . . . . . 2.252.64 3.12 3.5 7 4.02 4.09 4.73
June . . . . . . . . 2.02 2.38 2.88 3.33 3.81 3.86 4.57
July  . . . . . . . . 2.08 2.62 3.18 3.654.12 4.16 4.83
Aug.  . . . . . . . 2.28 2.98 3.51 3.91 4.29 4.34 4.90
Sept.  . . . . . . . 2.26 2.91 3.47 3.91 4.32 4.37 4.96
Oct. . . . . . . . . 2.30 2.94 3.52 3.95 4.38 4.43 5.02
Nov.  . . . . . . . 2.41 3.06 3.67 4.09 4.51 4.55 5.10
Dec.  . . . . . . . 2.38 2.97 3.58 4.02 4.45 4.49 5.04
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 2.21 2.71 3.34 3.81 4.37 4.33 4.94
Feb. . . . . . . . . 2.17 2.91 3.28 3.90 4.354.28 4.91
March  . . . . . . 2.06 2.71 3.26 3.71 4.17 4.43 4.75
Apr. . . . . . . . . 2.16 2.90 3.453.90 4.354.72 4.88
May . . . . . . . . 2.30 3.08 3.63 4.07 4.49 4.86 5.01
June . . . . . . . . 2.41 3.19 3.73 4.15 4.55 4.89 5.03
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.6
Greek government paper yields
(Percentages per annum, period averages)
Yield on government bonds
20-year 15-year 10-year 7-year 5-year 3-year
Yield on
one-year
Treasury bills PeriodStatistical section
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Period Savings2 Overnight1,2
2002 Sept.  . . . . . . . 1.57 1.57 3.13 0.84 3.36 3.22
Oct. . . . . . . . . 1.56 1.57 3.17 0.90 3.39 3.01
Nov.  . . . . . . . 1.55 1.55 3.15 0.84 3.46 3.17
Dec.  . . . . . . . 1.10 1.09 2.93 0.74 3.10 2.97
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 1.10 1.09 2.83 0.74 2.88 2.75
Feb. . . . . . . . . 1.10 1.10 2.73 0.752.79 2.71
March  . . . . . . 1.06 1.052.68 0.69 2.40 2.5 4
Apr. . . . . . . . . 1.051.04 2.70 0.73 2.67 2.46
May . . . . . . . . 1.04 1.03 2.61 0.70 2.66 2.45
June . . . . . . . . 0.82 0.81 2.44 0.55 2.41 2.10
July  . . . . . . . . 0.80 0.79 2.38 0.60 2.36 2.04
Aug.  . . . . . . . 0.81 0.79 2.29 0.52 2.31 2.00
Sept.  . . . . . . . 0.81 0.80 2.30 0.55 2.30 1.98
Oct. . . . . . . . . 0.87 0.852.27 0.62 2.37 1.98
Nov.  . . . . . . . 0.87 0.852.29 0.5 4 2.33 1.94
Dec.  . . . . . . . 0.87 0.86 2.22 0.59 2.35 1.98
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 0.88 0.86 2.26 0.55 2.18 1.99
Feb. . . . . . . . . 0.88 0.87 2.18 0.57 2.17 1.98
March  . . . . . . 0.89 0.87 2.29 0.54 2.13 1.95
Apr. . . . . . . . . 0.89 0.88 2.26 0.56 2.13 1.97
May . . . . . . . . 0.90 0.89 2.24 0.56 2.23 1.95
1 Weighted average of the current account rate and the savings deposit rate.
2 End-of-the-month rate.
3 Average monthly rate.





maturity of up to
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Greece: bank rates on new euro-denominated deposits of, and loans to, euro area residents






2002 Sept.  . . . . . . . 14.40 10.86 10.43 4.62 4.74 7.31 6.64 5.33
Oct. . . . . . . . . 14.51 10.69 10.45 4.65 4.81 7.28 6.37 4.98
Nov.  . . . . . . . 14.48 10.87 10.61 4.56 4.75 7.23 5.78 4.54
Dec.  . . . . . . . 14.54 10.58 10.45 4.42 4.61 7.23 5.76 4.50
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 14.71 10.46 10.17 4.53 4.77 7.15 5.53 4.39
Feb. . . . . . . . . 14.68 11.13 10.60 4.58 4.81 7.09 5.59 4.27
March  . . . . . . 14.66 10.82 10.76 4.58 4.87 7.04 5.37 4.06
Apr. . . . . . . . . 14.76 11.15 10.82 4.58 4.93 7.07 5.55 4.14
May . . . . . . . . 14.58 11.13 10.70 4.59 4.93 6.95 5.68 3.76
June . . . . . . . . 14.54 10.61 10.44 4.53 4.86 6.84 5.15 3.47
July  . . . . . . . . 14.24 10.41 10.33 4.37 4.66 6.70 5.06 3.68
Aug.  . . . . . . . 14.0510.24 10.37 4.48 4.76 6.67 4.95 3.60
Sept.  . . . . . . . 14.14 10.37 10.60 4.62 4.81 6.67 5.14 4.27
Oct. . . . . . . . . 14.22 10.57 10.58 4.57 4.81 6.68 5.24 4.68
Nov.  . . . . . . . 14.27 10.36 10.46 4.354.63 6.72 5 .14 3.66
Dec.  . . . . . . . 14.08 9.60 9.86 4.31 4.53 6.78 5.13 3.78
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 13.92 9.82 9.94 4.36 4.68 6.74 5.12 3.92
Feb. . . . . . . . . 13.97 9.94 9.99 4.354.63 6.855 .16 4.09
March  . . . . . . 14.00 9.44 9.87 4.37 4.63 7.13 4.88 3.45
Apr. . . . . . . . . 14.06 9.56 9.85 4.36 4.55 7.11 5.15 3.49
May . . . . . . . . 13.72 9.82 10.07 4.33 4.54 7.02 4.91 3.45
1 Weighted average of interest rates on loans to households through credit cards, open loans and current account overdrafts.
2 End-of-the-month rate.
3 Average monthly rate.
4 Weighted average of interest rates on corporate loans through credit lines and sight deposit overdrafts.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table πππ.7 (continued)
Greece: bank rates on new euro-denominated deposits of, and loans to, euro area residents
(Percentages per annum)
Consumer loans3
Loans to households Loans to non-financial corporations
With a floating rate oran initial


























to 1 yearStatistical section
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1 Central government1,2 7,102 10,535 2,259 4,669 6,543
– Government budget 6,674 10,842 3,244 5,843 7,608
(Ordinary badget)2 2,128 4,115 3,513 4,457 6,300
(Public investment budget) 4,546 6,727 –269 1,386 1,308
– OPEKEPE3 428 –307 –985–1,174 –1,065
Percentage of GDP 5.0 6.9 1.6 3.1 4.0
2 Public entities4 –1,657 –1,971 –1,099 –1,027 –366
– Financing of social security funds 44 135–118 38 –77
– Financing of local authorities 123 49 0 –26 –30
– Financing of other entities 39586 –16 116 397
– Liquid assets –2,219 –2,241 –965 –1,155 –656
Total (1+2)5 5,445 8,564 1,160 3,642 6,177
1 As shown by the movement of relevant accounts with the Bank of Greece, the Agricultural Bank of Greece and commercial banks.
2 Including the movement of public debt management accounts.
3 Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid. It replaced DICAGEP (Agricultural Markets Management Service) as of 3 September 2001.
4 Including their liabilities towards the banking system and, their bank deposits as well as their investment in Greek government paper intermediated exclusively by
the Bank of Greece; excluding other investment in securities, which nevertheless affects their cash surplus.
5Including the borrowing requirement of central government, as well as that of public entities as calculated on the basis of th e exclusive intermediation of the Bank
of Greece.
* Provisional data and estimates.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Table IV.1
Borrowing requirement of central government and public entities
(Million euro)
2002 2003* 2004* 2003 2002
Year January-AprilECONOMIC BULLETIN, 23  7/04 118
Table IV.2
Financing of borrowing requirement of central government and public entities
(Million euro)
1 Including sales of securities in the secondary market. For the definition of OMFIs, see Table III, footnote 1.
2 Net borrowing is equal to the change in the outstanding balance of loans less the change in central government and public entities deposits with OMFIs.
3 Concerns changes in the balance of government’s accounts with the Bank of Greece and not central bank financing.
* Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Greece.






















Greek government paper held by OMFIs1 –2,476 –45.5 –9,268 –108.2 156 13.4 –5,176 –142.1 –1,997 –32.3
Greek government paper held by private
investors and enterprises1 1,159 21.3 814 9.5 917 79.1 1,988 54.6 587 9.5
Net borrowing from OMFIs2 650 11.9 117 1.4 –5,160 –444.8 –1,753 –48.1 –4,842 –78.4
Bank of Greece3 273 –5.0 –616 –7.2 189 16.3 –159 –4.4 –233 –3.8
Borrowing from non-residents 6,385 117.3 17,517 204.5 5,058 436.0 8,742 240.0 12,662 205.0
Total 5,445 100 8,564.0 100 1,160 100.0 3,642 100.0 6,177 100.0Statistical section
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